

PAULINISM:
A Contribution to the
HISTORY OF PRIMITIVE CHRISTIAN
THEOLOGY.

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CHAPTER VIII.

THE ORIGINAL POSITION OF PAULINISM TOWARDS JEWISH CHRISTIANITY.

HAVING investigated in detail the gospel preached by Paul, with its peculiar characteristics, we shall proceed to ascertain what place it occupied in the history of primitive Christianity. We have repeatedly had occasion to remark that it differed on points of essential importance from the Jewish-Christian view; it need not surprise us, therefore, to see a conflict break out on several points between Paulinism and Jewish Christianity. The Epistles to the Galatians and to the Corinthians, whose main purpose is the defence of Paul's apostolic work against his Judaizing opponents, are especially calculated to give us a clear and true insight into the relation between the two parties. (We cannot depend upon the Acts of the Apostles as a source of information on this matter, since the relations of parties in the primitive Church are there viewed in the light of later dogmatic presuppositions, and adjusted accordingly.) The subject of the *Epistle to the Galatians* is partly the independence of the apostolic work of Paul, partly the right of an independent Gentile-Christian body to belong to the Christian community, without at the same time becoming Jews, as the opponents of Paul demanded, by subjecting themselves to the law, especially to circumcision—a disputed question, which eventually led to the

laying down of the principles on which the validity of the Mosaic law among Christians depended. In the Epistles to the Corinthians the disputes about the law fall into the background, as the opponents of Paul in the Gentile-Christian community of Corinth had directed their attack in the first instance less against the contents of Paul's Gospel, than against his claims to apostolical authority. The contest of principles, therefore, takes here the form of personal attack and defence. In the *Epistle to the Romans*, again, the personal element gives place to the actual setting forth of the doctrine of Paul, not, however, polemically, as in the Epistle to the Galatians, but rather in calm and positive development, and, moreover, with a decidedly conciliatory spirit towards the Jewish Christians. The *Epistle to the Philippians*, finally, shows the mixed feelings of the departing Apostle with regard to his opponents, the recognition of their Christianity being combined with irritation at their personal behaviour to him. We shall, therefore, have to distinguish three phases in the relations of Paul to the Jewish Christians, the contest about the law (Epistle to the Galatians), the contest about the apostolic office of Paul (the Epistles to the Corinthians), and the adoption of a conciliatory course regarding the question of principles (Epistles to the Romans and Philippians).

THE CONTEST ABOUT THE LAW

In order to prove to the Galatians that his gospel was independent of human authority, and depended on divine revelation, Paul relates to them how, after his conversion, he had not communicated with flesh and blood, nor gone to Jerusalem to see those who had been Apostles before him, but had withdrawn for three years to Arabia and Damascus; after which he had travelled to Jerusalem to see Peter, and remained with him fifteen days, but of the other Apostles he had seen none, except-

ing James, the brother of the Lord; he had therefore remained personally unknown to the other Apostles and to the community until the journey which he made to Jerusalem fourteen years later. The Apostle lays great stress upon these facts, because they prove that at the commencement of his exercise of Apostleship, and for the first fourteen years of it, he had not only been officially independent of the community at Jerusalem, but had in fact been wholly unconnected with it. The fact that he not only did not seek any connection with it, but apparently avoided it, clearly reveals the depth of the chasm by which he felt himself separated from the primitive community, and his gospel from theirs. But, nevertheless, he could not continue for any length of time thus to ignore the community at Jerusalem, because this community itself took up an aggressive attitude against his labours in the mixed community of Antioch, and that with so much success, that he saw the entire work on which he had hitherto laboured in danger of being undone. It was the fear that, in consequence of the reaction set on foot at Jerusalem, his running (striving) in the service of preaching the gospel to the Gentiles might be in vain, or had already been in vain (*μήπως εἰς κενὸν τρέχω ἢ ἔδραμον*, ii. 2), which finally, after the lapse of fourteen years, induced Paul to try to come to an understanding with the Christians at Jerusalem regarding "the gospel which he preached among the Gentiles;" that is to say, regarding the principle of his Gentile Christianity. The impulse which issued in this resolution, at which the Apostle evidently arrived with reluctance, was given by a "revelation," a recurrence of that miraculous form in which the overwhelming conviction of a higher necessity burst out through the struggles and oscillations of the human soul—psychologically the same phenomenon as we have already seen in the *ἀποκάλυψις* at his conversion (i. 12, 16: see Introduction).

We see from ii. 3—5, what was the main point at issue in this conference. Paul took the uncircumcised Gentile Christian Titus with him, in order to show by this example how unreason-

able it would be to yield to the extravagant demands of the Jewish Christians, who had crept into the community at Antioch as false brethren, in order to destroy the freedom which they had, and which they used there in Christ (on the ground of the faith of Christ), and to make slaves of those who were free. For these false brethren who had forced themselves in demanded nothing less than that the Gentile Christians should accept circumcision, and with it the observance of the Mosaic law. These demands, which had already been made in Antioch, and which excited the apprehension of the Apostle for the very existence of the Christian community that he had gathered from the Gentiles, they repeated in conjunction with those who held the same opinions still more strenuously in Jerusalem, the head quarters of this party. "But," says the Apostle, "we yielded subjection to them not for one hour, in order that the truth of the gospel might stand fast in you." The Apostle saw, therefore, in the demand that the Gentile Christians should be circumcised, an attack upon the principle of the gospel; to give way in such a situation was impossible, for it would have been in his eyes a denial in principle of evangelical truth. As, however, the demands of the Judaistic "false brethren" derived all their weight and their power to become dangerous from the support of the primitive community, and of the "influential persons," the men of authority, the older Apostles and James, the Apostle Paul felt the necessity of establishing the truth of his Gentile-Christian gospel against any further opposition, by means of an understanding with these pillars of the primitive Church. He narrates the result of these negotiations in vers. 6—10.

As regards these "influential persons" (*δοκοῦντες*)—by whose antecedents (as having been the immediate disciples of Jesus) he by no means allowed himself to be awed, for God does not regard the person (in matters of faith external advantages of a personal kind decide nothing)—they had nothing to impart to him (*προσενέθη*, cf. *προσανέθη*, i. 16); they were unable to teach him anything new, or to overthrow or limit his gospel of freedom

by a gospel of circumcision. But, on the contrary, as they saw that he had been entrusted with the gospel of the uncircumcision, just as Peter with that of the circumcision (for they were compelled to regard the actual success of his work amongst the Gentile Christians, which was not inferior to that of Peter's work among the Jewish Christians, as a divine judgment, by which God acknowledged Paul's work to be well-pleasing to Him)—as they recognized in this the favour bestowed on Paul (the being entrusted with the preaching of the gospel to the Gentiles), they, that is to say, those who were accounted pillars of the Church, James, Cephas, and John, extended to him and Barnabas the hand of fellowship, on this ground of peace and reconciliation—that he should go to the Gentiles, but they should go only to the Jews, care being taken to provide one connecting link between two so widely diverging parts, namely, that Paul, with the communities he had founded, should think of the Jewish-Christian poor. Thus Paul had certainly gained the great object which lay nearest to his heart—the *freedom of his Gentile Christians from the Mosaic law had been admitted by the heads of the primitive community*. But let us note in what sense and on what grounds this admission had been made. They made it only on the ground of the actual success of the Apostle of the Gentiles, which success they could not help regarding as a judgment of God, as a proof that God had blessed the work of the Apostle, and therefore that it was well-pleasing to Him. But in bowing to this judgment of God, they were far from recognizing the dogmatic principles which Paul made the ground of his mission to the heathen, or sharing his conviction of the abrogation of the law by the death of Christ, which was the foundation and corner-stone of Paul's Gentile-Christian gospel. For, had they done this, a two-fold consequence must necessarily and immediately have forced itself upon them. In the first place, the law would have been abrogated not only for the Gentile, but also for the Jewish Christians; and secondly, this abrogation of the difference in principle between Jew and Gentile would have re-

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moved all grounds for confining their apostolic work to the former, and they, as well as Paul, would consequently have had the duty of devoting themselves to the great work of the mission to the heathen. They did in fact, however, admit neither of these consequences; they determined for their part to have nothing whatever to do with the mission to the heathen; not because they merely did not recognize this as a personal duty in their own case, but because they looked upon it as something actually contrary to their duty, and forbidden; for in such matters there can be no middle way, no indifferent course, but only one alternative of a command urging them to do it, or a prohibition keeping them from it. But that the older Apostles accepted the latter alternative, is made very clear by their maintaining, in opposition to Paul, that the law which made the division between Jew and Gentile was perpetually binding. This is also the only supposition upon which the account that follows of what happened at Antioch is intelligible.

Hence we may now infer with tolerable accuracy in what sense the compact, ver. 9, was understood by each of the parties. *Paul*, in the first place, was contented to see that by it at least the future of his gospel was secured for the Gentile Christians, that these were free from the Mosaic law, and consequently the work which he himself as an Apostle had especially undertaken was protected in its integrity; but how he should behave with regard to the Jewish Christians, he manifestly allowed to remain in uncertainty;¹ he abstained, on the one hand, from

¹ This is overlooked by those who make out that the opposing views in their complete distinctness, which was not fully developed until a later period, came into collision here, and who thus needlessly overstrain the difference between Paul's account of this proceeding and that contained in the Acts of the Apostles. That Paul cannot at this time have extended the consequences of his views to the Jewish Christians, not only follows from his making no allusion in the whole course of his narration to any demands that went so far as this, but is the only supposition which naturally corresponds with the situation. He came to Jerusalem to obtain the recognition of his own work among the Gentile Christians, and to secure it from attacks that might have destroyed it. What was more natural than that, contented as he was with the admission of *this* claim, he should not have unnecessarily increased the difficulty of obtaining that which was of primary necessity to him, by pushing too far the converse

making any demand on this point, which would plainly have had no result but that of wounding the consciences of the Jewish Christians, and so diminishing the chances of reconciliation; and, on the other hand, avoided any concessions and promises that would have bound his own conscience, and that of his Gentile Christians or of the mixed communities, and have surrendered something of their right to the freedom of the gospel. It is thus quite possible (as is suggested, if not distinctly proved, by the behaviour of the mixed community at Antioch) that Paul, being satisfied with the recognition of the freedom of the Gentile Christians, and leaving the question of the Jewish Christians in uncertainty, had more or less consciously the latent idea in his mind, that his principle of Christian freedom from the law, when once established among the Gentile majority of the Christian community, would gradually exhibit on the Jewish minority also its power of annulling and renovating the old. This hope, which, at all events, has been justified by the course of events, might all the more easily have suggested itself, even at that time, to a far-seeing mind. It is, however, no doubt equally possible that Paul at that time had not distinctly put to himself the question, what was to be done regarding the observance of the law by the Jewish Christians; that he had not yet drawn the consequences of his principle so far as to conceive the freedom of the Jewish Christians from the law as a possibility, still less as a necessity; for it was the later course of events which led him on to these consequences. However that may be, we may safely assert thus much to be clear, that in the negotia-

proposition which followed from it? And is it probable that the Judaizers would have stretched out the *ἐξουσίαν τῆς κοινῆς* to one who decidedly professed antinomianism? Their subsequent behaviour certainly does not support that view. Moreover, it would be difficult to account psychologically for the vacillating conduct of Peter at Antioch, if an explanation of principles, and with this of course a division of parties on the ground of recognized differences of principle, had previously taken place at Jerusalem. The whole scene at Antioch strikes us distinctly as the *first* collision of the opposing principles in their developed form. This also accounts for the profound silence maintained in the Acts of the Apostles with regard to this proceeding, while the author was able to relate—modified of course after his wont—the more harmless negotiations at Jerusalem.

tions and the agreement made at Jerusalem, Paul allowed the question of what was to be done with regard to the law in the case of the Jewish Christians to remain in abeyance; and that it was probably not raised in any other quarter. The older Apostles, on their side, had evidently understood the arrangement with Paul to mean that they—constrained by the success he had achieved—acknowledged his personal work among the Gentiles to be praiseworthy and pleasing to God; and promised to refrain from opposing or injuring it in any way, so long as it was confined to the Gentiles. *But this qualified personal recognition was at the same time an indirect refusal to recognize any of the dogmatic principles of Paul's gospel, and a rejection of each and every inference that might possibly be drawn from it, first with regard to the Jewish Christians, but further with regard to the character of the Messianic community regarded as a whole.* As to the Jewish Christians, it was taken for granted, without anything being said on the subject, that everything should remain as it was; and that consequently no inferences should be drawn from the freedom of the Gentile Christians from the law, to the abrogation of the law among the Jewish Christians. On this assumption depended the limitation of the work of the older Apostles to the Jews (for these limits could not be overstepped without a violation of the law); on this also depended the sending of the persons from Jerusalem to Antioch by James, and their influence on Peter, whose free behaviour before they came is thereby shown to have been an exception to the rule. But if the religious significance of the law remains, in the conviction of the Jewish Christians, after the agreement just what it was before, in spite of the personal recognition of Paul, then it is plain that the full claim to participation in the Messiah's kingdom remains attached to the law as the ground of all the covenant promises; whence it follows that they might look upon the Gentile Christians, as such, as being without the law, and not full members of the Messiah's community. So long as they remained Gentile Christians, i. e. so long as they did not accept

the law, they were regarded by the primitive community as only guests and strangers ("proselytes of the gate"), who might indeed become more closely connected with the Messiah's community, which was essentially Jewish and theocratic, and have a certain relative share in its blessings, as had already been foreseen by the prophets in their frequent utterances about the Gentiles partaking of Israel's salvation. But if these half citizens of the Messiah's kingdom wished to become full citizens, there remained no other course by which this could consistently be done, but that they should become members of the Jewish nation by submitting to circumcision. Is it possible that, at the conference at Jerusalem, those members of the primitive community who held the more decided views, at least one like James, had such an after-thought as this, and only befriended the mission of Paul to the Gentiles on the unexpressed supposition that Paul's work was but the *beginning*, which might and should at a future time be brought to full completion by the acceptance of the law on the part of the Gentile Christians? This conjecture will appear to be not improbable from the subsequent behaviour of the party of James.

According to the above account, then, the agreement made at Jerusalem proceeded on the understanding that each of the two parties should confine themselves to their own particular sphere, but that, within each of these spheres, matters should be kept just as they had hitherto been; the Gentile Christians should remain without the law, the Jewish Christians under the law. It is plain, however, that *this could not be a satisfactory issue, either dogmatically or practically. Dogmatically it was without a principle, and illogical*; for if a man could, like the converted heathen, be a Christian without becoming a Jew, then Christianity was something new, and specifically different from Judaism. But in that case it followed that the converted Jew, in order to be a true Christian, must cease to be a Jew, and must therefore free himself from the Mosaic law. Conversely, if the Jewish Christian, in spite of his having become a believer, nevertheless

continued to look upon the law as the undisturbed foundation and the *conditio sine qua non* of his expectation of Messianic salvation, then Christianity was only a filling up and completion of Judaism; and it followed in that case that the converted heathen, in order to be a true Christian, must first of all become a Jew and accept the Mosaic law. This alternative, which involves a principle, and is the only logical one, may perhaps have floated before the minds of the thorough-going champions of the two sides at Jerusalem, such as Paul and James; officially, however, it was ignored, and doubtless never occurred at all to the greater number, the moderate men like Peter and Barnabas, so long as the theoretical inconsistency did not make itself felt in a practical conflict. But this could not long be delayed. For the agreement made at Jerusalem was also practically unsatisfactory; for while it established a separation between Gentile and Jewish Christians with regard to the law, it took no notice of the actual existence of mixed communities. If the Jewish Christians in these were to stand fast in the observance of the law, they could have no communion with the Gentile Christians, who were not bound by the law. But this would break up the unity of the body of believers, and destroy the common Christian life, which rested essentially upon that unity. If this were to be avoided, and if the mixed community were to be maintained in its status of a united Christian body, it was absolutely necessary that one of its two parts should accommodate itself to the other; that either, therefore, the Gentile Christians should stoop to submit themselves to the law by which the others thought themselves bound, or that the Jewish Christians should determine to release themselves from the law, from which the others deemed themselves free. Which of these two events should actually occur could only be decided, in the absence of any solution of the question on principle, by the preponderance which happened to exist at the time in each case, whether of the numbers or of the personal consideration of the representatives of either party. It was therefore natural that a decision

of this kind, which depended, not on any principle, but on the fortuitous existence of personal motives, should be liable to be reversed, and that thus the same mixed community should at one time assume a Gentile-Christian attitude of freedom from the law, at another a Jewish-Christian attitude of submission to it; that as the weight of the personal authority of the more thorough-going spirits pressed more strongly in one or the other direction, the undecided ones should oscillate between the two, now accommodating themselves to their opponents, and now again demanding the same from them.

Now, in Gal. ii. 11—21, Paul relates to us a case of this kind, which happened in the community of *Antioch*, a case which is not only in the highest degree instructive as an example of the state of affairs at that time in a mixed community, but is especially significant, because this was apparently the occasion on which the question of principle, left in abeyance at the conference in Jerusalem, came forward for decision; and that in such a way as to bring to *open antagonism* the opposition of principles which had hitherto been more or less concealed. Peter had come to Antioch, and had at first, in accordance with the freer customs of this mixed community, which had remained under the personal influence of Paul, eaten at the same table with the Gentile Christians. But on the arrival of certain persons from James (who came from, i. e. were sent by, the followers and the party of James), he "dissembled," as Paul expresses it, and withdrew from the Gentile common meal, through fear of the men of the circumcision; an example which proved so infectious, that the other Jewish Christians also, and such a man as Barnabas among them, allowed themselves to be induced to dissemble with him. And now, in order that the unity of the life of the brethren might not be given up, these Jewish Christians appear to have put forth in some way to the Gentile Christians the extravagant claim that they should accommodate themselves to them, and "live as Jews." This unprincipled vacillation on the part of the Jewish Christians,

who at one time lived like the Gentiles, and at another time used moral compulsion at least to force the Gentiles to live like Jews, is now rebuked by Paul as "dissimulation." He certainly does not use this word here in the gross sense of conscious disloyalty to better convictions; for, in the first place, it is very improbable that all those Jewish Christians should have had such worthless moral characters as to act against a theoretically clear and acknowledged conviction, from mere dread of men; and, secondly, the speech of Paul which follows would by no means tally with such a supposition, since he speaks not a single syllable against the moral error of unprincipled action through the fear of men, but points out, in a theoretical explanation, the intellectual error of the want of a guiding principle, of half convictions and want of clearness in points of dogma. What Paul here brands in too strong language as "dissimulation," was, therefore, in fact only the uncertainty in practical action which is the natural and inevitable consequence of uncertainty and want of clearness in dogmatic thinking. That want of clearness with regard to the question of principle, whether Christianity stands in relation to Judaism as a new religion, and therefore involves the end of the Jewish law, or whether it is only the completion of Judaism and the keystone of the theocratic edifice which is supported by the law—this want of clearness, which was shared, if not by all who were present at the conference at Jerusalem, yet at least by the great majority of the moderate party represented by Peter, made it possible for Peter to take part at first in the freer customs of the Gentile Christians, in unsophisticated and unreflecting liberality of mind, and then again, as soon as his Jewish conscience was sharpened by the strict observers of the law, to fall back into legal bondage. The appearance in Antioch of the people from the party of James could not possibly have had this influence on Peter, if he had already, while at Jerusalem, freed himself consciously and in principle from the legal standpoint of this party, and raised himself to the height of Paul's freedom from the law; for in

that case the discussion with the opposite party at Jerusalem would already have led to a complete mutual understanding, and to a separation of the two parties; and the Christian conscience of Peter, already made aware of his freedom, would have been so thoroughly strengthened at Antioch by the freer spirit of brotherhood which prevailed there, that it would have been psychologically impossible for it to be overpowered by the champions of a theory, the principle of which he had already overcome. As, however, this latter event did happen, it is thus clearly proved that the above presupposition did not occur; that Peter had not freed himself consciously and in principle from the legal point of view; that he rather shared in principle the views of James; that his looser practice, therefore, had been an inconsistency with respect to his own theory, prompted by good feeling—an inconsistency regarding which his eyes had been opened and his conscience quickened by the appearance of the consistent representatives of the same theory, so that he was now frightened at the free action which he could not justify to himself dogmatically, and returned practically to the bondage of the legal point of view, which he had never dogmatically overcome.

Let us observe how Paul (ver. 15 f.), while blaming the conduct of Peter, at the same time condemns with trenchant arguments the whole standpoint of the Jewish Christians who held fast by the law. "We who are by nature (birth) Jews, and not sinners of the Gentiles" (Paul here places himself on the standpoint of his opponents whom he has to refute, and speaks from the Jewish way of looking upon the Gentiles), "being convinced that a man is not justified by works of the law, but by faith in Jesus Christ, we also have become believers in Christ Jesus, in order to be justified by faith in Christ, and not by works of the law; for by works of the law shall no flesh be justified." Thus far does the positive argument of the Apostle reach, in order to bring to the consciousness of his opponent the inconsistency of his holding fast by the law while he also believes in Christ. He

argues upon the Christian axiom which was admitted even by the Jewish Christians, that the sufficient ground of justification did not consist of works of the law, but of faith in Christ, for, without this presupposition, it would be a groundless and unreasonable act for a Jew to become a believer. The Apostle here stands on ground common to both, inasmuch as this conception of the Christian consciousness, "A man is *not* justified by works of the law, but by faith in Christ," does not directly exclude that juxtaposition of works of the law and faith which constitutes the Jewish-Christian conception; but from this Jewish-Christian standpoint of an obscure coupling together of works of the law and faith, he now brings his adversary over to a logically consistent simple alternative of *one* or the *other*.—If we have become believers in the conviction that justification is not to be attained until we have done so, then we confess by that very act that righteousness actually comes *only from faith*, and *not* (in any respect whatever) from works of the law. In this very conviction, that for all mankind, whether Jew or Gentile, in consequence of the weakness of the flesh which is common to all men, righteousness by the law is a thing impossible, we have sought righteousness in the way of faith as the only possible way besides that of works, from which this is an entirely different way of salvation. What ground can there be then to justify our still clinging to the law, at the same time that we are following this new way of salvation, which alone leads to the end? Upon this Paul now allows his opponents to speak, and throws their main objection to his standpoint into the pregnant conclusion drawn by them in these words: "*But if we, while we sought righteousness in Christ, were ourselves also found to be sinners*"¹ (equivalent, according to the Jewish use of the word, as

¹ I dissent from the traditional view, and hold with Meyer, Holsten, Lipsius (Z. f. w. Th. 1861, p. 73 f.), in interpreting *ei—ἐπιθήμεν*, as not conditional of a mere hypothesis, but indicative of an actual fact; but I differ so far from these commentators in their further explanation of *ἀμαρτωλοὶ ἐπιθήμεν*, that I refer these words not to the "confession of natural sinfulness," which appears to me far-fetched and scarcely consistent with the context, but to the fact immediately in question, that

in ver. 15, to Gentiles who are without the law), *then is Christ therefore a minister (a promoter) of sin!*" We then have his own answer, which refutes the objection of his adversaries, and then passes on to his decisive attack upon them—"God forbid! If I indeed build again what I have destroyed, then (certainly) I acknowledge myself to be a transgressor (which is just your case, but this inference in no way affects me). For I have by means of the law (attained to such a condition, that I have) died to the law, in order that I may live to God; I have been crucified with Christ," &c. Paul thus defended his own standpoint against the specific objection of the Jewish Christians, and showed the utter worthlessness of this objection for those who stand on the ground of Pauline doctrine. The reproach which the strict Jewish Christians of the party of James threw in the teeth of the Jewish Christians of the Pauline party who had emancipated themselves from the law at Antioch, proceeded on the supposition that they who sought to become righteous in Christ had been found, on the contrary, to be persons who had put themselves on the same footing with the Gentiles, and were therefore sinners, as the Gentiles were sinners, so that their faith in Christ had thus served for the furtherance, not of their righteousness, but, on the contrary, of their unrighteousness, namely, of their living in sin without the law, like the Gentiles. It is clear that the whole weight of this reproach rested solely on the

the Jewish Christians of Paul's party at Antioch had been found to be persons who had placed themselves on the same footing as the Gentiles, and had thereby proved themselves—to the consciousness of a believer in the law—to be themselves sinners, as the Gentiles were. The conclusion must necessarily have been drawn from this by the believers in the law, that these emancipated Jewish Christians, instead of finding perfect righteousness in Christ, as they imagined, had, on the contrary, lost all righteousness through their faith in Christ; so that Christ, instead of being to them the cause of righteousness, had rather become an occasion of unrighteousness. This conclusion was quite correct on the assumption of the Jewish-Christian axiom—no righteousness without the law, but for that very reason it was to Paul a mere *petitio principii*, of which he exposes the fallacy by reducing the ambiguous notions *ἀμαρτία* and *ἀναγνώρις* to the more definite *παραβάσις* and *παραβίασις*, which only have any meaning where the law, while it is broken by action, yet is (still or becomes again) theoretically recognized as a law which gives the standard, but have no meaning where this recognition is entirely wanting.

different position. He has been convinced by the law itself of the impossibility of righteousness by the law (inasmuch as the perception of sin comes by the law, Rom. iii. 20); he has died to the law, has entirely released himself from it, no longer, therefore, acknowledges it as the standard by which he is to pass a moral judgment on himself, so that being without the law would be sin or Gentile unrighteousness; on the contrary, he is conscious that in being without the law he has not only not become godless, but that he has died to the law precisely for the great purpose that he may henceforth live wholly with his entire self to God; he knows that his dying to the law is being crucified with Christ, whereby the natural self, which being fleshly could never have attained to righteousness by works of the law, is done away, and Christ, the holy spirit of the Son of God, has come to life, and gained the mastery in him. Thus the Apostle, already intimates here, that which he afterwards (v. 13 f.) expands into further detail, that Christian freedom from the law is by no means, as the Jewish Christians thought, a falling back into Gentile godlessness and fleshly caprice, but the exact opposite of this, namely, living for God and in Christ (as has been explained in greater detail above, in Chap. v.). Having thus destroyed the force of the chief objection of the Judaizers as against his freedom from the law (and in doing so very ably turned the point of it against the illogical moderate party of Peter), he now finally proceeds to his attack upon the principle of Jewish Christianity. The principle of the law, without which the Jewish Christians are unable to conceive any Christianity, is so far from harmonizing with the gospel of God's favour and of faith, that it distinctly tends to set aside the favour of God, so that we have only the choice either of the law without favour, or of favour without the law (cf. v. 4 and Rom. xi. 6). But when once this distinct alternative has been established, in the place of the Jewish-Christian combination of the law and favour, no true believer in Christ can be left any longer in doubt as to his decision, "*I set not aside the favour of God* (which would be done

by holding fast to that heterogeneous way of salvation by the law); *for if righteousness were brought about by the law* (if the law had any significance whatever, were it ever so partial, in regard to the attainment of salvation), *then Christ would have died in vain*" (there would have been no occasion for a new means of salvation by the reconciling death of Christ). The Apostle aptly concludes his argument against the Judaism of the primitive Apostles with this retort, in which the fundamental thought of his gospel is as distinctly expressed as that of the Jewish-Christian gospel was in the reproach of his opponents (ver. 17). As this inferred from Paul's axiom—*faith without the law*—that Christ was a promoter of sin, so Paul infers from the Jewish-Christian axiom—*faith with the law*—that Christ had died in vain. "It is by these two inferences that we must measure the distance which separates the gospel of the Jews from the gospel of the Gentiles, Peter from Paul"¹

On this occasion we see the opposing views of the primitive community coming into conflict for the first time in their *distinct difference of principle*; partly because they had not previously been plainly seen, and partly because they had not yet been developed into complete distinctness. From this time forward Paul no longer contents himself, as in the conference which had been held at Jerusalem, with merely demanding freedom from the law for the Gentile Christians, while the Jewish Christians were left to themselves with regard to the observance of the law; but he boldly declares *Christ to be "the end of the law" for all* (Rom. x. 4). He deduces (dogmatically and exegetically) from the nature and the history of the law, its merely temporary character as a *παιδαγωγὸς εἰς Χριστόν*, and says to the Jewish Christians especially that they were redeemed by the Son of God in order that they might no longer be under the law as their governor, but that they might attain to sonship by faith in Christ; so that henceforth there is no difference between Jew and Gentile, but all have become one, within the one community

¹ *Holsten*, Comm. on Gal. in "Protestantenlabel," p. 729.

of Christ, and thus the barrier of the law has once for all been thrown down (Gal. iii. 5—28, iv. 5).¹ Nay, so far is he from merely securing this freedom from the law for the Jewish Christians, as a permission, of which they might make use or not as they liked, that he declares, in the strongest language he can use, that to fall back into the law (even by keeping the feasts appointed by the law, iv. 10 f.) is to fall away from Christ, to lose the benefits of Christ's salvation, to make all the labour bestowed upon them by the Apostle useless, to end in the flesh that which they had begun in the spirit (v. 1—4, iv. 11, iii. 3 f.). On the other hand, we find the Judaizers assuming from this time forward an equally decided polemical attitude towards Paul, and raising difficulties in the way of his work at every step. It is they who have "bewitched" the Galatians, so that they can no longer recognize Christ crucified, as pictured by Paul before their eyes (no longer understand the fundamental idea of Paul's gospel to be the abrogation of the law), Gal. iii. 1. It is they who have "hindered" this community, which had run so well, so that they were no longer obedient to the truth (v. 7); who sought to alienate the community from Paul, their only spiritual father, and induce it to emulate them, the Judaizers, by representing to the Galatians that Paul was not a true and upright friend to them, was not acting honourably by them, but was hindering them from full and complete participation in the Messianic salvation, which was only to be obtained by the acceptance of the law (iv. 12—20). It was they who by all these means "troubled and disturbed" the community, and who would have to "bear their judgment" for it (v. 10—12). And why do they act thus? "In order that they may not be persecuted through the cross of Christ, in order that the offence of the cross may cease" (vi. 12, v. 11), i.e. because Paul's conception of the cross of Christ, according to which it is the end of the law, and therefore his whole gospel, was offensive, galling, and insupportable to their Jewish consciousness (which clung to

¹ See above, Vol. I. p. 188 f.

the Jewish principle of the law, in spite of their faith in Christ).

Attempts have been made, with the idea of defending Christianity, to extenuate or almost to deny this opposition of principle between Paulinism and Judaism, to which the historical inquiries of *Baur* have, for the first time since the writing of *Marcion*, directed attention. This has been done by means of two assertions—first, that there was a complete understanding between the Jewish Christians and Paul with regard to the fundamental doctrine, that the law was not religiously binding on believers in Christ, but that they had from motives of piety retained it, though indifferent in a religious point of view, as a national observance. Secondly, it is said that Paul had found nothing to say against such a practical holding fast of the law, as an external regulation of life, but, on the contrary, had promoted it both by example and precept.¹ As regards the former of these assertions, it is not only unsupported in any way by those Epistles of Paul which can alone be treated here as authentic evidence, but it is completely refuted by them, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly,—for if Paul could have taken it for granted that the Judaizers agreed dogmatically in principle with his doctrine regarding the law, and only differed from him externally, in their practice, where would have been the use or necessity for all his splendid apparatus of dogmatic and exegetical argument in support of his antinomianism, and especially of his often-repeated and emphatic assertions of the independence of *his* gospel, if that of his opponents had not been *ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον* in principle, in cardinal dogmatic questions, such as this very one of the validity of the law? And that this was in fact the case, the Apostle directly affirms in Gal. i. 6 f., 2 Cor. xi. 4. So entirely was it another gospel, that the essence of Paul's gospel, the doctrine of the cross of Christ as the end of the law, was an offence, through which they felt themselves persecuted (vi. 12), and on account of which they

¹ *Hofman, Lechler, Ritschl, Weiss, &c*

persecuted Paul (v. 11). So far were they from considering the keeping of the law as a matter of indifference, as regarded religion, in the Christian community, that a Christ who was the cause of such indifference with respect to the law, appeared to them no better than ἀμαρτίας διδάκων (ii. 17). They wished to find righteousness by faith in Christ, not outside of the law, but on its firm foundation, and therefore looked upon those who bore as their motto, πίστις χωρὶς ἔργων νόμον, simply as ἀμαρτωλούς, like the heathen. Since they could only see in the faith of Christ the completion of the law and the means to the attainment of its highest righteousness, they naturally regarded the principle of faith without the law as an utter absurdity, a falsifying of God's truth, nay, as downright villany (2 Cor. iv. 2). It is thus established beyond doubt, in spite of all apologetic attempts that have been made to extenuate the fact, that the dogmatic standpoint of Paul's doctrine and that of the Jewish Christians, on the question of the validity of the law, were antagonistic in principle.

That differences of principle, however, do not exclude various means of accommodation and approximation in practice, is taught by the experience of all ages; and it can hardly be denied that this was the case in the primitive community to a greater extent than the Tübingen critics are inclined to allow. As a man like Peter adopted at Antioch, in order to please the Gentile Christians, a freer mode of life than was really allowed by his dogmatic standpoint, which he shared in principle with James, though the latter was stricter in practice, so the same thing might well happen in many other instances, and might widely extend itself. In fact, the Judaistic agitators in Galatia appear to have considerably relaxed the strictness of the demands of the law, from motives of prudence (vi. 13, v. 3); and in Corinth they evidently relaxed their demands still more.¹ At all events,

¹ The reader may here be reminded of the *Epistle of James* (certainly of a later date), which is decidedly Jewish-Christian in spirit, although it does not set before its readers, amongst whom Pauline Christians were included, a specifically Jewish demand of the observance of the law.

the Judaizers could not have avoided eating with those who were uncircumcised in mixed communities, still less in those in which the Gentile Christians were the majority, without losing all influence over them. As, however, practical concessions of this kind on the part of the Jewish Christians were inevitable from the first, so, on the other hand, Paul also bears witness of himself that "in order to win the Jews, he became to the Jews as a Jew, to those that were under the law as under the law, yet without being personally under the law" (1 Cor. ix. 20 f.). Nothing can be more absurd than to attempt to prove from this passage that Paul approved, or actually demanded, the perpetual observance of the law on the part of Jewish Christians, as a fundamental doctrine. On the contrary, if he is constrained to become to the Jews "as a Jew" (ὡς Ἰουδαῖος), certainly on no other ground than the wish to educate them, this proves plainly enough that ordinarily, and therefore as to his fundamental principles, he is no longer, and will no longer be, a Jew, which he moreover expressly states in adding the words, *μηδ' ὡν αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ νόμον*. It must however be confessed that this passage proves at least thus much, that Paul did not practically carry out his dogmatic antinomianism in that complete and absolute exclusiveness with which he sets it forth in principle, for instance, in Gal. v. 1—10. The Apostle who "could be all things to all men, that he might gain some," was very far from being a man who would get astride of an abstract principle and ride through thick and thin in his burning zeal to attack the law, without asking whether he destroyed souls or not, provided only that he saved his principle. No; this same Apostle, who, when in the actual defence of his principle he had to take part in a decisive negotiation, did not yield a single step, "so that the truth of the gospel might stand" (Gal. ii. 5), confesses, on the other hand, of himself, *ἐλεύθερος ὢν ἐκ πάντων, πᾶσιν ἑμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα, ἵνα τοῖς πλείονας κερδήσω* (1 Cor. ix. 19), and likewise demands from others that they should show regard for their weaker brethren, should neither judge any nor cause them to offend, but ever keep in view the edification of their neighbours

(Rom. xiv. 15). How far he may have extended this practical accommodation in particular instances, is a question which cannot possibly be answered *a priori*; for in this sphere everything is decided by the prompting of the individual conscience, and no one can judge for another the extent of what is permissible.

But by the very act of assigning "the weakness of their brethren" as the reason for thus accommodating themselves to the Jewish Christians, Paul characterizes it as a *concession to the standpoint of others*, as an *exception* to the normal rule, and therefore refutes the opinion of the modern apologists, that he required converts to continue their observance of the Jewish customs as a matter of principle. It is supposed that this assertion, which stands in the most manifest contradiction to the clearest expressions of the Epistles to the Galatians and Romans, is proved by 1 Cor. vii. 18 f. But this passage only declares that the Jewish Christian had as little need to abolish the outward sign of Judaism in his body, as the Gentile Christian had to adopt it, because it was a matter of perfect indifference whether they had it or not. That the observance of the whole of the Mosaic ordinances was bound up with the retention of this sign in the body, is an extraordinary notion, which it is impossible to discover in Gal. v. 3; for to allow oneself to be circumcised is of course a very different thing from not externally undoing one's circumcision. But the admonition to remain in the calling wherein they were called (1 Cor. vii. 20), refers to the different social positions in life, not to the ordinances of the Jewish law, to which rather the following texts are applicable—*ἐλθοῦσης τῆς πίστεως οὐκέτι ἐπὶ παιδαγωγῶν ἑσμεν*, and *εἰ οὖν ἀπεθάνετε σὺν τῷ Χριστῷ ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων τοῦ κόσμου, τί ὡς ζῶντες ἐν κόσμῳ δογματίζεσθε* (Gal. iii. 25; Col. ii. 20). In brief, therefore, Paul's fundamental principle of freedom from the law will no more admit of abatement than the Judaistic principle of legality; although it must also be granted that the practice of both parties was less severe than their theory.

THE DISPUTE ABOUT THE APOSTLESHIP OF PAUL.

When the primitive Christian community at Jerusalem had once begun to work upon mixed communities like that of the Galatians, by means of their emissaries, and had attempted, not wholly without success, to convert them from the gospel of Paul to that of the Jewish Christians, they went a step further, and began to attack the Apostle of the Gentiles in the field of labour which was exclusively his own, in purely Gentile communities like that at Corinth. This was, no doubt, a most flagrant breach of the compromise agreed upon at the meeting of the Apostles at Jerusalem, which had distinctly separated the fields of labour of the two parties, and assigned the work among the Gentiles to the Apostle of the Gentiles as his exclusive prerogative. The original Apostles did not indeed, by appearing in person and agitating in Paul's field of labour, themselves incur the blame of violating their compact by this encroachment; they rather backed those who, furnished with credentials of the weightiest authority, came to the Corinthians with a different gospel from that of Paul. But practically this made no difference; it was their authority which lent to those who had forced themselves in at Corinth, the *ψευδοαποστόλοις* and *ἐργάταις δολίοις*, the weapons for their attack on Paul; it was their authority also against which Paul had to defend his independent right of apostleship (2 Cor. xii. 4, 5); and thus it was certainly a breach of the compromise on their part, of which Paul justly complains. The opposite party could certainly appeal to the fact of Paul's having been the first to break the treaty—as they, the Judaizers, had understood it—by inducing the Jewish Christians in mixed communities like those of Galatia and Antioch, to assume the Gentile-Christian freedom from the law, the consequence of which was the mission from James, and subsequently the dispute with Peter. So far, each party was in the right from their own standpoint, and the abandonment of that treaty only showed the

incompatibility of the opposing principles which lay concealed within it.

Now, however, that the opponents of Paul had transferred their attack to his exclusive sphere of labour, they were compelled to adopt different tactics from those which they had hitherto employed among the Jewish Christians, to whom they could appeal on the ground of their common respect for the law. The final object of their agitation could of course, as before, be no other than to convert the Gentile Christians to the Jewish-Christian view of Christianity, and therefore to force upon them obedience to the law, in addition to their faith in Christ. But had they from the very beginning openly proclaimed this to be their ultimate object, they would have rendered the success of their agitation in the highest degree improbable, if not altogether impossible. They were compelled, therefore, to prepare a foundation for their anti-Pauline gospel by setting up the representatives of the other gospel against Paul as the higher authority. They accordingly put forward the Jewish-Christian Apostles as the "pre-eminent Apostles" (*ὑπερῶν ἀπόστολοι*), i.e. as Apostles whose authority far outweighed that of Paul, in comparison with whom, as the real Apostles and pillars of the Church, Paul could by no means rank as an Apostle of equal standing with independent authority to teach. Thus the contest was transferred from the question of the Law, which was of course throughout the real and important object of contention, to the question as to the right of Paul to independent apostolical authority, as the first and immediate point of the controversy.

In this contest the position of both parties was again precisely the same as in that regarding the law. Externally, regarded according to appearances (*κατὰ πρόσωπον*), the Judaizers had more right on their side, whence Paul is enabled to call their weapons fleshly, their mode of fighting *κατὰ σάρκα στρατεύεσθαι* (2 Cor. x. 3 f.). On the other hand, Paul had the deeper spiritual right on his side, which indeed was strong enough in itself to throw down every rampart that could be raised against the true

evangelical perception of God, and to compel every external ground of thought (*πάν νόημα*) to give itself up in obedience to Christ (to the truth of Christian salvation), but strong in this way only for those who were able spiritually to judge of spiritual things, not for those who *κατὰ πρόσωπον βλέπονσιν*. In what then consisted this *κατὰ πρόσωπον βλέπειν* and *κατὰ σάρκα στρατεύεσθαι* of the anti-Pauline party? The Apostle leaves no room for doubt on this point—they placed all their confidence in their *Χριστοῦ εἶναι*, which, they averred, was wanting to the Apostle Paul; in this it was that he was behind the chief Apostles (*ὑστερηκεῖναι*, xi. 5, xii. 11), and he therefore did not possess the full apostolic *ἐξουσία* (x. 7, 8). Paul opposes these assertions by maintaining, first, that he could appeal as well as they to the *Χριστοῦ εἶναι* as the foundation of his apostolic authority, and therefore stood in that respect exactly on the same ground as they; but, secondly, he went on to say that in regard to this very *ἐξουσία* he could boast of a further authority which went beyond it, and was thus not only on an equality with them, but in fact had an advantage over them.

Now what is this *Χριστοῦ εἶναι*, on the presence or absence of which the question of the apostolic *ἐξουσία* of Paul is to depend? Regarded as a note of apostleship, it cannot mean belonging to Christ in the sense in which all believers belong to Christ by faith, but must refer to some special sense in which the original Apostles belonged to him, and on which depended the peculiar rights and privileges of those Apostles and of the whole party which attached itself to them. But belonging to Christ in this sense can only mean that relation to him which resulted from the *immediate personal companionship of the original Apostles with Christ during his historical life*, and which was ratified and sealed by the call to the Apostleship which they received from Christ himself. This explanation is so natural, so entirely in accordance with the relations of the parties, and so obviously suggested by the crucial passage, 2 Cor. x. 7 f., that the refusal to accept it can only be accounted for by the prejudice of apolo-

gists.¹ What course was more obvious for the party of the original Apostles than to point to the difference of their past lives from that of Paul, as an argument against the latter? He, far from the historical Christ, a persecutor of his community, converted to the faith last of all and long after the others, now pretends to know what Christian faith and the true gospel of Jesus the Messiah is, better than they who were about him from the beginning, who received instruction directly from his lips, and were expressly appointed by him to their apostleship! The defence which Paul made shows plainly enough what powerful weapons his adversaries possessed in this argument, which is so striking from the point of view of the natural understanding. He insists over and over again, that this external advantage of

¹ The attempt of *Reyschling* (Theol. Stud. und Kr. 1865, II.) to separate the party who called themselves Christ's in Corinth from the original Apostles, and in fact to represent them as holding opposite views (cf. *Hilgenfeld*, Ztschr. f. w. Th. 1865, III.; 1871, I.; and 1872, II.), is utterly untenable. It is abundantly evident from 2 Cor. x. 7, 8, compared with xi. 5, that these persons had made *Χριστὸς εἶναι* into a party watchword at Corinth, solely for the purpose of proving the apostolic inferiority of Paul to the original Apostles, or the exclusive apostolic authority of the latter, by his lack of this characteristic. How then is it conceivable that they should have done this without the consent of the original Apostles, nay, in opposition to their views? And what weight could the *Χριστὸς εἶναι* possibly have as individual self-assertion in the mouth of a few casual new-comers? Whereas it would have meaning enough, and, as the sequel shows, a considerable importance, in the contest with Paul as the watchword of the whole party, which had the original Apostles at their head, and sheltered itself under their authority. Now inasmuch as these persons certainly did not make their appearance at Corinth merely in their own name, but solely as representatives of the party of the original Apostles, from the heads of which party they had in fact, as we know, procured letters of introduction to take with them, the question whether they themselves also may have been the immediate disciples of Christ during his lifetime would appear to be irrelevant. They did not evidently insist upon this advantage for themselves, but only in favour of those whose names they inscribed on their banner in opposition to Paul, in favour of the original Apostles. We must therefore allow that *Baur* is perfectly right in declaring that the "Christ party" was essentially identical with the party of Peter; the former was the dogmatic shibboleth, which indicated the principle that stamped the character of the party, the latter was merely the external denomination of the party from its head. Granting that the former term characterizes the anti-Pauline party in stronger and more decided colours, it is yet essentially one and the same anti-Pauline party, which brands itself around the original Apostles, shields itself with their authority, and appeals to their letters of recommendation (2 Cor. iii. 1). Cf. *Baur*, Paul, Engl. transl., I. p. 266 f.; and *Holsten*, ut supra, p. 22 f.

ance of Christ in the flesh was resolved into the pure spiritual being of the *ἄνθρωπος πνευματικός*, the belonging to Christ is now likewise elevated from the realm of the flesh, of the external acquaintance, and historical relation to his earthly person, upon which the *Χριστοῦ εἶναι* of the anti-Pauline party depended, to the higher realm of the spirit, the spiritual bond of union in "living for Christ." It is true that this spiritual belonging to Christ applies to all believing Christians, and therefore contains no special authorization for his apostleship. Thus far therefore the prerogative claimed on the part of his opponents was not disproved, and Paul was consequently obliged to bring forward another argument in support of his questioned equality with the original Apostles.

And he had another argument, nay a *περισσότερόν τι*, to bring against his opponents. If they grounded their apostolical authority on their having been in immediate communication with the person of Jesus, and having been installed in their apostleship directly by him—well, then Paul was conscious of the very same thing, only in another form. He also had seen Christ at his conversion, and had on that occasion been called by him to be his Apostle among the Gentiles. Hence he is enabled (1 Cor. ix. 1) fearlessly to confront his adversaries, who disputed his claim to

first time at his conversion and calling." Paul then speaks for the first time in his own person with the word *γινώσκωμεν*, while *εἰ καὶ . . . ἐγνώκαμεν* is a hypothetical case referring in the abstract to Christians in general, and applying in the concrete not to Paul, but to his opponents. He does not say *ἐγνώκατε*, because he is not here directly addressing his opponents, but only alludes to them indirectly, and therefore the expression is left undefined, so that it may apply with equal force to all who may feel that it concerns them. When Baur (Paul, Engl. transl., I p. 272) and Holsten (ut supra, pp. 430—432) translate the sentence *εἰ καὶ . . . ἐγνώκαμεν*, "if we (I, Paul) have also formerly known anything of a fleshly Messiah, i.e. of a Messiah according to the fleshly conception of the Jews, yet know we now nothing more of such an one," this appears to me to be an interpretation of *Χριστός* which is justified neither by the language of the text nor by the context, in which the word is applied throughout only to the historical Jesus Christ. And the whole point of Paul's polemic against the "Christ party," which Baur also rightly discovers in this passage, would be destroyed by that interpretation, for it was the *ἰσχυκλιναι* and *γινώσκειν* of the historical Jesus Christ which was, as we have seen, the matter of their specific self-glorification as against Paul.

apostleship with the question, "Am I not an Apostle? Have I not seen our Lord Jesus Christ? Am I not at liberty to act like the other Apostles, and the brothers of the Lord, and Cephas (himself)?" (ver. 5). As this passage plainly shows that the question of the right to apostleship turned on its legitimation by the *ἑπακέναι Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν*, it appears to confirm what we have stated above, that the *Χριστοῦ εἶναι*, which the anti-Pauline party made out to be the decisive note of genuine apostleship, depended also on the *ἑπακέναι Χριστόν* or on the personal relation to Christ. Now Paul also is able to apply to himself this *Χριστοῦ εἶναι* even in the strict sense of immediate communication with the person of Christ, 2 Cor. x. 7, *καθὼς αὐτὸς* (the adherent of the party of the original Apostles, who boasted of his *Χριστοῦ εἶναι* in opposition to Paul) *Χριστοῦ, οὕτω καὶ ἡμεῖς Χριστοῦ*. He also, as he so energetically insists in Gal. i. 1, 11, 12, 16, is an Apostle, not by the favour of men, or by the intervention of men, but immediately through Christ, and has likewise received his gospel directly by the revelation of Jesus Christ, like the historical disciples of Jesus. It is true that this immediate communication with the person of Christ was not that of intercourse with the earthly person of Jesus, nor of instruction received from the historical teacher, any more than his installation as an Apostle was an external historical public act; but all these were to him experiences of a miraculous nature, which, however real, did not belong to the theatre of earthly events, and were therefore wholly withdrawn from the observation and control of others, and stood fast as truths only in his subjective self-consciousness. But how could he with this truth, which was only subjectively valid, contend successfully against the objectively historical relation of the original Apostles to the living Jesus of history? If they threw doubt on the truth of his asserted vision of Christ and his revelations, what had he to oppose to them but a simple repetition of his assertions? And how obviously in that case did he lay himself open to the reproach of his opponents, that if there were any truth in these assertions, it must before all things have

proved itself by its fruits, namely, by the agreement of that which had been (as averred) revealed to him by the heavenly Christ, with that which the original Apostles had notoriously received from the earthly Jesus, as the true message of salvation! We actually meet with this very obvious reproach of the anti-Pauline party in a much later anti-Pauline work; the pseudo-Clementine Epistles make Peter address to Simon Magus, who represents Paul, the question—*πῶς δέ σοι καὶ πιστεύομεν αὐτί, κἂν ὅτι ὥφθῃ σοι (Χριστός); πῶς δέ σοι καὶ ὥφθῃ, ὅποτε αὐτοῦ τὰ ἐναντία τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ φρονεῖς?* The opposition of the teaching of Paul to that of the undoubted disciples of Jesus made his calling to the apostleship through visions and revelations, which rested only on assertions of a subjective character, in the highest degree doubtful from a rational point of view. Moreover, the question might be asked whether this could be in any way a possible or a proper way of becoming a disciple of Jesus. If the knowledge of the true gospel could be obtained by the unhistorical method of miraculous revelations, what purpose, after all, was served by the whole historical appearance of Jesus on earth? It is the pseudo-Clementine Epistles again which put this question in the mouth of Peter—*Εἰ τις δι' ὀπτασίαν εἰς διδασκαλίαν σοφισθῆναι δύναται; καὶ εἰ μὲν ἐρεῖτε, δυνατόν ἐστιν, διὰ τί ὅλη ἐναντιῷ ἐγγηγορόσι παραμείων ὠμίλησεν ὁ διδάσκαλος;*

But had Paul no further legitimation of his apostleship than the miraculous event of his conversion? He had more than one. He is not obliged to rest his *ἐξουσία* as an Apostle merely on the *past*, as the original Apostles do (*ὅποιοί ποτε ἦσαν οὐδὲν μοι διαφέρει*), but he can also appeal to *divine evidence which is being given at the present moment*; above all, to the judgment of God pronounced in the fact of his success as Apostle to the Gentiles. This, which he had already successfully advanced at Jerusalem as the most weighty argument in support of his right to the apostleship to the Gentiles (Gal. ii. 8 f.), he now brings forward again in reply to his opponents; he draws attention with great emphasis to the difference that there is in this respect between

himself and the party of the original Apostles. Whilst they were only able to boast of wide-spread success in a field of labour which did not belong to them (namely, Paul's), and in so doing took on false grounds more credit to themselves than was their due according to the facts,—Paul, on the other hand, always conscientiously abstains from every encroachment on other men's labours, will not deck himself with borrowed laurels, but boasts only of that to which he has an actual right, that is to say, so far as God himself has fixed the due proportion of merit by granting successful results. Thus it is not he who boasts, but the Lord himself offers his testimony as is meet: and so he does not boast of his success as if it had been gained by his own arm, but he makes his boast in the Lord (2 Cor. x. 12—18). He can, therefore, without vain self-laudation, boldly point to the fact that he, although he is the last of the Apostles as to the time of his calling, has nevertheless by the favour of God laboured more than they all (1 Cor. xv. 10). And not only in his success, but also in *labours and sufferings* of every kind for the sake of Christ, he is before all the other Apostles (2 Cor. xi. 23 f.). And he prefers to boast of his distinction in this respect, because this boast, having for its object suffering and weakness, is least exposed to the danger of being represented as vain self-exaltation. In connection with boasting of such advantages as these, which pass with the world for weakness and folly, he comes at last (2 Cor. xii. 1 f.) to the most delicate point of his defence, which he has purposely kept to the last, because the highest exaltation and the deepest humiliation come here into the closest contact, and at the same time the most blessed assurance regarding himself is most closely united with the painful consciousness of being helplessly exposed to the doubts, nay, even to the malicious mis-interpretation of others. He comes to the account of his *visions* and *revelations* (which were well known to his opponents), of which indeed he speaks with reluctance, well knowing that this kind of boasting was calculated to gain him no advantage, but rather to give his adversaries the greatest occasion for malicious

slander. Nevertheless, out of a number of visions and revelations of various kinds, he relates one extraordinary revelation, on the occasion of which (whether with his spirit alone, while his body remained on earth, or whether with his entire man, including his body, he cannot himself say) he was taken up into the third heaven, into paradise itself, and heard there words that cannot be uttered. If he wished to turn this glorious supernatural experience to his own glory, he was free to do so without falling into vain and groundless self-exaltation, for he would only be speaking the simple truth; but he wishes to keep entirely clear of this self-glorification, and chooses to regard the experience which befel him as something which had happened to another person (having been in fact not master of himself on that occasion, and therefore to a certain extent a different person from his ordinary self), in order that he might not induce any one to estimate his person more highly than was warranted by what he had actually experienced. With regard to himself, he determines, on the contrary, only to make mention or to boast of that which is his weakness. He then proceeds to speak of his bodily infirmity and excessive sensibility, and in a most masterly manner turns these weaknesses, of which his opponents had taken advantage in order to depreciate him (x. 10), to his highest praise, since they formed, as it were, only the reverse side, and were imposed by God as a counterbalance to his great exaltation by revelations and visions.

Having thus proved by facts of the most varied kind, drawn from his outward and inner life, that he could adduce divine testimony of fact for the legitimization of his equality with the original Apostles, not only of equal but in fact of much greater weight than theirs, he finally addresses to the community which, by their unloving remissness in defending him, had forced upon him the painful task of praising himself in his own defence, the question, whether they were not compelled to bear him witness that all the signs of an Apostle had been displayed amongst them, that they were in all respects, in all the proofs of the

genuineness and power of the Christian spirit, not a whit behind the other communities (referring especially to those which belonged to the field of labour of the original Apostles)—excepting indeed in this one point, that he had accepted no maintenance from them, as the other Apostles and Evangelists were accustomed to do in their communities. If this had been an injustice towards them, he begged that they would pardon him for it; but he certainly could not act differently in this respect in the future. Thus with fine and gentle irony Paul repels the coarse accusation, which only a low and malicious disposition could have brought against him, that he betrayed his consciousness of not possessing the full right of an Apostle by his renunciation of material payment for his labours from the community, and at the same time his evil conscience, as one who was thrusting himself into the dignity of an Apostle. Against this he repeatedly guards himself, saying that it was not because he had not this claim upon the community, as well as any other Apostle (1 Cor. ix. 1 f.), neither was it from want of love or confidence in them (2 Cor. xi. 7 f., xii. 13 f.) that he had refused to avail himself of it, and still intended to do so, but in order that he might cut off from those who would gladly have found some occasion against him, every opportunity of doing so (xi. 11 f.).*

Vehemently as he gave utterance, in defending himself, to all that was in his heart, or that his mind suggested to him, he fears, notwithstanding, lest in doing so he should again incur the reproach of vain self-glorification. He therefore begs for leniency and indulgence to this self-praise, which is forced from him by the necessity of self-defence, and with great delicacy reminds the Corinthians that they had shown only too much indulgence to his opponents. 2 Cor. xi. 4 f.: "If any chance person comes to you and preaches another Christ whom we have not preached, or you receive another spirit which you have not received, or another gospel which you have not accepted,¹ you bear that

* Every one who reads the 4th and 20th verses of this chapter with unprejudiced eyes must perceive that the writer is not here putting a merely hypothetical case, as

well." (Why then will you not bear from me at least that boasting to which you have yourselves forced me?) "I consider myself in no way inferior to the very chief Apostles" (induced by whose authority you listen to all that is said to you by any chance person who comes to you with another gospel, cf. vers. 19, 20) In appealing to the indulgence of his community with regard to his defending himself by means of self-praise which had been forced upon him, the Apostle gives them to understand that he ventured with all the more confidence to make this claim upon them, as they had only too readily and freely extended their indulgence to his opponents. And he unmistakably indicates, by the expressive addition of ver. 5 to ver. 4, that this indulgence to the new-comers, who with their new wisdom wished to make themselves lords over the community (v. 20—*εἰ τις ὑμᾶς καταδουλοῖ*), could only be grounded on their *extravagant respect for the authority of the "chief Apostles."* It is only on this supposition, which we may read between the lines, that this verse has a clear and good relation to the context. But if it be true that these persons who came to Corinth with another gospel, met with so much indulgence there only on account of the excessive respect of the Corinthians for the "chief Apostles" what can follow more clearly than *that those new-comers relied only on the authority of these Apostles, and in their name alone demanded recognition for their new doctrine?* And as we have already heard (2 Cor. iii. 1) from the Apostle that these new-comers were furnished with "letters of recommendation," is it possible to understand by this expression anything but official letters of authorization from those on whose name and authority the bearers relied, and owing to whose authority they met with so much indulgence?—in other words, *an official letter of authoriza-*

Beyschlag thinks, but alluding in a delicate manner to what really occurred Cf. *Hilgenfeld*, *Ztschr.* 1865, p. 261 "It is only Paul's delicacy which prevents him from saying plainly to the Corinthians, 'If men people who came from abroad preached to you another Jesus, you bore it nobly (ironically of course)'" He rightly calls attention at the same time to a similar instance (Gal. ii. 14) in the address of Paul to Peter, who certainly had lived like the Gentiles—*εἰ σὺ ἰουδαῖος ὡς ἐγώ, &c*

tion from the original Apostles, the ἐπιπλῖαν ἀπόστολοι, who sought thus to thrust out, by the hands of his own community, this man who had thrust himself into the apostleship? However unpleasing this result may be, we shall hardly be able to avoid it if we give the unprejudiced consideration of an historian to all that Paul, though he has veiled it with delicacy, allows any one who will read between the lines to see clearly enough.

TENDENCY TOWARDS PEACE.

How unselfishly the Apostle Paul, through all the heat of controversy, still kept in view only the truth of the gospel, the concerns of Christ and not his own, is most beautifully shown in the conciliatory course which we find him adopting the moment he sees that the principle of his gospel is no longer in danger. "Paul himself"—the sharp controversialist of the *Epistle to the Galatians*—"is the first to adopt in the *Epistle to the Romans* that peaceful and conciliatory tone which characterizes the post-apostolic development. For he is also the first who felt the deep need of the reconciliation of the Jewish with the Gentile Christians in the interest of Christendom itself."² It was the same need of reconciliation which made the offering of love for the

¹ According to *Beysslag* indeed, the "ἐπιπλῖαν ἀπόστολοι" are not the original Apostles at Jerusalem at all, but are identical with the "ψευδαπόστολοι, ὑπηρέται τοῦ σατάν and servants of Satan," cf. ver. 13 f., that is to say, the new-comers at Corinth themselves! So extravagant a fancy does not need a serious refutation. Cf. *Hilgenfeld*, *Z. f. w. Th.* 1865, p. 263. "Is it not the merest satire upon Paul to make him maintain, by a solemn appeal to the attestation of his apostleship, his full equality with persons on whom he turns his back as 'false Apostles and servants of Satan'?" Further, when *Beysslag* sees in the authorization of these emissaries from Jerusalem an act in contravention of that agreement described in Gal. ii. 9, he is quite right, no doubt, only he has forgotten to read from vers. 9 to 12, otherwise he must have known that an act in contravention of that agreement was not an impossibility at Jerusalem, but had in fact occurred very soon afterwards. The fact that this was possible only proves that the understanding at Jerusalem was not so complete as *Beysslag* would make us believe (see above pp. 7—12).

² *Hofsten*, in his review of Hofmann's Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, *Z. f. w. Th.* 1872, p. 456.

the faithfulness of God, which is not to be turned aside by the sin of man. This is the same thought which is carried into fuller detail in Rom. ix.—xi. The Apostle shows by the strongest expressions, ix. 1 f., his sympathy with his nation, for whose sake he would give up his own salvation; for they are the children of Israel; to them belong the theocratic sonship of God, and the glory of revelation (his presence and his communications to mankind) and the covenant, and the giving of the law, and the worship, and the promises, and the fathers (patriarchs, through whom they received the covenants and the promises), and from them is Christ descended according to the flesh. It is impossible then that the word of God can fail, that is to say, the assurance of Messianic salvation made to the fathers of Israel cannot be done away. This is still more definitely expressed in xi. 2—5, 28 f.—God has not rejected his people whom He had predestined to salvation through the Messiah, for He cannot repent of his gifts of favour, nor of his calling which went forth to Israel; on the contrary, this nation is still the object of his love, for the sake of the fathers, in the persons of the ἐκλογί (ver. 28), i.e. the remnant of believers which, according to the election of favour, remained amongst the unbelieving majority, as was the case in the time of Elias (cf. ver. 5). This chosen remnant is the enduring stock in which the historical dignity of Israel, as the chosen people of the covenant, is maintained in unimpaired integrity. But this stock constitutes at the same time the real guarantee that, at some future period, Israel as a people will participate in salvation. For “if the first-fruit be holy, the whole of the dough is holy; if the root is holy, the branches are so likewise” (ver. 16). And although the greater part of Israel is hardened, and only a *λείμμα κατ’ ἐκλογὴν χάριτος* be left in the first instance, as recipients of the same imperishable love of God which bestowed on the patriarchs such exalted *χαρίσματα* and *ἐπαγγελίας*, yet still the people of Israel, as a whole, belongs to the same body from which this *λείμμα* has been taken, and is sprung from the same root, and therefore cannot be

separated in its definitive destiny from this *λείμμα*, but must at some future time enter in its entirety into that "cadre" of the elect which has been preserved against that time. The nation in its entirety is not rejected in order that the Gentiles may take its place for ever, but a part of it only (the greater part certainly) is hardened for a time, and its place filled up by the chosen Gentiles, until the restoration of all at a future date. But Israel, notwithstanding, remains all the time, without any doubt, the main trunk upon which the Gentiles are grafted in like wild olive branches, in order to be sustained by it, and to partake of its sweet juices; and the natural branches of this trunk, which in the first instance were broken off, to make room for those that were grafted in, can therefore and must yet at some future time be grafted again into their own trunk (vers. 17—24). Finally, Rom. xv. 8 f. is in entire accordance with this:¹ "I say that Jesus Christ became a servant of the circumcision for the sake of the truth of God, to confirm the *promises* made to the fathers, but also that the Gentiles might praise God for his *mercy*." Since the *λόγια θεοῦ* (iii. 2) and the *ἐπαγγελίαι* (ix. 4) had been given as special advantages to the Jews, so also the fulfilment of these by Jesus the Messiah, who came from among them, belongs naturally first of all to them (*εὐαγγέλιον . . . Ἰουδαίῳ πρῶτον*, i. 16), for God cannot repent of his gifts of favour and of his calling; his truthfulness therefore required that the Messianic promises given to Israel should be confirmed, which is exactly what Jesus Christ did, doing his work for the benefit of Israel in the first place (*διάκονος περιτομῆς γενένηται*). Israel had no right to this, but it was required by the truthfulness of God, by the unchangeableness of his favour. The heathen, on the contrary, have become recipients of the pure compassion of God, without any previous promise, and contrary to all expectation, wherefore they have so much the more reason to praise God. These are

¹ I can by no means regard the whole chapter, Rom. xv., nor this passage in it (in spite of Baur, *Lucht*, and Lipsius in the "Protestantenbibel") as spurious, but, on the contrary, I subscribe entirely to the remarks of Hilgenfeld in reply to *Lucht* in the Z. f. v. Th 1872, IV. Compare especially p. 477 on the passage quoted.

precisely the same thoughts as in xi. 28—30; and it cannot be said that they contradict the freedom of God's favour; although it may be fairly argued that they rest, more than the previous expositions of the Apostle, on the ground of historical actuality, according to which Christianity has in fact grown out of Judaism.

Certain as it is, however, that all these passages are consistent with one another, yet it cannot be denied that there is to be found in Paul's writings another way of looking at these questions, which was the predominant one in the *Epistle to the Galatians*, but which assumes a secondary place in the *Epistle to the Romans*. In Gal. iii. and iv., Paul considers the promise made to Abraham as already completely fulfilled in the Christian community (whether consisting of Jews or Gentiles), because those who sought righteousness in faith, with Abraham, were the only true sons of Abraham (iii.—ix.). The promises given to Abraham and his seed did not from the first apply to the many descendants of Abraham (through his body), but only to one, namely, Christ. Now since those who believe in Christ belong to Christ (make up with him one single moral personality), it follows that *they* are the seed of Abraham, and heirs according to the promise (ver. 29). According to this view, the Messianic inheritance belongs exclusively to the *spiritual* sonship of Abraham, or to faith, and thus it is indirectly asserted that the promises made to the spiritual progenitor of the community of the Messiah do not apply at all to his *personal* descendants, or to the nation of Israel; consequently that Israel, as a nation, stands in no other, nearer, or more particular relation to the fulfilment of those promises in Christ Jesus, than the heathen. And as, in the community of the Messiah, the Gentile believers are now in point of fact the most numerous, to put Jews and Gentiles upon an equality with regard to the Messianic promises, is really to *give the advantage to the latter*. Foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, Scripture (God according to the Scripture) has already made to Abraham in anticipation the promise

—"in thee shall all the Gentiles be blessed"—in other words, it was from the beginning the predetermined purpose of the Divine ordinance of redemption, that the blessing of Abraham should come upon the Gentiles (vers. 8, 14). These spiritual children of Abraham, the father of the faithful, are the only free and legitimate sons with the right of inheritance; his personal descendants, on the other hand, are the children of the bondmaid (for Hagar is Mount Sinai, the covenant of the law, which gendereth to bondage), slaves without rights; what was formerly said of Hagar and Ishmael applies to them—"thrust out the bondmaid and her son, for never shall the bondmaid's son inherit with the son of the free-woman" (iv. 21—31). This is certainly the strongest declaration that Paul has made regarding the relation of Israel to the Messianic inheritance—not only has Israel as a nation no special claim to it, but he is, on the contrary, as the natural offspring of Abraham which has no rights, *once for all excluded* from the inheritance, and the community of the Messiah, which consists essentially of Gentile believers, is the *only* son who has a right to the inheritance, the true child of promise of Isaac.

Now this rough treatment of Israel is very essentially modified in the Epistle to the Romans; and if we examine it carefully we shall find it is so in two respects; first, as to the community of the Messiah, when the fact of its being made up of *Jews* and *Gentiles* is referred to, the precedence is always given to the former (whilst according to the Epistle to the Galatians the *Gentiles* are placed first among the spiritual sons of Abraham, iii. 8, 14); secondly, the promises made to the fathers of Israel are said not to have received their full and final fulfilment in the spiritual posterity of the father of the faithful, i.e. in the present mixed community in which the Gentile Christians predominate, but it is said that they shall attain to fulfilment in a distant future, *in a far higher degree in his own personal posterity*, in the nation of Israel (whilst according to Gal. iv. 21—31, the nation of Israel is simply for ever thrust out). The Epistle to the

Romans, indeed, perfectly agrees with that to the Galatians in this, that there also Abraham is called the father of the faithful (iv. 11), and his personal descendants are not all on that ground to be children of the promise (objects and recipients of the promise, ix. 6 f.). Here also it is, in the first instance, by this distinction between the personal and the spiritual sons of Abraham, that the truth of the declaration, that God's word of promise cannot fail, is to be established; according to this then (as in the Galatians), the divine word of promise to the fathers is fulfilled in the first instance only to the community of the faithful, not to the nation of Israel. This community, by virtue of the free mercy of God, has been called "not only from among the Jews, but also from the Gentiles" (ver. 24); from the latter for the most part, but still there is in it a remnant at least (*κατάλειμμα*, ver. 27), and a seed from Israel (ver. 29). But here there is based on this very fact the *further* hope that God has not definitively rejected Israel as a nation, but only hardened a part of them until the time when the fulness of the Gentiles shall have entered in (to the Messiah's kingdom), *καὶ οὕτω τὰς Ἰσραὴλ σωθήσεται*, xi. 26. Paul therefore by no means retracts here his fundamental idea, that the Messianic promises are fulfilled in the community of the believers in Christ, but he *gives it completeness* in two ways—first, by giving the Jews precedence in the community of Christians, and declaring that they are the main stock into which the believers from among the Gentiles have been inserted; and secondly, by holding fast to the hope that the whole of Israel will finally enter into the community of Christians, and that thus the promises made to the fathers will also be realized in their actual posterity. If the Epistle to the Galatians roughly said in an anti-Jewish sense—οἱ ἐκ πίστεως, οὗτοί εἰσιν υἱοὶ Ἀβραάμ, ὥστε οἱ ἐκ πίστεως εὐλογεῖνται σὺν τῇ πιστῇ Ἀβραάμ, ἵνα εἰς τὰ ἔθνη ἡ εὐλογία τοῦ Ἀβραάμ γένηται ἐν Χριστῇ Ἰησοῦ, the Epistle to the Romans says with conciliatory gentleness—διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ πίστεως, ὡς κατὰ χάριν, εἰς τὸ οὐκ εἶναι βεβαίαν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν πᾶσι τῷ σπέρματι, οὐ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ νόμου μόνον (there-

fore also to this) ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἐκ πίστεως Ἀβραάμ, ὅς ἐστι πατὴρ πάντων ἡμῶν (iv. 16). In this "Not only—but also" is reflected the whole character of the Epistle to the Romans, its peaceful and conciliatory tendency.

Some further peculiarities of this Epistle may be explained from the same point of view. Whilst the Epistle to the Galatians described the law as σάρξ, and included it in the same category with the Gentile worship of nature, as bondage ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου (iii. and iv. 3), and the second Epistle to the Corinthians also sees in it essentially the γράμμα ἀποκτείνον (iii. 6 f.), the Epistle to the Romans emphatically exalts the law—ὁ μὲν νόμος ἅγιος, καὶ ἡ ἐντολὴ ἀγία καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀγαθή, ὁ νόμος πνευματικός ἐστιν, ἐγὼ δὲ σάρκευς εἰμι. The impotence of the law to give spiritual life, which according to the Epistle to the Galatians might appear to be grounded in the law itself, inasmuch as it has to do with externalities, and its nature is itself external, is very distinctly referred in the Epistle to the Romans to the fleshly nature of man. In point of fact, both Epistles attain finally to one and the same thought, namely, that from the standpoint of the law, the will of man and the will of God are outside of each other and mutually opposed. Now whether this be expressed by declaring that the law is external to man, or that man is, as regards the law, fleshly, is evidently only a difference in form; but the second mode of expression has the advantage of being more considerate to the feelings of the Jewish Christians who believed in the law, and this is the reason that Paul employs it exclusively in the Epistle to the Romans. Again, whereas in the Epistle to the Galatians the falling back into life according to the law, even if it consisted only in keeping the Jewish sabbaths and feast-days, is a denial of the evangelical principle of the spirit and of freedom, is a decided mark of being "in the flesh," on the other hand, in the Epistle to the Romans, Paul is so tolerant and accommodating, that he who considers himself bound to keep feast-days holy, does it to the Lord just as much as he who does not keep them

holy. He here therefore unhesitatingly puts the perpetuation of the Jewish feasts (for he is evidently speaking of these) before the individual conscience, as a matter of indifference to a Christian. When he refers to eating also, to which he applies the same general rule, we must understand him to mean not only the ascetic practices of the Essenes (for which one man would hardly have judged another), but also the Jewish laws regarding food. He certainly characterizes the scruples with which the Jews still bind themselves in these matters, as weakness in Christian faith; but he does not regard this as a thing to be rejected, but something to be borne with in love; he demands of those whose views are more free, the same consideration and accommodation for those who are less free which he had already declared to be his own maxim, 1 Cor. ix. 19—23. But who can fail to observe that this mild course of action is very different from the uncompromising assertion of principles in the Epistle to the Galatians? Finally, we may call to mind the friendly way in which mention is made in Rom. xv. 26 f. of the primitive community, as the one to which the other communities were debtors, as they had received from it the spiritual riches of Christianity. As it could never have entered into the Apostle's mind to question this simple fact of history, there is in these verses no actual contradiction of his former assertions; but their tone is certainly different; it is more gentle and conciliatory, as compared with that in which the original community and the Apostles who were its pillars are spoken of in the Epistle to the Galatians. Meanwhile, if we remember that a short time previously the emissaries and letters of commendation which came thence had given much trouble to the Apostle in Corinth, the unselfish character of this conciliatory expression of feeling will appear in so much the stronger light.

It is true that Paul wrote the Epistle to the Romans for the purpose of winning over the mixed community which existed there, and guarding against divisions in it, before his old adversaries had again engaged in personal attacks upon him on this

new scene. It is the more interesting, therefore, to observe how the relation of Paul to the Judaizers of the community at Rome shaped itself *after* these painful experiences. The *Epistle to the Philippians*, written during his imprisonment at Rome, gives us particular information on this head. And this is in fact precisely of the kind which we should expect from the antecedents, from the *Epistle to the Romans* on the one hand, and the earlier *Epistles* on the other. Paul's tone in this *Epistle* appears as a mixture of the conciliatory temper of the *Epistle to the Romans* with the personal irritation which, as we have seen from the earlier letters, was the result of immediate contact with his opponents. This *mixture* of feelings is certainly a peculiar feature, which is found only in this *Epistle*, and which has therefore given occasion for doubts as to its authenticity; but we ought to consider how well this feature suits both the character of the Apostle and his situation at the time, and, on the other hand, what consummate art would have been required to give this highly characteristic colouring to any letter written at a later period.

In order to strengthen his beloved community anew in their proved faithfulness, Paul, well knowing that he was not doing so for the first time, but feeling that he could not too often or too deeply impress this point upon them, sets before them again (iii. 1 f.) the contrast between the evil workers who boasted of their fleshly (Jewish national) advantages, and himself, who could boast of the same and yet higher fleshly advantages, but dispensed with all boasting of the kind (such as being a Jew, a Pharisee, and zealous on behalf of the law)—nay, held these apparent advantages to be really loss for Christ's sake, i. e. with regard to the only true good, righteousness by faith, to the attainment of which that apparent advantage could only be a hindrance, if the slightest value were attached to it. Those *κῆρες* and *κακοὶ ἐργάται* (ver. 2) can be no other than his Judaizing opponents, who were again preparing to throw difficulties in the way of the Apostle in his present field of labour; the same class of persons as he describes in no gentler terms than

ψευδαποστόλους, ἐργάτας δολίους, and διακόνους σατανᾶ (2 Cor. xi. 13), and whom, in wrathful scorn for their mania for circumcision, he wishes to be castrated; just as he describes them in Phil. iii. 2 as the κατατομήν, while the true circumcision is that of the Christians (ver. 3)—cf. Rom. ii. 28 f.: περιτομή καρδίας ἐν πνεύματι, οὐ γράμματι, οὐ ὁ ἔπαινος οὐκ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ. And as, in the passage just quoted from the Epistle to the Corinthians, he promises to the deceitful workers and servants of Satan, who disguise themselves as servants of righteousness and apostles, a fearful end worthy of their deeds, he now similarly speaks (iii. 18 f.) of (those who were well known to his readers as) "enemies of the cross of Christ, whose end is destruction;" these were the advocates of circumcision, with whom we have become acquainted in the Epistle to the Galatians, to whom Paul's doctrine of the cross of Christ as the end of the law was an offence, not probably Jews (for why should their fleshly mode of life and enmity to the cross cause the Apostle so much anxiety, as if their Jewish mode of life could be a dangerous and misleading example to his community?), but Jewish Christians, Judaizing opponents of the gospel of Paul. He may, it is true, have judged these opponents somewhat too harshly in attributing to them, in ver. 19, a sensual disposition, but it exactly accords with the mode of judging adopted by these Corinthian opponents, to whom he also (2 Cor. ii. 17) ascribes a καπηλεύειν τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ, an avaricious motive for their mission and their agitation, thus also strongly marking his own disinterestedness in contrast to them (2 Cor. xi.). Finally, Paul expresses himself with no less-severity against these personal opponents in Phil. i. 15—17, where he charges them with preaching Christ out of hatred against him, not with purity of purpose, but with malignant party interests, and with the intention of aggravating the pain of his imprisonment by diminishing the regard in which he was held by the community. We cannot tell to what extent the Apostle's judgment may here be tinged with personal bitterness; it is quite possible that the Judaizers may have made use of

Paul's imprisonment as an argument against him, by representing it as brought upon him by his own fault, through his violent attacks upon the law; and ver. 20 may refer to this, where the Apostle expresses his confidence that he will in no respect come to shame; and also ver. 13, where he says that his bonds were manifest in Christ, i.e. he bore them in consequence of no personal guilt, but as the Apostle of Christ

Now it is to be observed that the more distinctly the personal excitability of the Apostle is shown by all this, so much the more striking is the perfect *tolerance* which he displays in speaking of the work of his opponents in itself (irrespective of their personal behaviour to himself)—“for the rest, however it be, whether as a pretext (for interested party objects foreign to the gospel), or for the truth's sake, Christ is preached, and I rejoice at it, and will still more rejoice” (ver. 18). This is unquestionably very different language from that in which Paul spoke, in Gal. i. 7 f., of the preachers of the *ἕτερον εὐαγγέλιον*. There he denies that there is in truth any other gospel at all than his own, and declares the preaching of Jewish Christianity to be a simple “perversion of the gospel of Christ.” Here, on the contrary, he sees in the work of the Judaizers also a real preaching of Christ; he concedes to his opponents the character of Christians, and rejoices at their success for the sake of the general advancement of Christ's work, although they were influenced by motives of hostility to him, and their spirit is very different from his. Is such tolerance as this *possible* for a character like that of Paul? It would be difficult to answer this question *a priori*, but it is answered by the *Epistle to the Romans*, in which we traced the turning into the path of peace and reconciliation as a *fact*. One great reason why the genuineness of the *Epistle to the Philippians* has been doubted, is, that critics have overlooked this fact, which really decides the question. If the Apostle shows himself to us in the *Epistle to the Philippians* also, as a man not free from human weakness, from the irritability and passionateness common to all choleric natures and

pioneering spirits, yet we can see from this his last Epistle, how he has learnt more and more to separate the personal element from the great end at which he is aiming, party interests from the common object of Christ's kingdom, which stands above all individuals and all parties in the Church. And it is precisely this, after all, which is required of true servants of Christ in all ages—not absolute neutrality, which would imply either reprehensible indifferentism, or superhuman elevation of mind, but the power always to distinguish their own party from the kingdom of God, and the self-denial always to subordinate the former to the latter. Paul gradually came to see that the gospel of Christ was not identical with the gospel of Paul, but was above both Paulinism and Judaism: would that every ecclesiastical party and sect could learn from him to practise the like humility!

CHAPTER IX.

PAULINISM UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALEXANDRINE PHILOSOPHY.

(*THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS, THE EPISTLE TO THE
COLOSSIANS, AND THE EPISTLE OF BARNABAS.*)

THE EPISTLE TO THE HEBREWS.

THE old contest of the Apostle with his Judaistic opponents presents itself to us in the Epistle to the Hebrews in a new and most peculiar phase. The Hebrews to whom it is addressed are Jewish Christians (whether in Palestine or, as is more probable, in Alexandria, is for our purpose irrelevant), who were still so persistent in their attachment to the Jewish worship, that their complete relapse into Judaism, with which they had never completely broken, was to be dreaded. It was not their object to maintain the validity of the Mosaic law in the Christian dispensation, and to force it even upon the Gentile Christian communities (as the Galatian Judizers wished to do); it was not therefore the preservation of Christian freedom from the law, and the opposition of faith and works of the law, that had to be maintained against them. It was enough to bring them to see that Christianity was capable of affording them, not only in equal measure, but in a far higher degree, that religious satisfac-

tion which they still sought, and thought to find mainly in the Jewish worship—nay, that Christianity alone could give them perfect satisfaction; consequently that it was by no means necessary, in addition to this perfect thing which they possessed as Christians, to hold fast also the incomplete satisfaction of Judaism, or to long to return to it. In arguing with such Jewish Christians as these, who valued Judaism, not as a positive body of authoritative law, but as an institution of worship which afforded religious satisfaction, and therefore as something which was actually felt to be a means of salvation, it would evidently have been to no purpose to represent the Mosaic system, as had been done in the old Pauline dialectic, as something which had come in between promise and fulfilment, and maintained itself as a third in opposition to both; it was necessary to recognize the element of salvation which was contained in Judaism, but to prove its imperfection as compared with Christianity. The Epistle to the Hebrews does this by conceiving Judaism as the type of Christianity, and the latter as the filling up of that copy which preceded it. If this relation is, as must be allowed, a more positive one than that which Paul established between the Law and the Gospel, yet it is as little favourable as anything can be to the independent significance of Judaism, and to the holding fast of it as a part of Christianity. The cardinal doctrine of Paulinism, that Judaism was from the beginning to be only a religion of relative truth and temporary validity, destined to be abrogated on the appearance of the perfect religion of which it was the type, is not less firmly held by the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, than by Paul himself, and so far he must unquestionably be regarded as a follower of Paul, and his doctrinal writings essentially belong to the history of the development of Paulinism. It is certain, however, that the way in which this cardinal doctrine is established and expanded in the Epistle to the Hebrews, is essentially different from that adopted by Paul. The writer of this Epistle transfers the essential results of Paul's doctrinal system to a very heterogeneous region, that of the

Alexandrine notion of the universe, and endeavours to establish them independently upon these premises; and of course the ideas of Paul, when thus transplanted, do not remain unchanged, but undergo essential modifications and alterations. But it would be equally one-sided to regard these modifications as a simple advance of Paulinism directly from the teaching of Paul to that of John, and to take them as a retrogression from Paulinism to Jewish Christianity. The doctrinal system of the Epistle to the Hebrews forms in fact a third, resulting from these two opposing views of primitive Christianity; it is a *thoroughly original attempt to establish the most essential results of Paulinism upon new presuppositions, and in an entirely independent way*—a way which, proceeding on lines of thought regarding the constitution of the universe which were widely spread amongst the educated people of that time, necessarily had far greater power of diffusing general enlightenment than the dialectic of the old Pauline system, which was so highly wrought up to an individual standpoint. From these considerations it is perfectly intelligible that the Epistle to the Hebrews possesses deep significance, almost in a greater degree than the Epistles of Paul himself, with reference to the further development of Paulinism, and the Epistle to the Colossians, and the Epistles of Barnabas and Clement, as well as others, plainly point to the same fact.

Paul had attempted to establish the independence of Christianity with respect to Judaism, and the abrogation of the latter in the first place, by proving logically the opposition and incompatibility of the ideas of law and the promise of favour, works and faith. In doing this with the presupposition of the immediate divine inspiration of the law, to which he also adhered, he involved himself in difficulties, his solution of which displays great individual power and daring, but is hardly calculated to produce general conviction. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews attempts to solve the same problem, not directly by means of a dialectical exposition of the differences between Judaism and Christianity, but with the assistance of a view of the

universe which, belonging in truth neither to the one nor to the other of these opposing systems, possessed for that very reason peculiar advantages as a means of reconciling them, and of developing from Judaism an independent Christianity. *The opposition of the invisible, imperishable, archetypal world, to the visible, perishable world of appearance copied from the former* characterized the Alexandrine theory of the universe; and it is this which the Epistle to the Hebrews, with great intellectual power and originality, applies to the relation of Christianity to Judaism, in order to establish on firm grounds the principle of the absolute truth and perfection of the former, transcending space and time, as contrasted with the merely figurative and temporary significance of the latter. As John afterwards identified the *Logos* of Philo with Jesus Christ, in order to mark out Christianity as the only absolute revelation of God, the essential and all-embracing manifestation of the Divine glory, favour, and truth, as specifically distinguished from all other religions, and raised infinitely above them,—so the Epistle to the Hebrews applies the *κόσμος νοητός* of Philo (which according to that philosopher represents nothing but the concrete development of the *Logos* into its different determinations) to Christianity, to the entire Christian dispensation, and to the sum of the Christian blessings of salvation. And as that application of Philo's notion of the *Logos* to the person of Christ was suggested and brought about by the intermediate notion of the "word of the Creator" spoken of in the Old Testament, and the later Jewish idea of the wisdom of the creation, so also the primitive Christian idea of the *Messiah's kingdom* was a connecting link which suggested the application of the *κόσμος νοητός* of Philo to the blessings of Christian salvation. The latter was characterized by its very name, "the kingdom of heaven," as a higher world, like the *κόσμος νοητός*, a sphere of higher supersensuous and imperishable life. In addition to this, it had assumed, in the imagination not only of Jews, but also of Jewish Christians (as is proved by the Apocalypse of John), the form of the heavenly Jerusalem of the ideal

ized theocracy of Israel, or of a heavenly original of the imperfect earthly theocracy of the old covenant. From this point it was evidently no great step for an Alexandrine Christian to combine the religious conception of the kingdom of the Messiah or of heaven, with the philosophical idea of a heavenly or archetypal world. This combination naturally met with the same fate as the application of the idea of the *Logos* by John; the philosophical idea, by being transplanted into the region of religious intuition, became something very different from what it was before; in the place of the ideal abstraction, we find the complex tissue of concrete moments derived from actual religious self-consciousness and from events of history. Hence it is quite intelligible that precisely as the *Logos*-Christ of John is something very different from the *Logos* of Philo, so the heavenly world of the Epistle to the Hebrews is very different from Philo's *κόσμος νοητός*. The latter is an abstraction of thought void of content, the former a religious form of conception filled with the richest materials, for it contains within itself nothing less than the whole Christian consciousness of salvation, for which it serves to give expression, in distinct forms of thought, to its inward fulness of life and perfection. As this change necessarily takes place the instant a philosophical idea is transplanted into the region of religious intuition, the difference as to matter which arises from this cause gives no just ground for doubting of their identity as to form, either in this case or in that of the *Logos* of John.

Thus then the Epistle to the Hebrews constructs, out of the Alexandrine idea of the *κόσμος νοητός*, a transcendent reality (*τὰ ἰσχυρότερα τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς*, viii. 5, ix. 23), which forms in the first place the opposite of this present world. That is to say, it is related to the latter (*αὐτῇ ἢ κτίσει*, ix. 11) as the original sanctuary which Moses saw in heaven is related to the earthly one which he prepared according to that pattern, or as the original which in its origin and essence is divine, heavenly, supersensuous, perfect, and eternal, is related to the finite and

the sensuous, which is merely an imperfect copy (*ὑπόδειγμα*) and likeness traced from the shadow (*σκιὰ*) of the divine pattern (viii. 1—5, ix. 23), and is distinguished as the visible (*τὰ βλεπόμενα*, xi. 3), tangible (xii. 18), changeable, that can be shaken (*σαλευόμενα*, xii. 27), from the original pattern, which is the invisible (*πράγματα οὐ βλεπόμενα*, xi. 1) that cannot be shaken (*τὰ μὴ σαλευόμενα*, xii. 27), and eternal. As the dwelling-place of God, this higher world is called *οἶκος θεοῦ* (x. 21), *σκηνὴ ἀληθινή* (viii. 2), *ἡ τοῖς θεμελίους ἔχουσα πόλις* (the city which has firm foundations, xi. 10), *πάτρις, πόλις ἐπουράνιος* (xi. 14, 16), *Σιών ὄρος καὶ πόλις θεοῦ ζῶντος, Ἱερουσαλὴμ ἐπουράνιος* (xii. 22), and finally *βασιλεῖα ἀσάλευτος* (xii. 28). As this latter expression suggests a combination of the archetypal world with the Messiah's kingdom, so also the preceding passage contains clear evidence that the heavenly and archetypal world simply coincides with Christianity in the mind of the writer. For Christians are here told that they are not come to the tangible mount (Sinai) like the nation of the Old Testament covenant, but to the Mount Zion, the heavenly Jerusalem. Now if the Christian has already gone to this heavenly city of the Messiah, so that he has entered into a bond of citizenship with it, and receives and enjoys its gifts and powers (*παραλαμβάνοντες βασιλείαν*, xii. 28; *γενσάμενοι τῆς δωρεᾶς τῆς ἐπουρανίου δυνάμεις τε μέλλοντος αἰῶνος*, vi. 4, 5), then it is clear that we can understand by this nothing else than the reality of the blessings of salvation thrown open in Christ, the Christian dispensation. Christianity is thus represented as a world absolutely raised above everything earthly and temporal, as the sphere of the only true and lasting reality, of the divine life, in comparison with which everything else, including therefore the religious dispensation of the Old Testament, is defined as the unsubstantial and perishing—in short, as mere finite existence. It is true that this identification of Christianity with the heavenly archetype of the world has also its reverse side. If Christianity is only so far the perfect existence as it is identical with the future world, then it is itself only something future

which cannot actually be possessed in this present world, but, on the contrary, can only be an object of hope on this side the grave. Thus from the *transcendence* of the higher "*heavenly world*" as to *place*, follows necessarily the *transcendence* of the "*future world*" as to *time*, of the αἰὼν μέλλων (vi. 5), or the οἰκουμένη μέλλονσα (ii. 5). By this also, as both passages plainly show, nothing else is to be understood than Christianity, the object of the Christian doctrine of salvation (περὶ ἧς λαλοῦμεν, ii. 5), the totality of the powers of salvation which are already given to the Christian here to enjoy, as "powers of the world to come," as "heavenly gifts" or "the holy spirit" (vi. 4, 5).

Let us observe here how the *Epistle to the Hebrews* forms precisely the required medium and the harmonizing transition from the primitive Christian views to those of John. According to the former, that which is perfect and heavenly begins with the second coming of Christ, and therefore belongs wholly to the future, and Christianity still falls under the category of things present, imperfect, only preparatory for that which is perfect, and is accordingly not absolutely, but only relatively, distinguished from Judaism, which was a previous stage of preparation. According to John, on the other hand, eternal life is already present in Christian truth, in the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ his Son (John xvii. 3), and Christianity is thus the absolute, and is specifically different from everything that is not Christian. Now the *Epistle to the Hebrews* takes up this peculiar intermediate position: on the one hand, it regards Christianity (like John) as something heavenly and perfect, and thus affirms its absolute exaltation above everything that is not Christian; but, on the other hand, it regards the perfect (with the primitive Church) as something yet to come, and transcendent both in time and place; these two ideas combine to produce the very peculiar view of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*, according to which Christianity belongs to the αἰὼν μέλλων, and the αἰὼν οὗτος denotes the pre-Christian age, which was terminated by the appearing of Christ. It therefore says of him that God has

όμενοι, τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν τοῦ σώματος (ib. 23). Here then the two-fold nature of the Christian consciousness, of the ἐσώθημεν—ἐλπίδα, results from the dualism of spirit and flesh,—a *psychological dualism* which, before its final (eschatological) solution, undergoes progressive relative elimination by means of the immanent religious-moral process of living in the spirit. Because the Christian really has the spirit of sonship, therefore he knows the fact, ἐσώθημεν, and it is only because he still lives in the flesh, and its power over him, although ever diminishing, is still felt, that he is still also one who hopes, one ἀπεκδεχόμενος τὴν νιοθεσίαν. The dualism of the Epistle to the Hebrews, on the other hand, results from the *metaphysical* opposition of the heavenly, invisible, and eternal world, to the earthly, visible, and perishable world. Because the former of these is thrown open to him through Christ, because he has attained to it by faith, and has tasted of its powers, the Christian, according to this teaching, also knows that salvation is assured to him; but as it is still a world of the future, and the exact opposite of all that is earthly, so the Christian while on earth always thinks of it as in the far distance, as the object of his hopes, rather than as a possession. The relative elimination which was possible in the case of the psychological dualism of Paul, by means of a process that went on within the man, is not possible in the case of this metaphysical dualism; only an anchor of hope reaches from the Christian life on earth into that other world of real Christian salvation (Heb. vi. 19: ἥν ἐλπίδα ὡς ἄγκυραν ἔχομεν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀσφαλῆ τε καὶ βεβαίαν εἰσπρηχόμενην εἰς τὸ ἐσώτερον τοῦ καταπετάσματος, ὅπου πρόδρομος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν εἰσῆλθεν Ἰησοῦς), an anchor of hope, the hold of which depends on Jesus Christ's having gone before, and which must be firmly held by waiting in patience and in the hope of faith. More than this cannot be done here; the chasm between this world and the future world cannot really be bridged over; the solution of the opposition is not a religious-moral one going on within the Christian, but it is itself something that transcends the sphere of the present—namely, the

second coming of Christ, the expectation of which as very near at hand is therefore much more essential to the Epistle to the Hebrews than to the older system of Paul. In this respect the Epistle to the Hebrews is certainly far behind Paul; it externalizes and fixes again the opposition of the natural and the Christian elements in man, which Paul had partially reconciled in the inwardness of the life of the spirit that proceeds from God. But, nevertheless, we cannot see in it a relapse into Jewish Christianity, but an attempt to establish the absolute exaltation of Christianity above everything not Christian, upon the metaphysical opposition of the supersensuous to the sensuous world which was peculiar to Alexandrine speculation. If this exaltation of Christianity to an absolute cosmical significance was purchased, in the first instance, by throwing it back into a transcendent sphere dis severed from the present world, it was reserved for Christian theology, in the course of its further development, to bring it down again from that transcendent height into the actuality of the present life, and thus for the first time to bring the absoluteness of its idea into harmony with the historical events of its appearing. The first step to this was the declaration of John, "The word became flesh."

As Christendom is identical, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, with the invisible heavenly world, so also is *Christ* a being from that world; the heavenly origin of Christ, his pre-existence, is from the very beginning taken as a self-evident fact: here also the teaching of Paul is evidently presupposed. But the author of this Epistle had a two-fold object in his Christology, occasioned by the views against which he had to contend. Since his opponents (probably under the influence of the Essenes) set the angels above Christ, at whose earthly humiliation, especially his sufferings and death, they seem to have taken offence, this writer endeavoured, in the first place, to prove most distinctly the unqualified exaltation of Christ above the angels; and, secondly, to justify also his earthly humiliation and sufferings from the standpoint of a divinely ordained moral course of action, a

necessary condition of his exaltation. Whilst the Christ of Paul is "the second (or spiritual) man from heaven," and at the same time the very image of God and the archetype of man, the Epistle to the Hebrews, on the other hand, places the Son of God wholly above everything that is human, or even archetypal of humanity, and conceives him as a specifically divine being, ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτὴρ τῆς ἱστορίας τοῦ θεοῦ (i. 3). That this description is not to be understood merely in the sense of the Pauline εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ, but is rather intended to declare the metaphysical connection of the nature of Christ with that of God and his origin from God, is plainly shown by the unmistakable way in which the Christological passage before us alludes to and leans upon the analogy contained in the Book of Wisdom, where σοφία is described as ἀρχὴ τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ δυνάμεως, καὶ ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εὐκρινῆς, ἀπαύγασμα φωτὸς διδίου καὶ ἱσοπύρον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας, καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αὐτοῦ. μὴ δὲ οὕτως πάντα δύναται καὶ μένουσα ἐν αὐτῇ πάντα καινῶν, &c. (vii. 25, 26). According to this, σοφία is the splendour that issues from God, because it is also the effluence (ἀπόρροια), as it were the effulgent flame (ἀρχή), of his power and glory, which indicates the unity of its nature with that of God, up to the point of cancelling its independent substantive existence; the latter is, however, affirmed by the expressions ἀπαύγασμα, ἱσοπύρον and εἰκὼν, according to which σοφία, as the reflection and effulgent splendour of God, is indeed all that it is only through Him and by Him, but is notwithstanding another beside Him. These two ideas are precisely what the description in the Hebrews contains, "The effulgence of his glory and the impress of his nature." According to this, Christ is the exact image and the perfect expression of the Divine nature, so that in his own nature he is only a duplicate of the nature of God, forming indeed a nature of his own which belongs to him, but which yet is in complete unity with that of God and an effluence from it. Moreover, the added words, φέρων τε τὰ πάντα τῷ ῥήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ, may remind us of the passage we have quoted

from the Book of Wisdom, vii. 25, 27, ἀρμὴς τῆς δυνάμεως and πάντα δύναται. As, in this passage, σοφία is not only the serviceable instrument of the omnipotence of God, but is herself the representative, the personified power of the Almighty, and thus takes the place of the creator or maintainer of the universe himself, representing the Godhead in respect of its creative power, so also in this passage from the Hebrews a much higher position is assigned to the Son with reference to the world, than was assigned to him by Paul when he conceived the pre-existent Christ as the intermediate instrument of the creation. In this passage he is himself in independent possession of the word of power, by which he maintains the universe, and is therefore the active subject of the omnipotent will to create and maintain it, or personified omnipotence itself, just as the Alexandrine σοφία, and subsequently the λόγος of John, is itself life and light, and not merely the intermediate instrument by which life and light are produced. But although the Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews goes far beyond that of Paul himself, and (precisely like that of the Epistle to the Colossians) raises Christ to the cosmical principle through the introduction of Alexandrine philosophy, yet it has this in common with the older Christology of Paul, that it has not yet bridged over the chasm between the historical view of the earthly Redeemer and the absolute view of the eternal pre-existent Son of God—nay, it brings this chasm most prominently into notice. As the Christology of Paul, in spite of the conception of Christ's pre-existence, and without attempting to reconcile the opposition of the two ideas, persisted in regarding the appearance of Christ on earth as a condition of poverty and humiliation, which was followed by his exaltation, but not until his resurrection, as a reward for his previous humiliation (Phil. ii. 8, 9), so we are now taught also by the Epistle to the Hebrews that God placed Jesus for a short time below the angels, and then, on account of his undergoing death (δὲ τὸ πάθημα, cf. Phil. ii. 9, δὲ—), crowned him with glory and honour (ii. 9); that God made him the heir of all things (i. 2,

ἐθηκε, the historical aorist indicates a definite historical fact); that Christ, after having completed his work of cleansing mankind from sin, sat down at the right hand of majesty in the highest, and became so much more mighty than the angels, as he had obtained a more excellent name than they (i. 3, 4). How this historical commencement of Christ's dignity as our Lord from the time of his exaltation is to be reconciled with his having originally established the world at its beginning (φέρων τὰ πάντα τῇ ἰσχύϊ τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ), is not indicated in the Epistle to the Hebrews any more than in any of Paul's Epistles. We can therefore only suppose that such reconciliation had not yet entered into the writer's field of vision, because he had not yet made the absolute view of the person of Christ, as a pre-existent (and cosmical) principle, the central point of his entire conception, as John subsequently did. The Epistle to the Hebrews raises, it is true, the pre-existent person of Christ still higher than Paul, in making him a cosmical principle, but this conception remains in the background, without exercising any real influence on the writer's view of the historical Christ. On the contrary, he gives far more weight to the human and moral point of view than Paul; he says of Christ, that he was tempted in all respects as we are, only without sin; that he, although a son, learnt obedience from what he endured; that he offered prayers and supplications with tears to Him who was able to rescue him from death, and was heard because he feared God; that he was made perfect through suffering (iv. 15, v. 8, vii. 2, 10). While in Paul's writings Christ in heaven is the pattern of the Christian, it is, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the earthly and especially the suffering Redeemer who is the example of patient faith, the leader and captain of all those who enter into glory through suffering (xii. 2, ii. 10, vi. 20). This stands in the most intimate connection with the peculiar conception of the *work of Christ* which we find in the Epistle to the Hebrews.¹

¹ It is quite possible that the traditions regarding the earthly life of the Redeemer, preserved in Jewish-Christian circles, were more accessible to the author of the Epistle

In this respect also the Epistle to the Hebrews takes up the same ground as Paul's Epistles, inasmuch as the death of Christ is in both the central point of the whole work of redemption. In Heb. x. 5—10, it is said that God has prepared a body for his Son, in order that he might come upon the earth and do the will of God, namely, do away with the sacrifice of animals, in which God had no pleasure, by the better sacrifice of his own body offered once for all. The ποιῆν τὸ θέλημα θεοῦ for the purpose of which God τὸ σῶμα κατηργήσατο for his ἡκῆν (to the earth), consisted in the προσφορά τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ: here also the whole appearance and life of Christ on earth converges towards his death as the true central point of the redemption. But this fundamental idea is not carried out in its details in the Epistle to the Hebrews in the same way as it is by Paul. According to him, the death of Christ is pre-eminently a sacrifice of reconciliation, ordained by God himself, in which Christ takes the part rather of the passive victim than of the active sacrificing priest; in the Epistle to the Hebrews, Christ is at once the victim and the sacrificing priest, and in fact with special emphasis laid on the latter. Here, therefore, the main point, on which the significance and the value of this sacrifice depends, is not what has befallen him through the ordinance of God, the purely objective fact, but the part which he himself takes in it, the subjective moral action. And in close connection with this is the fact, that this sacrificial death is not so much an expiatory sacrifice offered to the avenging justice of God for the redemption from the curse of the law of the sinner who deserves to be punished, but rather a sacrifice of purification and sanctification, the significance of which relates immediately to humanity, to its puri-

to the Hebrews than to Paul; but this would hardly be sufficient to account for the stress which the former lays on the moral example of the suffering Jesus. A more probable reason for this is the hortatory purpose which he had in view, in consequence of the danger his readers were in of taking offence at the idea of a suffering Messiah, as well as of stumbling at the sufferings they themselves had to undergo for Christ's sake (x. 29—35). But the main cause is, doubtless, the dogmatical point of view in which the whole work of Christ is represented in this Epistle.

law (*δικαιώματα σαρκός*, ix. 10), which could not make the sacrificers perfect as to their conscience, but only sanctify them with regard to the purification of the flesh (ib. vers. 9, 13); that is to say, they brought about only a levitical purity, placed the sacrificers and the people for whom the sacrifice was made merely in a condition of theocratic holiness, through an external sanctification (which affected their flesh); but so far were they from being able to take away sin, that they rather served to renew every year the recollection of uncanceled sin, and so could not take away the consciousness of sin and guilt, could not bring about a perfect or entirely satisfactory condition as regarded the conscience, could not purify the guilt-stained conscience and reconcile it to God (x. 1—4, 11, ix. 8—10). On the other hand, the sacrifice of Christ, as it was itself presented blameless through the mediation of the unchangeable Spirit, so also it effects in a corresponding manner the cleansing of our conscience from dead works, (which has the further result of causing us) to serve the living God (ix. 14); it enables us, being sprinkled in our hearts and relieved from an evil conscience, to enter with the full confidence of faith into the sanctuary, the entrance to which Christ has opened to us by his blood (x. 19—22); in short, it produces, by the cancelling (*ἀθίτησις*, ix. 26), the taking away (*περιελείν*, x. 11), the forgiveness of sin (*ἄφεσις*, x. 18), the everlasting perfection of the sanctified (*τετελειώκεν εἰς τὸ διηκεῖς τοῖς ἁγιαζομένοις*, x. 14). These passages, taken alone, are sufficient to show, without the slightest ambiguity, that the *cleansing of the conscience*, which the Old Testament sacrifice could not effect, and which the sacrifice of Christ did effect, consists in nothing else than the *doing away with the consciousness of guilt*. If any one has once been cleansed, then he has no consciousness of sins, that is to say, no more consciousness of guilt (*μηδεμίαν ἔχειν συνειδησιν ἁμαρτιῶν τοῖς ἀπαξ κεκαθαρμένοις*, x. 2); if a man's heart is sprinkled, then he is freed from an evil conscience (*ἐρρηγαντισμένοι τὰς καρδίας ἀπὸ συνειδήσεως πονηρᾶς*, x. 22). And as being freed from an evil conscience, or from the consciousness of guilt, is necessarily conditioned by the

forgiveness of sins, the word *καθαρίζεσθαι* may be considered equivalent to the expression, *ἀφέναι* (ix. 22), and the cancelling (*ἀθέτησις*, x. 26) of sin is no other than the *περιελείν* or *ἀφαιρεῖν* *ἁμαρτίας* (x. 11 and 4), which forms the opposite to the abiding *συνείδησις* and *ἀνάμνησις* *ἁμαρτιῶν* (ib. vers. 2 and 3), and which must therefore signify the doing away, not with the power of sin upon the will, but with the tormenting and defiling consciousness of sin (consciousness of guilt) in the conscience.¹ Nor should the expression, *καθαριεῖ τὴν συνείδησιν ἀπὸ νεκρῶν ἔργων εἰς τὸ λατρεῖν θεῷ ζῶντι*, in ix. 14, throw any doubt upon this well-grounded conclusion. This text refers, no doubt, to the moral worship of God, to the renewing and sanctifying of our lives; but this is expressly described as only an intermediate result and purpose of Christ's sacrifice, whereas the purpose directly aimed at by it is the cleansing of the conscience. But this is not called a cleansing from "dead works" in the sense of freeing the conscience from the doing of evil, or from the works of the law, which is impossible, for the simple reason that the conscience is not and cannot be the subject of moral action, either of bad works or of works of the law; but the conscience always means only the moral self-consciousness, in which the moral worthiness or unworthiness of its deeds makes itself felt to the ego, and which is defiled by the consciousness of such deeds as belong to the domain of spiritual death. Accordingly it is cleansed from dead works by the removal of the tormenting and defiling consciousness of such deeds as belong to death and deliver man over to death; for its being clean consists in the cessation of this consciousness of the guilt of sin (cf. x. 2). And to this we must refer the *ἀπολύτρωσις* *τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ παραβάσεων* (ver. 15), which Christ, as the mediator of the new covenant, has accomplished by his death, in order that those who are called may receive the promise of the eternal inheritance. The connection of these words with

¹ *Καθαρισμὸν τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ποιησάμενος*, i. 3, is also to be understood in this sense. Although this text, taken by itself, might be applied to moral cleansing, i. e. doing away with the dominion of sin, yet all the above-mentioned parallel passages support the other interpretation, namely, taking away the guilt of sin.

ver. 14, shows that this ἀπολύτρωσις is virtually identical with the cleansing of the conscience, in the sense of redemption from the consciousness of guilt. This is suggested, moreover, by the addition of the clause in which the purpose of Christ's mediation is stated; for the attainment of the promised inheritance was impossible before Christ came (cf. xi. 39 f.), because the transgressions committed under the first covenant had resulted in guilt, the real forgiveness of which had not been purchased by all those expiatory acts which were enjoined by the Old Testament. Nor is this conclusion in any way affected by the repeated use of the word ἀγιάζειν as the effect of the sacrifice of Christ. The fact that this word (ix. 13 and 14) is replaced and explained by καθαρίζειν, shows that ἀγιάζειν, as the effect of the death of Christ, does not denote moral sanctification, or giving a new direction to the will; besides which, the word as used in ver. 13, apart from the context, could not possibly refer to moral sanctification; for what meaning could be conveyed to our minds by saying that the blood of goats could morally sanctify those who are defiled (place them in the condition of being morally renewed), in relation to the purifying of the flesh? But the blood of sacrifices has this real significance, that it "sanctifies" those who were defiled with regard to external theocratic purity; that is to say, it places them in the condition of belonging to God, according to the relations established by the theocratic covenant.¹ Accordingly we are compelled by analogical reasoning to understand the ἀγιάζειν, which is the effect of the death of Christ, to mean the *sanctification by which we truly belong to God* in accordance with the relations established by the new covenant (xiii. 11, 12). This is made especially clear by x. 10, ἡγιασμένοι ἐσμέν διὰ τῆς προσφορᾶς τοῦ σώματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐφάπαξ. The word ἐφάπαξ, as well as the connection with the expressions περιελεῖν ἀμαρτίας and ἁφesis which follow (vers. 11 and 18), shows

¹ Cf. Weiss, p. 515. *Riehm*, however (Lehrbegriff des Hebräerbriefs, p. 576), endeavours to connect with this also "the freeing from the bondage of sin in principle,"

that what is here referred to is the placing us once for all in the condition of those who, in consequence of the forgiveness of sins, are freed from an evil conscience, and have access to God, therefore in the condition of belonging to God, without being disturbed by any consciousness of guilt (vers. 19—22). And thus Christians are called *ἀγιαζόμενοι*, ii. 11 and x. 14, not with reference to the condition of moral sanctification, which is a continual process upon which they have entered, but with reference to the condition of belonging to God, which they have accepted through sanctification by the blood of Christ; and the present participle used here denotes that which happens without reference to any particular time, that is to say, which repeats itself in each individual case, and is so far never ended (like *δικαιούμενοι* Rom. iii. 24, and *μέλλει λογιζέσθαι*, iv. 24). This sanctification consisted under the old covenant in the external sprinkling with the levitical purifying blood of animals, but under the new covenant it consists in the sprinkling of the heart in order to freedom from an evil conscience, in the cleansing of the conscience from the consciousness of guilt. It was guilt which had made complete communion with God and the attainment of the promised inheritance impossible. By cancelling this, therefore, a new covenant relation of complete communion with God is consecrated (the "access to the heavenly sanctuary, to the throne of favour, to the city of God, &c., is opened") or the reconciliation with God is effected.

In this fundamental idea, that we are reconciled with God by the death of Christ, the Epistle to the Hebrews entirely agrees with Paul; but the Pauline working out of this idea, the satisfaction of the avenging justice of God by the death of him who is vicariously punished, is not found in the Epistle to the Hebrews. It is true that it approaches very nearly to this thought, and it could not be otherwise; for its author applies to Christ throughout the propitiatory sacrifices of the Old Testament as a type, and these are certainly (cf above, Vol I., p. 95 f.) founded on the idea of a vicarious sacrifice. It is doubtless

for the necessity of Christ's tasting death for every man, in the other passage that has been quoted (ii. 9): instead of showing dogmatically that it was necessary, the author tells us that "it was proper" that, as the other sons of God, so also the captain of our salvation should be brought through suffering into glory (*ἐπεπε γὰρ*, &c, ver. 10),—an assignment of a reason for the death of Christ which is not less different from the teaching of Paul than the doctrine of Scotus on this point is from that of Anselm, or the Socinian doctrine from that of Luther. Under these circumstances, we can hardly resist the conclusion, that the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews had adopted, in its general outlines, Paul's fundamental doctrine of redemption by the death of Christ, but had rejected the method of working it out in detail which had been suggested to Paul by his Jewish beliefs with regard to God and the law,¹ probably because his Alexandrine education tended in an opposite direction; instead of connecting the reconciling effect of the death of Christ in the first instance with the wrath of God that was to be appeased, he connected it *directly* with the removal of man's consciousness of guilt. The road was thus opened to a deeper and more thorough apprehension of redemption than that which is contained in the juridical form of Paul's doctrine, though at first a gap was still left between the means and the end, between the death of Christ and the removal of the feeling of guilt. The inference that this spiritual

¹ Weiss, p. 512 f., and Riehm, p. 541, allow that Paul's idea of vicarious punishment is not directly stated in the Epistle to the Hebrews, but they believe that it must be assumed as a presupposition upon which the above passages rest. But why should this presupposition have constantly remained in the background, if it were really familiar to the writer? Why should it not at least have been expressed where it would so materially have advanced his object, namely, the theodicy with reference to Christ's death? Is it not rather to be inferred that, whether in conscious or unconscious divergence from Paul, he had not by any means made this Pauline thought his own? Küstlin well remarks (Johann. Lehrbegriff, p. 435), "The principle of vicarious suffering is not interposed as a third, between the offered Christ and the cleansing effected in man, but the means and the effect are one." But the question may well be asked, whether this "being one" is really conceivable; and if not, how our author arrived at this extraordinary conclusion? Küstlin has not explained this, and I believe the only explanation is the one above given.

blessedness. But what this condition is, we have to gather partly from the immediate context of this verse itself, and partly from ver. 7, where it is said that Christ entreated the Father, *σῶζειν ἐκ θανάτου*, and was heard because of his piety. This piety is then described in ver. 8, whereupon ver. 9, with the word *τελειωθείς*, evidently takes up again the idea of *εἰσαλασθεῖς* from ver. 7, and so declares that he was rescued from death, which of course refers in this case to his exaltation after his resurrection. After he had thus actually attained to *σωτηρία* from death in his own person, in consequence of his prayer, *σῶζεσθαι ἐκ θανάτου*, being heard by God, he was able in like manner, and for that very reason, to become the cause of the like *σωτηρία* to all others also, who entered upon the same road of *ἡπακοή* as he had taken himself. This it is which makes him the *ἀρχηγὸς τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῶν*, because both the road (*διὰ παθημάτων*), and also the goal (*τελειῶσαι* and *εἰς δόξαν ἀγαγεῖν*) are the same for both—the condition of *σωτηρία αἰώνιος*, of *δόξα καὶ τιμὴ* (ii. 9, 10, comp. with v. 9). *Τετελειωμένος* shows that this condition is established once for all, and cannot be lost, both when the word is used in reference to Christ as the everlasting high-priest, in opposition to the transient and weak human high-priest (vii. 28), and also when it is applied to the blessed in heaven (xii. 23, *πνεύμασι δικαίων τετελειωμένων*); in perfect agreement with which, the attainment of this condition of promised blessedness by the latter is called *τελειοῦσθαι* (xi. 40, *τελειωθῶσι*, parallel to *κομίσασθαι ἐπαγγελίαν* in ver. 29). Thus far, then, the term is used in a simple and consistent sense; it denotes, in the passages that have been quoted, a condition of perfection, which is at the same time a condition of finality, the ultimate end and conclusion of an imperfect state which preceded it—in fact, to put it precisely, the perfect and final condition of the future life, as opposed to the imperfections of the present life. But now *τελειοῦν* is also applied to inward effects produced at the present time, which at any rate are quite distinct from the completion in a future life. It is thus used when it is said of the law that it

συνδοξασθῆαι, are as good as already attained in principle along with the state of justification, because they are ideally secured (τοῦς ἐδικαίωσσε, τούτους καὶ ἐδόξασεν, Rom. viii. 30 and 17, v. 9—11), so also the Epistle to the Hebrews may denote by the same term both the perfection of the final state and the complete satisfaction of the Christian consciousness in this life, because the former is as good as already present in the latter, being ideally secured. And these two ideas can coalesce here all the more easily, because the world of perfection, in which the final completion of the future life occurs, is, according to the Epistle to the Hebrews, not merely a world of the future, but a reality existing at this moment, and projecting itself into this present world, with its powers and gifts in which the Christian already has a share.

Thus, then, it is in the *reference to the heavenly world* that these various views of Christ's work coalesce, and the whole conception assumes an objective character. As the τελειῶσθαι of Christ himself consisted in passing through sufferings and death, from his earthly life of weakness to the heavenly life of everlasting perfection, so his τελειῶσαι εἰς διηκεῖς τοὺς ἀγιαζομένους consists in his opening for them once for all the entrance into the heavenly sanctuary (εἰσοδὸν τῶν ἁγίων ἐνεκαίνισεν ἡμῖν, x. 19 f.). That this entrance into the heavenly sanctuary was not yet revealed in the old covenant, is denoted by the curtain that veiled the holiest in the tabernacle (ix. 8); and whereas the high-priest only entered once a year into the sanctuary behind the curtain, and sprinkled it with the blood of the sacrifice, so Christ has opened the way, once for all, and for all his own, through the curtain, i.e. his flesh (x. 20); that is to say, by devoting his body to death, he has put aside the separating curtain that hung before the heavenly sanctuary (an evil conscience, ver. 22), and has on our behalf gone before us into the inmost sanctuary behind the curtain, into heaven itself (vi. 20), and has sprinkled and purified this sanctuary with the blood of a better sacrifice, his own blood (ix. 23), and has hereby become a perfect high-priest for ever separated from sinners, and exalted above the heavens, and there-

fore exempt from all earthly weakness (vii. 26—28); so that we also have now a firm anchor of hope for our souls, which reaches into that heavenly sanctuary (vi. 19), and may accordingly entertain the joyful assurance that, with true hearts and perfect faith, being sprinkled in our hearts, and freed from an evil conscience, our bodies also being washed with pure water (of baptism), we shall enter into that heavenly sanctuary, the house of God, where we have Christ for our mighty priest (x. 22). It is easy to recognize the dogmatic idea that runs through all this imagery drawn from Old Testament types. It is, that Christ, by devoting himself to the suffering involved in his work of redemption, has, first for himself, and then by the same act for humanity, initiated a new covenant relation between God and man, has opened for mankind that full communion with God which had till then been hindered by the consciousness of guilt, and has thus become the author of our blessedness, the mediator of a new covenant of redemption. The objectivity of the new religious relation of humanity now reconciled to God, the objectivity, that is, of the Christian principle, which Paul fixed by the objective ideas of ἀπολύτρωσις, καταλλαγὴ, δικαίωσις, finds expression, in the Epistle to the Hebrews, in the figure of the opening of the heavenly sanctuary. As we have from the beginning recognized in the heavenly world of the Epistle to the Hebrews the idea of the perfect religion, of the full communion of man with God, which is projected into another world remote from this both in time and place, and yet really extends into the present life of the Christian consciousness, so the opening of this world by Christ, the forerunner and leader of faith, is no other than the opening of the Christian consciousness of full communion with God; and the double aspect of this consciousness,—which knows, on the one hand, that it is already in possession of this full, unbroken, joyful communion with God; and yet looks forward, on the other hand, to its absolute satisfaction in undisturbed perfection only in the completeness of the future life,—is reflected in the double meaning of the word τελειοῦν, as well as in that of αἰὼν μέλλον,

inasmuch as both denote perfection, partly as transcendent in the future state of completion, partly as immanent in the Christian consciousness in this life.

It is to be observed, further, that this idea of the opening of the upper world by Christ, is also to be found in *John*. As Christ is he who came from heaven, so also he will ascend again into heaven, in order to prepare mansions for his own there. He is the way; through him alone we come to the Father. When he is raised, he will draw his own after him (*John* iii. 12, 14, 17). But while, according to the Epistle to the Hebrews, Christ *by his death* unlocks the sanctuary in heaven which was till then shut up, and opens the road to it by preceding us thither, he is represented by John as being able to say to his disciples at the very beginning of his ministry, "Indeed I tell you that *from this time* you shall see heaven opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of Man" (*John* i. 52); he has not to hope for joy and glory as a future crown of victory (*Heb.* xii. 2, ii. 9), but begins his course at once by dispensing abundantly the wine of the higher joys of humanity, and thus revealing his glory (*John* ii. 11). As he himself, the only-begotten of the Father, the life and light of the world, did not first need τελειοθαι, in order to become the αἴτιος σωτηρίας, so also is the τελειοθαι of Christians already realized in their communion of life with God and Christ and with one another in this world, and their joy is full (xvii. 23, ἵνα ὥστε τετελειωμένοι εἰς ἐν, and xvi. 24, ἣ ἁπαρ ἐμῶν ἦ τετελειωμένη). And this view makes it perfectly easy to explain how it was possible for the Epistle to the Hebrews to retain the Pauline connection of the work of redemption with the death of Christ, in spite of its presuppositions which point in a different direction. For if redemption be regarded as the throwing open of the sanctuary in heaven, it is of course a most obvious idea that the death of the body is the decisive turning-point, the transition from the earthly to the heavenly world. In this sense, the death of Christ is, to the mind of John also, the decisive moment of the ἐγερθαι, which is

connected with the communication of the powers of blessing, of the holy spirit (xii. 32, xvi. 7); only it cannot be denied that the figure of the grain of wheat which dies that it may bring forth fruit (xii. 24), is much more applicable to *this* way of looking at the death of Christ, than that of the propitiatory sacrifice, the relation of which to the exaltation of Christ and his opening the heavenly world is only carried out in the Epistle to the Hebrews by means of the Old Testament system of types.

There is yet one other view of the work of redemption to be noticed in this Epistle, which certainly has more affinity to John than to Paul,—the view, namely, that Christ by his death *overcame the devil, as the being who has the power of death* (ii. 24). This relation of redemption to Satan is not found in the earlier teaching of Paul, but John, on the other hand, gives it a remarkable prominence; the whole world of opposition to God is represented by him as a realm which is centred in the person of the devil who is its ruler, as the kingdom of God is centred in the person of Christ; consequently Christ's appearance on earth may, according to this doctrine, be regarded as his coming to destroy the works of the devil. The Epistle to the Hebrews takes a narrower view, inasmuch as the devil is regarded, not as the representative of all wickedness, but as wielding the power of bodily death, that is, the representative of evil, of the punishment of sin, as it were the executioner and jailer of sinful humanity; consequently redemption from him does not at all mean, as it does according to John, the conquering of wickedness, but only the liberation of man from the fear of death, which weighed upon humanity as a curse (ver. 15). Now as death is mainly to be feared on account of the judgment which is to follow it (ix. 27), freedom from the fear of death can only consist in freedom from the terror of judgment, or, regarded psychologically, from the consciousness of guilt. And so this *καταργεῖν τὸν τὸ κράτος ἔχοντα τοῦ θανάτου* turns out to have the same meaning as *καθαρίζειν τὴν συνείδησιν*, only with this difference, which is worthy of note, that the latter expression characterizes the effect of the redeem-

for. The obedience of Noah to the command that he should build the ark, while nothing was as yet to be seen of the predicted flood, was an act of faith; the obedience of Abraham to the call which summoned him to a land as yet unknown to him, as his future heritage, was an act of faith; in the same way Sarah trusted in the divine promise, in spite of the probabilities against it; Abraham was willing to sacrifice Isaac, thinking that God was able to raise him again from the dead; Isaac and Joseph showed in their last wishes their faith in the future of their nation, and in the divine promises regarding it; in faith Moses preferred a partnership in suffering with the people of God to the temporary enjoyment of sin, the ignominy of Christ (taking part in the sufferings of the Messiah with the Messianic nation) to the riches of Egypt, for "he looked forward to the bestowal of the reward;" in faith he went out of Egypt without fearing the fury of the king, for "he was steadfast as if he had seen the invisible God with his eyes." All these and numberless other holy men who performed in faith the acts recorded in the Old Testament, and endured sufferings and death, did not receive the promised blessings of salvation, but only saw them from afar, and were thoroughly persuaded of them, and joyfully hailed them (*ἀποσπόμενοι*), and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth, in saying which they made it clear that they sought as their true fatherland what could be no earthly country, but a better one, that is the heavenly country which God was preparing for them (xi. 13—16). That is the same heavenly world into which the Christians have now entered (*προσεληλύθατε*, xii. 22), since it has been opened to them by Christ who has prepared the way; therefore those holy men of the Old Testament could not be made perfect before, not without us Christians (*μὴ χωρὶς ἡμῶν τελειωθῶσι*, xi. 40). According to this, the faith of the Old Testament is not only in some degree analogous to that of the New as regards its content, as it was shown to be in the instance of Abraham's faith in Rom. iv., but it has precisely the same object, only with this difference, that the holy men of the

Old Testament only saw and greeted this object from afar, while the Christian, on the contrary, has reached it, and, as the way of access to it has once been opened for him, is able at all times to approach the throne of God's favour with joyful ease; in short, the relation in which the holy men of old stood to the promised salvation was that of hope only, but the Christian stands to it in the relation of present enjoyment, combined with hope. In both, faith is directed to the *οὐρανίῃ μέλλουσα* as its object, but to the holy man of the Old Testament this world is still only *μέλλουσα*: he knows that he is still outside of it, as a stranger and pilgrim waiting for and striving towards his heavenly fatherland (*ἐκέρχεται* and *ἐπέρχεται*, xi. 10, 16). His faith, therefore, consists only in the confident hope, which, trusting in the divine promises, gives up everything in order to become a partaker in the object of them. The Christian, on the other hand, already actually possesses, in the act of believing, a share in the immortal kingdom (*βασιλείᾳ ἐσθλαυτορ περιλαμβάνοιτες*, xii. 28), has already obtained the perception of the truth (x. 26), has already become *μέτοχος Χριστοῦ* (iii. 14), is *ἀγιασθείς* (x. 29), *ἐοικισθείς* (32), *γεννάμενος* *τε* *τῆς ἐλπίδος τῆς ἐνοικουμένης αἰ μέτοχος γεννηθείς* *πεινᾷται* *ἁγίοι καὶ ἀπλὸν γεννάμενος* *θεοῦ ῥῆμα*, *ἐκίμενος* *τε* *μέλλουστος αἰῶνος* (vi. 1 f.), he finds himself in possession of a treasure in heaven which exceeds all earthly riches (*ἔχον ἡ ἐν ταῖς ἀράτοις ἐπαρξιν ἐνοικουοῖς καὶ μέουσται*, x. 34). Christian faith is thus present actual experience of the promised blessings of salvation, at least so far as they are of an inward and spiritual kind—the holy spirit, the perception of the truth, freedom from the consciousness of sin, rejoicing at the access to the throne of favour. But in so far as the full realization of that which was from the beginning the object of all the promises, is only possible in the perfect and unchangeable world of the future life, in the actual *αἰῶν μέλλον*, *ἐλπίς* also belongs to Christian faith, and is an essential moment of it; nay, this faith proves its truth and its power, just as that of the Old Testament does, in *καρτερῶν, μὴ ἀσβεστέῃ τῆς ἀπορρησίας*, in *ἐπομένῃ* and *μακροβμία* (x. 35—37).

If we compare this notion of faith with that of Paul, we are at once struck with their difference in two respects, namely, in the subjective form and the objective content. Hope is indeed, according to Paul, an essential consequence, but not an actual moment of faith, because the content of faith is not the future world, but the historical Christ who died and rose again for us. He realizes to himself the Christian principle of salvation in the most concrete form, as the person of the Redeemer, and fixes it most definitely in his death and resurrection. Not so the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. He never regards Christ as an object of faith, neither the person of Christ in general, nor his death or resurrection in particular; but Christ is in his eyes simply the person who has procured for faith its complete content, by having first won it for himself by his own *τελειωθῆναι*; he is his forerunner on the road of faith, who, having brought faith into full manifestation in himself (*τελειωτῆς πίστεως*), has by this act become the example and guide of those who follow in his steps (*ἀρχηγὸς πίστεως*, xii. 2). With these passages in view, the attempt has been made, but not quite justifiably, to place the idea of faith, as explained by the Epistle to the Hebrews, on precisely the same footing as that of the Jewish Christians (of James for instance). It cannot indeed be denied that the faith of the Epistle to the Hebrews, having Christ for its example only, and not for its object, does not bear the specific Christian stamp so directly as that of Paul; but it is notwithstanding very far from being merely faith in (in the sense of hope of) the impending return of Jesus the Messiah to govern his promised Messianic kingdom. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, the blessing of salvation is not regarded merely as the perfection of the future final condition of those who are saved, but it is drawn into the present time also, as a possession which the Christian already has in himself, although its true place is in heaven (x. 34, *ἐχὼν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ὑπαρξὴν ἐν οὐρανοῖς*). The Christian knows that he has already become a partaker of Christ (iii. 14), having been cleansed in his conscience, having devoted himself to God, and entered into com-

munion with Him; his religious consciousness, in short, being completely satisfied, and that in consequence of what Christ has accomplished for him (in that he *τετελείωκεν ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν τοὺς ἀγαθομίους*, x. 14). The *essential matter*, then, with which we are concerned, in the justifying faith of Paul, namely, the inward appropriation of the principle of Christian salvation, is not wanting in the Epistle to the Hebrews; nor is that mysticism alien to it which possesses, in the consciousness of reconciliation with God, substantial salvation, the blessed communion with God of peace and love—in short, the “perfection” of the religious relation to God, as an inward reality. It is only in *the form* that its author differs from Paul, and he does so in a way that involves a disadvantage in one respect, no less than it gives him a certain advantage over Paul in another. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, the blessing of Christian salvation, of reconciliation and communion with God, is apprehended under the conception of the future heavenly world which Christ has opened for us, and is certainly thus removed from us and made transcendent (whether we regard it in reference to place or to time), and this may well appear unsatisfactory as contrasted with the immanent Pauline idea, *Χριστὸς ἐν ἡμῖν*, because a preponderating importance is given to the moment of hope. Inasmuch, however, as that heavenly world to which Christ has opened the way for us, is after all essentially no other than the representation of the kingdom of God founded by Christ, of the perfect communion with God opened by Christ—in short, therefore, of the religion of redemption, this is in reality only the pure kernel of the Pauline object of faith, without its dogmatic husk, in the shape of the vicarious death and the resurrection of Christ. Consequently the faith of the Epistle to the Hebrews is calculated, by the imaginative mysticism of its ideal Christian world, to fascinate minds which would be repelled by the dry dogmatical form of the faith of Paul.

Now although righteousness is directly united to faith in the Epistle to the Hebrews, as well in the writings of Paul, yet it is at once evident that this is done in a different way, because in

the former case the presuppositions of the Pauline doctrine of justification are altogether wanting. It is said in xi 4, that Abel ἐμαρτυρήθη εἶναι δίκαιος through faith, and in ver. 5, that Enoch μεμαρτύρηται εἰρησκηκεῖν τῷ θεῷ, and in ver. 7, that Noah διὰ πίστεως (that is to say, by his act of faith in building the ark before there was anything to be seen of the flood) κατέκρινε τὸν κόσμον, καὶ τῆς κατὰ πίστιν δικαιοσύνης ἐγένετο κληρονόμος. This righteousness corresponding with faith consists therefore in that disposition of the mind and that course of action which is pleasing to God, of which faith, or the firm trust in the divine promises, is necessarily the foundation, for we "cannot please God without faith" (ver 6). All the examples of the righteousness of faith adduced in ch. xi. show the power of faith as manifested in suffering or acting according to the will of God, and for this these heroes of faith received from God the testimony of their righteousness (ver. 39). The faith which manifests itself by obedience is accordingly already in fact righteousness, and therefore has no need to obtain righteousness by means of justification. This righteousness is consequently by no means the Pauline δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ or ἐκ θεοῦ, which is bestowed on man only through a judicial act of God (the act of justification, δικαίωσις), before which act man is so far from possessing it, that he is, on the contrary, ἁσιβής. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews knows nothing whatever of such a judicial act, nor of imputed righteousness, because all the juridical forms taken from the standpoint of the law, under which Christian salvation is here represented, are alien to his Alexandine standpoint. The Epistle to the Hebrews, therefore, does also contain the essential matter, the doctrine of the reconciling favour of God, but expresses it in the terms of which we have spoken above—καθαρίσειν, ἀγιάζειν, τελειοῦν—which were suggested by his view of the Mosaic cultus as a system of types. But it was natural that in holding to the connection of faith and righteousness, which he found ready to his hand in Paul, the author of this Epistle should give it another sense, and especially that he should understand righteousness, not in the peculiar Pauline sense, but in the ordinary sense of

inherent character, of righteousness of life. But when thus understood, it enters into a different relation to faith—it is no longer the divine gift which faith receives, but the human condition which faith produces (οἱ διὰ πίστεως ἐργάσαντο δικαιοσύνην, ver. 33), the property which man acquires (δικαιοσύνης ἐγίς το κληρονόμος, ver. 7). Since faith is thus really the effective cause of righteousness, it can no longer be said that God *imputes* it to the sinner, but only that He recognizes the righteousness which is in believers, and which is manifested by their actions and sufferings, as well-pleasing to Him, and that this recognition is expressed to the believer as a divine *testimony*. Hence such expressions as δικαιοῦσθαι or λογίζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην are not met with, but their place is very expressively supplied by μαρτυρεῖσθαι δίκαιον εἶναι, or ἐραριστηκέναι θεῷ, or simply μαρτυρεῖσθαι διὰ πίστεως (vers. 4, 5, 39). We therefore have here, instead of the Pauline δικαιοσύνη θεοῦ, certainly an ἰδία δικαιοσύνη, although not ἐξ ἔργων νόμον, but ἐξ ἔργων πίστεως. Paul, however, likewise fully recognizes a real righteousness of life of this kind, resulting from the active working of faith (see above, Vol. I. pp. 211 and 223), although he seldom applies the word δικαιοσύνη to this notion of the new Christian morality, because it far more strongly suggests to his mind the righteousness of faith. There is, therefore, no essential contradiction between the doctrine contained in the Epistle to the Hebrews and that of the genuine writings of Paul, though there is certainly this difference in form, that the former expresses the thoughts of Paul in other words, and attaches different thoughts to the word which Paul uses. By doing the first, it forms the transition from Paul to John, who completely divests Paul's thought of the legal dress in which it was originally clothed, but by the second it forms the transition to the doctrine of Paul as it was modified by the Church, to that hybrid theological system in which Paul's words indeed are retained, but the thoughts which are attached to them are not the thoughts of Paul.

The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews delights especially in regarding the Christian life of faith as the moral "worship of

God" (λατρεῖν θεῷ ῥῶτι, ix. 14; λατρεύμεν εὐαρίστως τῷ θεῷ, xii. 28); and this corresponds with the inclination which he constantly displays to employ types drawn from the Old Testament worship. He sets before us, as the "sacrifices" of this Christian worship that are pleasing to God, "the praise-offering of prayer" (which we ought constantly to lay before God as the fruit of the lips which confess his name), "doing good and communicating" (xiii. 15, 16). *Sanctification* is understood quite in the Pauline sense, partly as the object of human striving and conditioned by human effort, by which alone man can attain to seeing God or be made partaker of definitive blessedness, partly as the operation of God who, through the mediation of Jesus Christ, produces in us that which is well-pleasing to Him, and makes us capable of doing his will (xii. 14, διώκετε τὸν ἀγιασμόν, οὗ χωρὶς οὐδεὶς ὄψεται τὸν κύριον: and xiii. 21, ὁ θεὸς καταρτίσαι ἡμᾶς ἐν παντὶ ἔργῳ ἀγαθῷ, εἰς τὸ ποιῆσαι τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ, ποιῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ ἀρεστόν ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ, διὰ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, cf. Phil. ii. 12, 13). It is an object of the deepest solicitude both to Paul and to our author that Christians should be firmly rooted in the faith, that they should not allow themselves to be moved hither and thither by every kind of doctrine, especially that they should not constantly be inclined to return to the ordinances of the Jewish law. The latter is even more decided than Paul in distinctly calling upon the Jewish Christians once for all to free themselves entirely from everything Jewish, to separate themselves from all connection with Judaism, to give themselves up to Jesus who was crucified before the gate, outside the camp (the symbol of the Jewish bond of religion), and to bear his reproach: instead of repeatedly looking backward and being thereby constantly tempted to relapse into Judaism, they should rather seek their future country (i.e. the heavenly kingdom of Christ which is exalted above all limited nationalities, xiii. 9—14). Such a *relapse* would be sinning wilfully against better knowledge, and renouncing the gracious gifts of the future world which had already been experienced, treading the Son of God under foot, accounting the

blood of the covenant a mean thing, doing despite to the spirit of grace, crucifying the Son of God afresh, and openly mocking him (x. 26—31, vi. 4—8). For this sin there was no more expiatory sacrifice, for it consisted in the rejection of that one sacrifice, which is for ever valid; there was therefore nothing remaining for it but a fearful expectation of judgment, of that retributive vengeance which will descend the more heavily on the fallen Christian, in proportion as that which was given to him, and which he despised, was the greater in comparison with the Old Testament blessings of salvation (x. 29, xii. 25). To those who have forfeited their title to favour, God is a consuming fire; it is fearful to fall into his hands (x. 31, xii. 39). If we consider that these passages refer not merely to particular sins, but to a denial of the Christian faith in general, and a direct backsliding from the Christian to the Jewish religion, the strength of the language used by the writer will be quite intelligible. The sentiments of Paul on this point were much the same (cf. Gal. v. 2—4, vi. 7, *θεὸς οὐ μεταγίγνεται*). To escape this fearful danger of relapse and the divine punishment of it, there was all the more need of the greatest earnestness; of a disposition which consists no less of *fear* and *timidity* in view of the terrible award of justice at the hands of a holy God (*λατρεύμεν μετὰ δέοις καὶ σὺλαβείας*, xii. 28, cf. Phil. ii. 12, *μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου*), than it does at the same time of *holding fast to the blessed and comfortable hope* of his award of favour. As faith knows God to be *μισθαποδόστην τοῖς ἐκζητοῦσιν αὐτόν* (xi. 6), so it must prove its earnestness and zeal by the *πληροφορία τῆς ἐλπίδος ἀχρητέλους* (vi. 11), holding fast that confidence which is sure of recompense (*μὴ ἀποβάλητε τὴν παρρησίαν ἡμῶν, ἥτις ἔχει μισθαποδοσίαν μεγάλην*, x. 35). Hope in the *οἰκονομίῃ μέλλουσα* is, we have seen, the sure anchor which reaches into the sanctuary of the upper world, into which Christ, as our forerunner, has entered; and therefore it is only by keeping fast hold of it that our connection with this heavenly world, that is, with the object of Christian faith, the salvation thrown open to us in Christ, can

be retained. This holding fast and persevering through affliction and tribulation is the *μακροθυμία* and *ὑπομονή* by which faith must prove its strength and power of endurance. Consequently this is sometimes connected with faith, and sometimes regarded as exactly synonymous with it, and spoken of as the condition of attaining to the promised salvation (vi. 12, διὰ πίστεως καὶ μακροθυμίας κληρονομοῦντων τὰς ἐπαγγελίας; 15, μακροθυμήσας ἐπέτυχε τῆς ἐπαγγελίας; x. 36, ὑπομονῆς ἔχετε χρεῖαν, ἵνα τὸ θέλημα τοῦ θεοῦ ποιήσαιτες κομίσθητε τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν). True faith is really the disposition which confidently takes firm hold of the invisible world which is the object of its hopes, and is therefore the opposite of cowardly drawing back from fear (of *ὑποστέλλεσθαι*, x. 38 f.).¹

The exhortation to steady perseverance even under the sufferings which may be the consequence of faith, is strengthened by the expectation of the *speedy coming again of Christ*, at which the *οἰκουμένη μέλλουσα* will have entered into the present time, Ἐτι γὰρ μικρὸν ὅσον ὅσον, ὁ ἐρχόμενος ἤξει καὶ οὐ χρονεῖ, x. 37 Then will follow the change of this perishable world, and the commencement of an immovable order of things (xii. 27), when man shall have entered into that sabbath rest which has been kept for the people of God from that first promise of a time of rest, which was not yet fulfilled to Israel. Since, according to the fundamental view of this doctrine, the *οἰκουμένη μέλλουσα* is the world of perfection, of heavenly and unchangeable existence, which is realized at the instant of the second coming of Christ,

¹ This is also a thoroughly Pauline idea, that it is only by holding fast with firmness and perseverance, under sufferings if need be, to the object of faith, that the ultimate end of *σωτηρία* can be attained (cf. Phil. iii. 10—12; 2 Cor. iv. 17 f.; Rom. viii. 17). According to Paul also, it is standing fast in the faith which makes us manly and strong (1 Cor. xvi. 13), and therefore, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, faith is the foundation of perseverance. Only Paul makes the strength of faith to be the consequence of its susceptibility, which quality is thrown into the background in the Epistle to the Hebrews, by the preponderating importance given in it to the *ἐπιζήμια*. Therefore also the sense of the words ὁ δικαίος ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται in Heb. x. 38 ("the righteous will obtain final salvation as the consequence of his perseverance in faith"), is different from that of the same expression when used by Paul (who means that "he who is justified by faith will be blessed"). Compare *Wüster*, p. 527.

while the αἰὼν οὗτος comes entirely to an end and the αἰὼν μέλλων (which, however, is already in a certain sense present) will have come into complete present existence—it is plain that a provisional kingdom of glory interposed between the παρουσία and the end of the world (a millennium) is quite out of the question. On this point, the eschatological ideas of the Epistle to the Hebrews diverge essentially from those of the Apocalypse and of Paul, and take the line which through John has become predominant in the Church. Since the αἰὼν μέλλων of primitive Christianity was thus made identical with the upper heavenly and eternal world of the Alexandrine philosophy, it necessarily ceased to be regarded as a world that was again limited by time, and which belonged to earthly and sensuous space, i.e. as a mere provisionally final state, a millennial kingdom of Christ; it passed into the absolute and definitive final state, which was beyond time and earthly space, and the millennium was thus done away with. For the same reason, because the primitive Christian antithesis of the present and future world was fused with the Alexandrine antithesis of the lower and upper world, a further result followed, namely, that the second coming of Christ lost much of its significance for the individual, because the individual at his death enters at once into the upper world, and hence departed believers are described in plain terms as πνεύματα δικαίων τετελειωμένων (xii. 23).¹ For the

¹ *Richtm.*, indeed, (ut supra, p. 797) says that the resurrection awaits those also who are already πνεύματα δικαίων τετελειωμένων, and consequently "of course" the final εἶσα, so that for them also the final fulfilment of the promises falls within the time of the παρουσία. But this must not be assumed in this off-hand way as a matter "of course." On the contrary, it appears to me far more probable that the fulfilment of the promises has been completely realized to those who have once entered into the heavenly holy of holies, and who enjoy the visible presence of God, and that their τετελειωθῆαι is absolute. With respect to the resurrection, however, it is very suggestive that it is enumerated in the Epistle to the Hebrews among those doctrines which one who is advancing towards perfection should leave behind him (vi. 2). It is not indeed said in this passage that the writer meant to deny this doctrine, but it is certainly intimated that it does not fit in with his Christian system. Moreover, it is a fact that he does not say a single syllable about it in any of the passages in which he speaks of the future hopes of the Christian! This is very easily explained by the

same reason, the *judgment* is here removed from its place at the end of the world, which is ordinarily assigned to it, and connected immediately with the death of the individual, as his passage into the upper (supersensuous) world (ix. 27). This alteration in the eschatological view is logically involved in the idea of the *τελείωσις*, as explained above, of which so much is made in the Epistle to the Hebrews—if this is already inwardly present in the spirit of the Christian, it is clear that it will fully and absolutely realize itself when he lays aside his sensuous body, that the final state is entered upon by the individual immediately upon his entrance into the supersensuous world, and that this is independent of the later event of the *παρουσία*, which accordingly possesses significance only for the Christian community on earth, while Paul makes it the real beginning of the final state for those who have fallen asleep, not less than for those who survive. Alongside of this view, however, we have already found in the writings of Paul another view, according to which the final condition of the individual Christian is, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, immediately connected with the death of his body; and indeed we have seen that this latter view was an original product of his Christian system, more especially of his Christian psychology (*πνεῦμα ἐνοικοῦν*, Rom. viii. 11), which nevertheless he did not reconcile with that other view which he got from Jewish Christianity. It will occasion the less surprise, therefore, that the Alexandrine follower of Paul has exclusively adopted Paul's specifically Christian eschatology, and supported it with his Alexandrine metaphysics.

If we now, in conclusion, look once more at the relation in which Christianity, as it is conceived in the Epistle to the Hebrews, stands to Judaism, we shall find here also a remarkable impress of the principles of Paul. For its author always

consideration that our Alexandrine author fixed his regard much more on the upper heavenly world, than on the future end of this world, of which the resurrection from the dead is an essential moment.

takes the same ground as Paul with regard to practical doctrine, simply presupposing the result of his contests as a fixed axiom, namely, *the independence of the Christian community with regard to Judaism*. He declares the forsaking of the Christian assembly in order to take part in the Jewish worship to be *ἐκνομίως ἀμαρτάνειν*, and requires his readers to break off all communion of worship with Israel, and "to come to Jesus who was crucified without the camp." As the death of Jesus on the cross constituted an actual breach with Judaism (and had thus become the turning-point of Paul's independent Christian consciousness), so should the Christian community likewise "bear his reproach," so that they might regard themselves as thrust out, so to speak, with Christ from the camp of the Israelitish religious community (xiii. 12, 13, compare the same idea expressed in a different figure in Gal. vi. 14). The Epistle to the Hebrews, then, assumes the same practical position with regard to Judaism as Paul, but the theoretical arguments by which it is here established are different and original. Paul apprehended Judaism from the standpoint of the exacting and judging *law*, and accordingly placed it in direct *opposition* to the gospel: the former causes wrath and kills, the latter reconciles and gives life; in the one we are under the curse, in the other we are under the favour of God. The Epistle to the Hebrews, on the other hand, apprehends Judaism from the standpoint of the *cultus*, the central point of which was the expiatory ritual, and accordingly makes it bear to Christianity the *positive* relation of a preparatory institution, which copied Christianity in anticipation. Hence it necessarily followed, that its author represented the Christian ordinance of salvation entirely under the type and in the figures of the levitical ordinance of cultus contained in the Old Testament—Christ as high-priest, his work as a sacerdotal expiatory sacrifice in order to the purifying consecration of the sinful nation; the Christian life of faith likewise as a sacerdotal service, its fruits as a sacrifice pleasing to God; the final state as a sabbatical rest; the Christian community as the people of the Lord,

and their state of salvation as free access to the heavenly holy of holies, as having come to the hill of Zion, to the heavenly Jerusalem, to their heavenly country. Now all this is so far from being founded on the idea that Christianity is merely a higher form of Judaism, and that Judaism was the substance of Christianity, that, on the contrary, Judaism is here for the first time plainly declared to be really an utterly unsubstantial shadow, while Christianity is the original and essential substance. This thought is so clearly and distinctly unfolded under various forms in the Epistle to the Hebrews, that it is not easy to misunderstand it. It was implied first of all by the statement that Christianity was not a copy of Judaism, but that Judaism was a copy of the heavenly sanctuary which is essentially identical with Christianity. What is this, in reality, but saying that Christianity, although apparently the later, is notwithstanding, according to the essence of things, the earlier, that it is eternal; while Judaism is in comparison of only temporary validity, not having its end in itself, but in the appearing of that perfect thing for which it was only a preparation? Hence also the promises and the hopes of the holy men of Israel pointed from the beginning to an object that reached beyond the limits of the Israelitish theocracy, to a sabbath rest in a heavenly country that lay beyond Canaan; it was the heavenly *παρoίς* towards which Abraham had already turned his eyes; it was the reproach of Christ which to him was esteemed by Moses, in view of the future recompense, as greater riches than the treasures of Egypt; therefore all these holy men did not attain to the completion of the promises before the holy men of the new covenant, but at the same time with them (ch. xi.). Just as we cannot help thinking, in connection with this, of the passages in *John* which refer to Christ or his day having been seen by Abraham and Isaiah (*John* viii. 56, xii. 41), so also, finally, the idea, peculiar to this Epistle, that *Christ is a priest after the order of Melchisedec*, forms an exact pendant to the religious philosophy of Paul.

The carrying out of this typical parallel into detail (chap. vii.)

certainly reminds us very strongly of the fanciful treatment of types at a later period, but the whole idea of the type is evidently no other than that of Paul, when he represents Christ as the antitype of Adam, or as the seed of Abraham, to which the promise made to Abraham belonged (Rom. v. 12—21; Gal. iii. 15—29). In these passages the independence of Christianity with respect to Judaism is supposed to be assured by its being represented as virtually anterior in time to the Mosaic institutions, through its immediate connection with the pre-Mosaic Adam or Abraham; while the Mosaic law is represented as having been interposed between the type (promise) and fulfilment as a third which was altogether subordinate, and which possessed only temporary validity. And the typical connection of Christ with the pre-Mosaic Melchisedec has precisely the same meaning. As Melchisedec, owing to his having neither father nor mother, nor beginning nor end of life, is exalted above all human priesthood, and further above the Mosaic priesthood of Israel by the blessing of Abraham, and by his taking tithe from him, and through him from the levitical priesthood, so Christ, the antitype of Melchisedec, is likewise priest of a higher order than the Mosaic priests; and the latter are thus only interposed between the type and its fulfilment, and have already testified through their father Abraham their inferiority to the priesthood of Melchisedec and of Christ. Accordingly the whole Mosaic ordinance of priesthood, and consequently the Mosaic institutions in general ("for where the priesthood is changed, the law also must necessarily be changed," vii. 12), was from the beginning ordained merely as a temporary connecting link, to last till the appearing of the true priesthood of Christ, from which its abrogation at the appearing of Christ follows as a self-evident consequence. Thus the Epistle to the Hebrews has reached, by a somewhat different road, the same result which Paul reached by his speculations regarding the law, and the promise, and its fulfilment—the assurance of the independence of Christianity with regard to Judaism, by repre-

senting its roots and types as dating back before the institutions of Moses, and as the fulfilment and completion of the original religion that existed before Moses—that is to say, as we should understand it, as the realization of the idea of religion, in comparison with which every other religion has merely a temporary and relative value.

THE EPISTLE TO THE COLOSSIANS.

We have seen that the Epistle to the Hebrews is addressed to Jewish Christians who believed that they had not found in Christianity the complete religious satisfaction which they desired, and points out to them that they required nothing more, since the final completion of their religion (*τελειωσις*) had been once for all given in Christ, who was exalted above all finite things, even above all the angels, and was the absolutely "perfect" (*τετελειωμένος*) Mediator between God and man. The Epistle to the Colossians pursues the same object, and from the same standpoint—that of an Alexandrine follower of Paul. Its author also opposes a Jewish-Christian party, which thought that it had not attained to the fulfilment of its Christian life (*πεπληρωθαι*) in Christianity, and therefore sought to supply this supposed want from elsewhere in such a way as to endanger the position of Christ as the sole head of the community and source of their salvation, as well as the purity and freedom of the evangelical life. But whereas the Jewish Christians against whom the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews contended, thought to supply the supposed defect of Christianity only by the Jewish worship and ceremonial law (even with regard to food, xiii 9), the question with the *false teachers of the Epistle to the Colossians* was not of a return to the Jewish ritual, but of an advance to a speculative and ascetic refinement of Judaism, which was amalgamated with Christianity, and represented as the complete fulfilment of it.

They represented to the community at Colosse, which consisted chiefly of Gentile Christians, that their simple Christianity was still defective, and required to be supplemented in two ways—*theoretically* by a *deeper wisdom*, which should penetrate the secrets of the supersensuous world, the world of angels, by a visionary and philosophizing method; and *practically* by a *higher holiness* of life, which should enable them to enter into relation with the pure angel-world, by putting restraint on earthly pleasures. This practical side of the false doctrine is treated of in ii. 16—23. The very first sentence, κρίνειν ἐν βρώσει, ἢ ἐν πόσει, ἢ ἐν μέρει ἑορτῆς, ἢ νοουμηνίας, ἢ σαββάτων (in ver. 16), goes beyond simple observance of the Jewish law, at least with regard to πόσις, and reminds us of the “weak brethren” at Rome, who abstained from the enjoyment of wine and meat with an asceticism which went beyond the law (whether derived from the Essenes or not we cannot tell). But the conclusion of the passage shows still more plainly that the precepts of these false teachers regarding *abstinence and purity* were not those of the Mosaic law, since they are referred (ver. 22) to the ἐντάλματα καὶ διδασκαλίας τῶν ἀνθρώπων. It is plain, however, from ver. 23, ὅτινά ἐστι λόγον μὲν ἔχοντα σοφίας, that their ascetic principles were intimately connected with their notion of “*wisdom*.” It is possible that a dualistic view of matter was also a part of this higher wisdom, which may have been the ground of the ἀφειδία σώματος, and the μὴ ἄψη, μὴδὲ γέση, μὴδὲ θέγης: for if matter be impure and defiled, material pleasures ought to be limited as much as possible. At all events, a peculiar doctrine about *angels* must have been included in it, as this is expressly stated in ver. 18 (to which ver. 23 also clearly refers). The connection between those doctrines and the practices described above is, without doubt, that the apparent humility of an ascetic spiritualization of themselves was supposed to bring men into such a condition of mind, that they could enter into real contact with the pure world of the angels, and penetrate into the secrets of the higher world by revelations made to them in ecstatic visions. This is referred to in

ver. 18, *θρησκεία τῶν ἀγγέλων, ἃ ἐώρακεν ἐμβατεῖων, εἰκὴ φυσιοῖμενος* *ἰπὸ τοῦ νοῦς τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ.* It is not merely regarding angels with respect and reverence (as the Essenes did) that is referred to in this passage, but their boasting of what had been "seen," i. e. of angelic visions, and seeking in them a satisfaction, which the author of this Epistle rightly describes as being puffed up with a feeling that is distinctly not spiritual, but fleshly, as is the case, in fact, with all ecstatic manifestations of that kind. As, however, ecstatic illumination always blindly over-estimates its own supposed revelations, and exalts itself above the revelation of history, or even disdains it altogether, so in this case the doctrine regarding angels, and the worship of them, was connected with a *derogation of Christ's position as the only source of salvation* to the Christian community. Accordingly, ver. 19 proceeds, *καὶ οὐ κρατῶν τὴν κεφαλὴν, ἐξ οὗ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα . . . αὐξεῖ τὴν αὐξησιν τοῦ θεοῦ.* How we are to understand this "not holding by the head," is to be inferred from other controversial passages in this Epistle. It does not imply a complete falling away from Christianity, but a kind of Ebionitish apprehension of the person and the work of Christ, which does not recognize in him an all-sufficient and final revelation of God, nor place all the fulness of salvation in simple faith in him. These false teachers appear to have placed Christ in a subordinate or co-ordinate relation to their angel world, either regarding him as a mere man who had received revelations from the higher world through angels, or as himself an angelic being, but only one out of the entire body of heavenly existences in which the divine life manifests itself in partial powers and in appearances. But if the full revelation of God (*πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος*, ver. 9) had thus not been made in Christ, then his work was not the complete redemption of mankind from the realm of the powers at enmity with God, from the dominion of darkness, and had not completely placed them in the kingdom of light of the higher world. But if Christians are not fully redeemed (*πεπληρωμένοι*, ii. 10) by Christ, *then must*

dates from the destruction of Jerusalem,¹ a false doctrine so far in advance of it as that which is controverted in the Epistle before us can hardly be assumed to have appeared before the end of the first century. But there is so much that is genuinely Pauline both in the beginning and in the practical latter portion of the Epistle to the Colossians, comprising the personal remarks and greetings with which it closes, that it is almost impossible to regard the whole of this Epistle as a later production. It appears therefore to be a justifiable hypothesis, that an original letter of Paul to the Colossians had been retouched by a later writer, in accordance with the later needs of that community. How this was done, whether by the interpolation of single sentences and words into the original text, or by substituting continuously a new text for the old, it would be difficult to ascertain accurately. The dogmatical explanations of the two first chapters of the Epistle, which are entirely confined to controversy against the false doctrines, may in any case be attributed to the later reviser; although particular turns of expression are found in them which may have been retained from the original text. The views of the reviser are those of an Alexandrine follower of Paul, and resemble those of the Epistle to the Hebrews, with which some of his expressions (cf. ii. 17) exactly accord.²

¹ Cf. *Ritschl*, *Altkath. Kirche*, p. 222 f. To regard the Colossian false teachers, as *Ritschl* does (p. 232 f.), as "precursors" of the Christian Ereses, who date from A D 70, is hardly admissible. See, on the other hand, *Holtmann*, "Epheser-und Colossenerbrief," p. 201: "It was not till the beginning of the second century that attempts were made on an extensive scale to give to Christianity the form and fashion of an æsthetic theosophy of the Jewish stamp; and the earliest data for resistance to these attempts are found in the interpolated Epistle to the Colossians. The existence of a false doctrine, according to which the ἀλήθεια was not concentrated in Christ, but spread over the whole upper world of spirits, is as improbable in the age of the Apostles as it is natural in the age of Gnosticism."

² *Ewald* has also observed the mixed character of this Epistle, but thinks it may be accounted for on the hypothesis of the joint authorship of Paul and Timothy, which is not sufficient. *Hitzig* and *Weiss* started the theory of interpolation, and *Holtmann* has quite recently worked it out in the work before quoted. I consider that his reconstruction of the genuine text shows great critical ability, but is not quite convincing in certain parts. As to the time when the original groundwork of the Epistle was composed, I would assign it to the imprisonment of Paul at Cæsarea, to which date the contemporary Epistle to Philemon may probably, and the kindred

The main error of the Colossian false teachers lay in their opinion that historical Christianity did not present to mankind a complete religion, but needed, both on its theoretical and its practical side, to be supplemented by theosophy and asceticism. Their refutation therefore consists in *the positive establishment of the fundamental Christian truth, that complete religious fulness, the perfect and perfectly satisfying religion, is given in historical Christianity.* This is carried out in connection with the nature of Christ and the nature of salvation. The fulness of the God-head has revealed itself in Christ; complete redemption and the universal reconciliation of the world is brought about by him; therefore we Christians are perfected in him, i.e. we have attained to the full possession of salvation, so that we neither need any higher wisdom—for all the treasures of wisdom (so far as religion is concerned) are comprehended in the knowledge of Christ; nor do we need any higher angelic holiness—for by virtue of the death of Christ, appropriated by us in baptism, we are presented before God as holy and blameless, and the supposed higher holiness, which consists of an external asceticism, would be only a falling back from the substance to the appearance or shadow. And thus the simple evangelic preaching of Christ, with the power that it has to guide into the right way, and to

genuine portion of 2 Tim. iv. 9 (not 6)—21 certainly point. But the essential point on which I differ from Holtzmann is, that I do not consider the reviser of the Epistle to the Colossians to be identical with the author of the Epistle to the Ephesians. In the first place, in the particular passages which come into question, the Epistle to the Ephesians appears to stand in a relation of dependence to the Epistle to the Colossians, while the latter never clearly stands in that relation to the former. And secondly, the character and object of these Epistles are essentially different. There is neither any trace in the Ephesians of the false teachers of the Colossians, nor is there in the latter any trace of that tendency to the union of the Church which is the dominating idea of the former. There will be an opportunity, when the doctrine of the Epistle to the Ephesians comes to be stated, of showing the difference of the dominant principles of these two Epistles, as shown in their most important parallel passages. Here in commenting on the Colossians no notice can be taken of the other later Epistle. My opinion is, that nothing has hitherto been so great an obstacle to an accurate understanding of either of these two Epistles as mixing them up together, and overlooking the deep divergence of their main scope and purpose which underlies their apparent similarity.

instruct, is sufficient to present *every man* (and not only the spiritual Gnostics) "*perfect in Christ*." This is the fundamental idea of that portion of the Epistle which is concerned with the refutation of the false teachers, viz., from i. 12 to ii. 23.

It is quite clear from the above, that the *Christological exposition* in i. 15—22, not only forms a part of the refutation¹ of the false teachers, but is really the central point of it, just as the Ebionitish Christology of the false teachers was the real ground of their *μη κραταίρ την κεφαλήν*. The intention of this Christological exposition is to set forth Christ as the only and perfect mediator between God and the world; with the same object also, his complete exaltation above all worldly and created things, as well as his being the very image of God, and containing the fullness of God, are insisted upon. He is, according to i. 15—17, *εἰδὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*, "for in him, by him, and for him, were all things, both in heaven and earth, both visible and invisible, created; he is before all things, and all things subsist by him." As these words express an instrumental relation of Christ to the creation of the world, they evidently refer to the pre-existing Christ.² What is here said about him decidedly goes beyond Paul's notion of Christ being the image of God, and accords with the Alexandrine doctrine of the Logos, which was clearly present to the mind of the writer here, although he does not use the word itself. The very addition of *τοῦ ἀοράτου* suggests this; for it points to the Philonic idea, that God who is Himself concealed can only be made evident by means of the Logos, and is therefore in need of this *alter ego* in order that He may come forth from his seclusion and enter into relation with the world. This is a metaphysical thought which was far removed from the Christology of Paul, because the latter

¹ The denial of this evident fact by *Hofmann*, *Comm. z. Col.* p. 159, is an untenable fiction, only invented for the purpose of keeping out of view the Gnostic Ebionitish character of the false teachers, which was not agreeable to his apologetic tendencies.

² *Schleiermacher's* attempt to refer these words to the work of redemption as the "new creation" may now be regarded simply as an exegetical curiosity.



did not proceed from a metaphysical idea of God at all, but from the idea of the exalted Christ. Again, when Christ is here called *πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*, we are reminded of *πρωτότοκος ἐν πολλοῖς ἀδελφοῖς*, Rom. viii. 29, as well as of *πρωτότοκος ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν*, which immediately follows in ver. 18; but whereas both these latter predicates are applied to the historical Christ, and to the moment of his resurrection, when he became the first of spiritual men and of the perfected sons of God, the expression first quoted refers, not to the historical Christ and his temporal relation to the Christian community, but only to the pre-existent Christ and his eternal relation to the created world in general, and is therefore as far removed from the real ideas of Paul as it is verbally in close accordance with *Philo*, who repeatedly describes his Logos as the *πρωτόγονος* and *πρεσβύτερος υἱὸς θεοῦ* in comparison with the world. When, therefore, his relation to the world, and indeed to the creation and maintenance of it, is so described in the verses following, that the more general expression with which he commenced, *ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκτίσθη τὰ πάντα*, is turned into *δι' αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἐκτισθαι τὰ πάντα . . . καὶ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνεστήκει*, this goes decidedly beyond the old Pauline Christology, according to which Christ was indeed the personal instrument of the creation of the world (*δι' αὐτοῦ*, 1 Cor. viii. 6), but not the *ultimate end* of it; on the contrary, *εἰς αὐτόν* was distinctly reserved by Paul for God alone, so much so, that Christ was finally to give back into the hands of God the dominion which God had lent to him, in order that God himself might be *τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν* (1 Cor. xv. 28 compared with Rom. xi. 36). Moreover, that the world should subsist by Christ (*συνέστηκεν ἐν αὐτῷ*, ver. 17), goes beyond the part of an intermediate agent in the act of creation, and makes Christ to be permanently the centre and the turning-point of the creation, and thus simply a *cosmical principle*, which no longer agrees with the Pauline idea of the "heavenly or spiritual man," although it quite accords with the Alexandrine notion of the Logos, as is the case with the Christology of the Epistle to the

Hebrews, where the expressions used in i. 3 (*ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης*, and *φέρων τὰ πάντα τῷ ρήματι τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτοῦ*) are perfectly analogous with those of the Epistle to the Colossians. After Christ has thus been described as the creative and sustaining principle of the world, absolutely exalted above all other beings, our author descends from this height of metaphysical contemplation to the historical relation of Christ to the community, as that of the head to the body (ver. 18). The comparison of the community to the body of Christ is indeed to be found in the early writings of Paul, but not the designation of Christ as the head of this body. Christ was rather represented by Paul as the spirit which animated the body of the community; his designation as "*head*" is very characteristic of this Epistle; it symbolizes that *absolute dependence of the community on Christ*, of which the cosmical position of the pre-existent Christ would form only the metaphysical background, and on which the controversy with the Ebionitish Gnostics of necessity essentially turned. (Finally, the same comparison is made from yet another point of view in the Epistle to the Ephesians. There Christ is not only the head on which the whole body depends, but also the head which finds in the rest of the body its necessary completion (*πλήρωμα*), and at the same time again, in accordance with Paul, the spirit which animates, penetrates, and fills the whole;—evidently the most enlarged conception of the relation between Christ and the community, which must have had as its basis both that of Paul and also that of the Epistle to the Colossians.) When, again, the position of Christ as head of the community, which, as we have seen above, was founded on his metaphysical place in the universe, is also referred to the historical moment of the resurrection, when he became the "*first-fruits*," the first-born from the dead, in order that he might be the first of all men, this historical foundation of his *πρωτεύειν* does not well agree with what precedes and follows (ver. 19), but agrees all the better with the genuine Pauline Christology, in which Christ's position as the first-born (*πρωτότοκος*, Rom. viii 29), and his being the

first-fruits (*ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κεκοιμημένων*, 1 Cor. xv. 20), is connected with the resurrection in language similar to that used here. It is therefore quite possible that these words, *ὅς ἐστιν ἀρχὴ, πρωτότοκος ἐκ νεκρῶν, ἵνα γένηται ἐν πᾶσιν αὐτὸς πρωτεύων*, are retained from the original text of Paul's letter, and that they have become the point of connection for our entire Christological exposition (in which case the meaning of *ἐν πᾶσιν*, "among all," would be fixed with so much the more certainty by the parallel passage in Rom. viii. 29, whereas in connection with their present larger context they may appear to be doubtful). The conjecture that we have in ver. 18 a remnant of genuine Pauline Christology inserted into the later Christology of the reviser of the Epistle, will appear the more probable when we observe that ver. 19, again, contains an expression which is in striking contrast to the words of ver. 18, which immediately precede it. For while the latter connect the exaltation of Christ with the resurrection, and therefore presuppose his previous earthly life to have been a condition of humiliation (cf. Phil. ii. 7 f., 2 Cor. viii. 9), according to ver. 19 the whole fulness of the Godhead already dwelt in Christ during his earthly life. For τὸ πλήρωμα must in any case be explained by the more definite parallel passage in ii. 9, as *πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος*. This entirely excludes the relation to the whole realm of redemption, or to the community, which, though found in another connection in the Epistle to the Ephesians, has been introduced quite unjustifiably here. "The fulness of the Godhead" which dwelt in Christ "bodily," can only mean the whole of that portion of the revelation of the divine life and being which was offered to the world, or the fulness of the divine powers of salvation and redemption, which by their historical appearance in the world have given rise to a religion of completed revelation and of perfect salvation. This is placed beyond all doubt by the connection of the two passages, i. 19 and 20 and ii. 9 and 10, which perfectly accords with this view. It is a question of only secondary importance here, whether the writer found the expression already used by

the false teachers to indicate the invisible powers (the angel world or later æons) in which the divine essence had unfolded itself. It is well known that the later Gnostics used the expression for their world of æons; it has not yet been proved that the earlier Ebionitish Gnostics of our Epistle likewise did so, but it is not of course for that reason impossible. The use of the words in i. 19, without any kind of explanation, makes it certainly probable that the writer ventured to assume that they were familiar to his readers; in that case, then, he simply intended to say to the false teachers—the fulness of the divine life is not distributed amongst the many beings who make up the spiritual world, so that we can only come into contact with it by means of asceticism to make us like the angels, and by visions of angels, but it has come down into the *one man* Jesus Christ, so that in him, in his historical personality, it has, as it were, found its “body,” the form of manifestation which comprehends its unity. This is the force of the words, ii. 9, ἐν αὐτῷ κατοικεῖ πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τῆς θεότητος σωματικῶς: and the last word is neither intended to teach the true humanity of Christ in opposition to a Docetist Christology (of which no trace is anywhere to be found), nor does it indicate a heavenly body of light,¹ an idea which would be quite out of place in connection with this passage, but it is meant to emphasize the way in which the fulness of the Godhead came to dwell in the one historical Christ, in opposition to the supposed plurality of the abstract spiritual forms of the false teachers. This would be

¹ This view, which Weiss also defends, p. 428, misapprehends the real gist of the passage before us in connection with what follows, and consequently that of the entire controversial portion of the Epistle, that is to say, the insisting on the concrete notion of Christ as the bearer of revelation, who appeared in historical reality, in opposition to the abstract spiritual beings of a fanciful and unhistorical Gnosticism. The use of the present tense, κατοικεῖ, cannot be made an argument against the interpretation we are maintaining, for it is self-evident that the indwelling of the fulness of the Godhead in the historical person of Christ has suffered no diminution in consequence of his exaltation. The point, however, did not lie in the exalted Christ, but in the historical earthly Christ, because it is his earthly work of redemption on which all the following declarations regarding salvation (vers. 10—15) depend. This connection has indeed been generally overlooked, both in this passage and in i. 19 f.

perhaps most suitably translated into the categories of modern thought by the expression "concrete actuality." But if we look more closely into this idea, we shall find that two different thoughts are contained in it—the being apprehended in unity, and the having appeared historically. Because the fulness of the Godhead is apprehended in its unity in Christ, he is specifically different from all other spiritual beings, *κεφαλὴ πύσης ἀρχῆς καὶ ἑξουσίας* (ver. 10); and because it has actually and historically appeared in him, therefore he has become for us, the Christian community, the ground of our complete redemption (*καὶ ἵστε ἐν αὐτῷ πεπληρωμένοι*, *ibid.*). Thus the historical earthly person of Christ is distinctly indicated by the connection between ii. 9 and ii. 10, as well as by the word *σωματικῶς*. The very same thing is intimated by the two aorists *εἰδόκησε* and *κατοικῆσαι* in i. 19, and by the connection with the following verse; that is to say, the aorists denote a definite moment of time, when it was well-pleasing to God that the fulness (of his revelation) should take up its abode in Christ. This verse cannot possibly therefore refer to the eternal being of God in the pre-existent Logos, but to the indwelling of the fulness of the revelation of God in the historical Redeemer Jesus. Now it would certainly be possible, with reference to what goes before, to understand the resurrection of Christ to be the moment of this *κατοικῆσαι*, only this interpretation is distinctly forbidden by the close connection with what follows, where the reconciliation of the universe by the cross of Christ, therefore by the earthly Christ, is added, as the wider object of the divine *εὐδοκεῖν*, to the former one, and is thereby evidently indicated as subsequent to it.¹ Accordingly, we must refer *εἰδόκησε* and *κατοικῆσαι* to the

¹ Compare with this *R. Schmidt*, *ut supra*, p. 209. "Unless the statement of the indwelling of God in Christ is to stand quite apart from the connection, it must be understood to be only a pre-supposition for the intended restoration of all things (ver. 20); but for this very reason the moment at which that indwelling commenced must not be placed in a period subsequent to the realization in principle of this restoration." This appears to be incontrovertible, and moreover to be completely established by the parallel passage, ii. 9 and 10, when rightly understood. What *Wefel*,

beginning of the earthly personality of the Redeemer, to the time when the pre-existent image of the invisible God, and the mediator of his revelation, became man. The connection of the two verses will then be as follows—because the historical Redeemer Jesus was no other than the primordial bearer of the divine image, and the mediator of the divine revelation in the universe (vers. 15—17), and because as having appeared in time, he also during his whole appearance on earth bore the fulness of the divine powers of life in himself (ver. 19), therefore he was able to complete the work of reconciliation, and that perfectly, that is to say, in perfection both extensively and intensively—as extending over the whole universe without exception (ver. 20 and ii. 10), and as securing unconditionally for every individual the final end of religion, that of being pleasing to God. We must accordingly admit that i. 19 and ii. 9 contain a declaration that the historical Christ during his earthly existence bore in himself the fulness of the Godhead, and by this alone was qualified for his work of reconciliation; and this is a thought which is distinctly opposed to the genuine Christology of Paul; for according to this, even in its latest form which it assumes in the Epistle to the Philippians, the earthly life of Christ was a condition of humiliation and emptiness, and by no means one in which he possessed the fulness of the Godhead; but, on the contrary, the putting off of the divine shape is there made the condition of the possibility of the work of Christ. The passage before us also goes far beyond the view of the Epistle to the Hebrews. It has already taken up the ground of the theology of John, in which likewise the stress is mainly laid on the point of the eternal Logos having appeared in a bodily form in the person of Jesus (compare $\delta \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma \sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{x} \epsilon\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\tau\omicron$ with $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omega}\varsigma$), and constantly dwelt in him (comp. $\epsilon\sigma\kappa\eta\gamma\acute{\omega}\sigma\epsilon\tau\epsilon\iota \epsilon\gamma\ \eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$ with $\kappa\alpha\tau\omicron\iota\kappa\epsilon\iota$).

As, again, in the Christology of John, so also in the Epistle to

p. 123, says against it is very unsatisfactory, and is probably due rather to his wish to harmonize this passage with the Epistle to the Philippians, than to an unbiased consideration of it.

the Colossians, the work of Christ is only the realization in time of that which Christ was essentially from the beginning in relation to the world. If Christ, according to Col. i. 16 f, is, from the very beginning, the central point which holds the world together, by whom and for whom all things were created, then the purpose of his work on earth corresponding thereto, is no other than this—to establish in reality that unity which the world always possessed ideally in him, who is its transcendent principle, but which did not yet actually exist (or which had ceased to exist),¹ and to do this by bringing together to himself—the ideal centre—that which was separated, by reconciling to unity in himself that which was severed. This doctrine of reconciliation agrees closely with the Christology of the Epistle before us, while it differs not unessentially from the genuine Christology of Paul. Its most striking peculiarity is its relation to the heavenly world, to the invisible spiritual powers. As in ver. 16 the whole of that which is created in Christ, by him and to him, is set forth in the words τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, τὰ ὁρατὰ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα, εἴτε θρόνοι, εἴτε κυριότητες, εἴτε ἀρχαὶ εἴτε ἱερωσύαι, so now in ver. 20 the whole of that which is reconciled by him and to him is set forth in the words εἴτε τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, εἴτε τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. And both expressions evidently serve the same purpose, namely, to emphasize the exaltation of Christ alone as the κεφαλὴ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ ἱερωσύας (ii. 10), in opposition to the false teachers who degraded him by placing him below their angel world. From this controversial point of view, we shall have to consider more closely the idea of a reconciliation of the heavenly world of spirits. It is evident that the false teachers

¹ Whether ἀποκαταλλάσσειν implies the restoration of a unity which originally existed, but which had been lost through sin, cannot be inferred with certainty from the composition of the word; and as there are no other means of deciding the point, it is better to regard it as an open question. And this is the case also with regard to that other question—how far the angel world also was in need of reconciliation. Our author has never reflected upon this, because the only thing that concerned him was, that the whole of the angel world, far from being able to become an independent means of salvation, is in some way or other connected with the sole mediation of Christ, the absolute mediator between God and the world.

obscured the perfection of Christ's work of redemption in two ways—first, by their positive worship of angels, whereby they sought other mediators of communion with God, beside and above Christ; and, secondly, by their opinion that the Christian, by virtue of his material body, was always subject to a certain dominion of hostile spiritual powers, from which he could escape only by spiritualization (and circumcision). When our Epistle teaches, in opposition to this, that Christ was also a reconciler for the heavenly beings, and head of every power and dominion (amongst them), we must take this to have two meanings—first, that there was no being, even in the angel world, independent of him, which could be an independent mediator of communion with God, for that they all were rather themselves also bound in some way to his mediation; and, secondly, in the sense that there were no longer, for the redeemed Christian, any hostile spiritual powers from whom they had to free themselves by their own redemption, since, on the contrary, all such hostile powers had been deprived of their dominion by the cancelling on the cross of Christ of our bond, the ground of their claim against us. The apparent discrepancy, that the heavenly powers are represented in one passage as reconciled by Christ (i. 20), in another passage as conquered by him (ii. 15), is simply explained by the two-fold relation in which the mediation of Christ alone is opposed to the Gnostic Ebionitish ideas regarding angels and regarding salvation. Especially interesting is the turn of thought found in ii. 15 in connection with ver. 14. The reconciling effect of the death of Christ is here represented under two different forms—as the blotting out, taking out of the way, and nailing upon his cross, of the bond which bore witness against us in the commandments; and again as the stripping and leading away in triumph of the (hostile) spiritual powers and dominions (of the invisible world, which must be meant here after what has been said in i. 16). The *χειρόγραφον τοῖς δόγμασιν, ὃ ἦν ἰπεναντίον ἡμῶν* (ver. 14), cannot possibly denote anything but the law, so far as it is the *γράμμα ἀποκατεῖνον* (3 Cor. iii.), or the *κατάρτα*

part, called into operation by our disposition, which is alienated from God, and by our evil deeds. We have here, therefore, exactly the same turn given to Paul's theory of reconciliation as in the Epistle to the Hebrews;—the relation in which reconciliation stands to God, to his anger or avenging justice, is replaced by a two-fold, viz., an objective and subjective relation; first, by the relation to the hostile spiritual world, the devil and his kingdom, from whose power Christ has released us; and, secondly, by the relation to the subjective religious consciousness of mankind, which is changed from a state of alienation from God, and severance from Him by sin, to a state of reconciliation. Both these views are connected with the transition from Paul's theory of redemption to that of John.

Moreover, the teaching of the Epistle to the Colossians with regard to *subjective salvation* is in a great measure determined by its opposition to the false teachers. The same is the case with the general descriptions of the Christian state of salvation: "God has made us fit (to receive) the heritage of the saints in light, for He has rescued us from the dominion of darkness, and transferred us to the kingdom of his beloved Son, in whom we have redemption (through his blood¹), the forgiveness of sins" (i. 12—14). The "*heritage of the saints in light*" is the future glory (δόξα), into the inheritance of which Christians are already installed as children of God (Rom. viii. 17, &c). This certainty of the inheritance at some future day, which is given at the same time with sonship, is here expressed by *ἰκανώσας ἡμᾶς*, meaning that He has placed us in a state in which we are fit, and therefore certain, to possess that inheritance at some future time. The means by which God has placed us in that condition are stated in the next two verses, the transference from the state of sin to that of his favour is expressed by "rescuing us from the dominion of darkness, and transferring us to the kingdom of his beloved Son." The expression *ἐξουσία τοῦ σκότους* is not merely suggested by the word *πρωτὶ* in the preceding verse, but is certainly used in

¹ These words are not found in the best MSS.

allusion to the false teachers, according to whom even Christians were not yet entirely free from the *ἐξουσία* of the hostile spiritual powers, but had to practise asceticism in order to free themselves entirely from it; it is thus an anticipation of the idea expressed in ii. 15. "*The kingdom of the Son of his love,*" as the kingdom of God is here remarkably designated, forms the expressive contrast to the dominion of darkness. In the writings of Paul we neither find the kingdom of God called the kingdom of Christ, nor Christ called the Son of the love of God; but both these expressions are suitable to the purpose of this Epistle, and are especially apposite in this context, inasmuch as the fullest possession of every blessing of salvation, and absolute security against all the powers of darkness, are guaranteed to the Christian, if he can see in Christ the focus of all divine love, and regard him as wielding all the sovereignty of God. Finally, we are told in ver. 14 by what means that transference from the kingdom of darkness into that of Christ has been brought about—"In Christ we have redemption: that is to say, the forgiveness of sins." It should be noted that in this passage, as in the Epistle to the Hebrews, ἀπολύτρωσις is identified with ἀφεσις ἁμαρτιῶν: whereas in Paul, according to Rom. iii. 24, it is an objective institution of God for redeeming the sinner from his avenging justice by means of the ransom of Christ's propitiatory sacrifice, which has as its consequence—as another objective act of God—the acquittal of the sinner, or declaring him to be righteous, which then in turn produces the subjective state of freedom from the consciousness of guilt, or of peace with God (Rom. v. 1). Thus in Hebrews ix. 15 f., and likewise in Col. i. 14, ἀπολύτρωσις is immediately related to the liberation from the consciousness of guilt, or to the subjective state of certainty of the forgiveness of sins which we have in Christ, in believing in him as the Son of the love of God. We find, therefore, that just as above in the account of the work of Christ there is no trace of the original Pauline notion of God as one who had to be reconciled, so here also the juridical notion of acquittal or justification is absent; the word *δικαιοῦν*

does not occur in our Epistle; instead of it we have a notion which does not occur in Paul's Epistles, ἀφενεῖς ἁμαρτιῶν, not in the sense of a divine act, but of a human state of freedom from guilt, which we possess as a subjective blessing of salvation in our communion with Christ by faith (this is the only way in which ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν, &c., can be understood). We must also connect with this state of absence of guilt the words of ver. 22, according to which the purpose of the death of Christ was παραστήσαι ἡμῶς ἁγίοις, καὶ ἀμώμοις, καὶ ἀνεγκλήτοις κατενώπιον αὐτοῦ (sc. θεοῦ): for the connection of the dominating ideas, ἀποκαταλλάσσειν and εἰρηνοποιεῖν, forbids us to understand these three predicates as referring to moral purification or renovation, and compel us rather to refer them to the peaceful relation of man to God undisturbed by any consciousness of guilt, or to harmonious communion with God, and therefore to take ἅγιος in the sense in which ἀγιάζεσθαι is used in the Epistle to the Hebrews. This perfection of the Christian consciousness of salvation is also expressed in ii. 10 by the pregnant words, καὶ ἔντε ἐν αὐτῷ πεπληρωμένοι, which infers the Christian's complete fulness of salvation from the indwelling of the complete fulness of God in Christ. We have here the same intimate connection between πληρωμα in reference to the nature of Christ, and πεπληρωθῆναι, as we have in the Epistle to the Hebrews between the νῦν εἰς αἰῶνα τετελειωμένος and the τελειοῦσθαι of the Christian; but as the word τελειοῦσθαι refers partly to the present, as inward cleansing of the conscience, and partly to the future, as external glorification, so also πεπληρωθῆναι in this passage is in the first instance only the redemption and giving of new life, which consists in the complete forgiveness of sins (ver. 12 f), and not yet the full possession of ζωῆ, or, if it is the ideal possession of it, yet not the real enjoyment of ζωῆ; for it is expressly said in iii. 3 f., that the ζωῆ of the Christian is for the present hidden in God with (the exalted) Christ, and will only be revealed when he is also revealed (at his second coming) to Christians, and in his δόξα. According to this, the ζωῆ αἰώνιος—

for it is of this alone that he is speaking—is indeed at the present time in the possession of the Christian (ἡ ζωὴ, ἡμῶν), but it has not yet become inherent in him, he has not yet got it as ἐν αὐτῷ μένουσαν (1 John iii. 15), but it is at first only a possession laid up for him in heaven in the hands of Christ and God. This is precisely the same view as that of the Epistle to the Hebrews (cf. especially x. 34—ἔχειν ἐν αὐτοῖς κρείττονα ὑπαρξιν ἐν οὐρανοῖς); and both are a mean between the πιστεύομεν ὅτι συνήξομεν of Paul and the ἔχομεν ζωὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς of John. Finally, with regard to the words in i. 28, ἵνα παραστήσωμεν πάντα ἄνθρωπον τέλειον ἐν Χριστῷ, it is questionable whether they are to be understood in the sense of the words ἅγιος καὶ ἁμωμος καὶ ἀνέγκλητος in ver. 22, and πεπληρωμένος in ii. 10, as referring to the perfection of the state of Christian salvation, which requires no completion from without, or to the moral perfection which is the object of the striving after sanctification. The latter is more probable for this reason, that the subject treated of is not the immediate object of the work of Christ, but the ultimate end of νοουθετεῖν and διδάσκειν, of pastoral edification, which must at all events keep in view at the same time moral perfection. But even then the repetition of the words πάντα ἄνθρωπον suggests the thought that Christian perfection is not a privilege of individual (Gnostic) Christians, depending on sectarian wisdom or asceticism, but an end which is attainable by every Christian, by the practically and theoretically edifying power of the universal preaching of the gospel.

We see, from what has already been said, that it is a main object of our Epistle to impress deeply on its readers the perfection of the Christian salvation. Its author, therefore, carries out this idea, not merely in a general way, but also in particular relation to the special points in which the false teachers thought that simple Christianity, especially that of the Gentile Christians, required to be supplemented. If these teachers affirmed that the Gentile Christians were still subject, through their fleshly body, to the dominion of the unclean spiritual powers,

unless they escaped from it by the symbolically purifying act of circumcision, and by ascetic abstinence from any defiling contact with matter, they were refuted in two ways: in the first place, the hostile spiritual powers, to whom the Gentile Christians were supposed to be still subject, had already been stripped of their power over men by the death of Christ, as a conquered foe is stripped of his armour (cf. *supra*, p. 110); secondly, the Gentile Christians had put off, by the circumcision of Christ, at their baptism (ii. 11 f.) their fleshly bodies, through which they were supposed to be subject to those powers; so that their redemption, regarded both objectively and subjectively, has already been perfectly completed, and stands in no need henceforth of any self-redemption by their own power. This conception of baptism as the "*circumcision of Christ*"—that is, as the Christian analogue or counterpart to the circumcision of the Jews—makes its first appearance here; and the point of comparison depends on this, that baptism, as the being buried with Christ—that is, as a mystical appropriation of the death of Christ—is an ideal putting away of the fleshly body, just in the same way that circumcision, as the symbolic putting away of one part of the body, denotes the putting away of the whole. The idea that baptism is the being buried with Christ, is taken, so far as the words are concerned, from Rom. vi, but whether it has the same meaning as in that passage, where it denoted the cessation of the life of sin, becomes very doubtful when we consider the continuation of the figure on its positive side. In baptism we have also been raised with Christ, by faith in the power of God which raised him from the dead; that is to say, God has also by virtue of the same power raised to life with Christ those who were dead in their transgressions and in their uncircumcised flesh (those who had been Gentiles), by pardoning all our transgressions (vers. 12, 13). Here the sense is decidedly different from that of Rom. vi, in spite of a great similarity in the words. That baptism in the latter passage is not said to be the

συνεγερθῆναι, is probably no mere accident, but is connected with the fact, that in the context the participation of Christians in the resurrection of Christ is in the first place connected with their assuming his likeness after their death (cf. *supra*, Part I. p. 195), and their present newness of life, in the moral sense, is deduced from that ground as its necessary practical consequence. *Συνεγερθητε* in our Epistle, on the contrary, certainly does not refer to the future life, but exclusively and immediately to the new inward life that begins with baptism. But this expression, again, has not, like *καινότης ζωῆς* in Rom. vi. 4, the sense of a new moral direction given to the life, but that of a new religious privilege, namely, that of the forgiveness of sins, which is conferred on man through his faith in Christ. This is made perfectly clear by ver. 13, where *συνεζωποποίησεν* is explained by *χαρισάμενος ὑμῖν πάντα τὰ παπτώματα*, which is further carried out in the participles of vers. 14 and 15, which allude, as we have already seen, to the doing away with the guilt which separates us from God, and subjects us to the dominion of darkness. If this latter is a disastrous condition, a state of spiritual death, then rescuing us from it by placing us in the state of salvation (in "the kingdom of the Son of his love") is giving us a new religious life, even though the full *ζωή* is still only an ideal possession, and not yet an actual reality (cf. *supra*, remarks on iii. 3). But this does not hinder the Christian's state of salvation from being a perfect unconditional one.

From the existence of this complete salvation is then deduced, as its practical consequence, in the first place the negative proposition, that *bodily asceticism* is not only not necessary for a Christian, but is rather a *falling back* from the essence to the appearance, from the higher striving to the lower earthly one. For all the externalities, on which the practice of the false teachers turned, stood in the same relation to Christianity as the bodiless shadow to the real substance (the Epistle to the Hebrews had already placed the ritual ordinances of the Old Testament

in the same light); they belonged to the sensuous elements of the world (στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου),¹ to which the Christian has died with Christ; therefore he should no longer occupy himself with precepts which relate only to the use of sensuous and perishable matter, and which can only possess significance for those who still cling in their religious and moral life to the sensuous world. So far, therefore, is this false asceticism from being of any service towards true liberation from the life of the flesh, that it rather conduces, on the contrary, "to the contentment of the flesh" (to the satisfaction of the cravings of fleshly pride, ver. 23 — πρὸς πλησμοσὴν τῆς σαρκὸς, comp with ver. 18, εἰκὴ φιλοτιμούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοῦ τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ). Instead then of striving after that which is earthly, as the ascetics also do after their fashion, the true Christian should, on the contrary, seek the possessions of the world above, which he knows to be the home of Christ who is his life. This turn of thought at once reminds us of the Alexandrine opposition between the upper and the earthly world (cf. the Epistle of the Hebrews), and also of Phil. iii. 20. This is, however, made the occasion for the exhortation to *true Christian sanctification*, by laying aside the old and putting on the new man. And the turn of thought is peculiar here, being kindred with that of Rom. viii. 13 and Gal. v. 24, but coloured by the Alexandrine philosophy, iii 5, νεκρώσατε τὰ μέλη ἡμῶν τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, by which are meant the ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ παθήματα τῆς σαρκός. The description of the new man as one who is renewed εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ ἀγίου πατρὸς αὐτοῦ, ver. 10, is also peculiar. The latter words refer to the image of Christ, the Son of God, who is also the image of God, to whose likeness, according to Rom. viii. 29 also, the children of God will be conformed. But that ἐπίγνωσις should be represented as the distinct purpose of

¹ The notion has certainly this sense in Col. ii. 20, which agrees with Gal. iv. 3—9; but whether it has the same sense in ver. 8, is not so clear, it almost appears as if it should be explained there by κατὰ τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν ἀποστόλων which precedes it. It is not impossible that the reviser found the notion in the original text of the letter, and gave to it in ver. 8 this erroneous meaning.

this renovation, is a peculiar feature which conclusively indicates the standpoint of this Epistle.

If these false teachers, in support of their theoretical and practical divergences, boasted of a higher wisdom (ii. 23, and *φιλοσοφία*, ii. 8), our Epistle not only shows that their supposed higher wisdom was false, because it was unchristian and injurious to the fundamental truths of the Christian consciousness, but it also sets forth in opposition to them the true wisdom, which consisted simply in the deeper knowledge of Christ, and of the divine secrets revealed by him. It developes such deeper knowledge of Christ and his works in i. 15—22, by proving to its readers the perfection of their Christian salvation, from the absolute significance of Christ as an eternal mediating principle between God and the world. But the author of this Epistle also desires for his readers an independent increase in every kind of Christian wisdom and spiritual insight (i. 9), a growing in the (Christian) knowledge of God (ver. 11); they must be strengthened not only in love, but also unto all the richness of complete insight (*πλοῦτος τῆς πληροφορίας τῆς συνέσεως*), unto the knowledge of the secret of God (the Father), and Christ (i.e. of God revealed in Christ as the Father), in whom are hidden all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (ii. 2 f.). Whereas, in the writings of Paul, this deeper knowledge appeared rather as a mere individual advantage, which was desirable indeed, but not absolutely necessary to the Christian life of salvation (cf. 1 Cor. viii. 7), the Epistle before us (i. 28) makes instruction in every kind of wisdom the means by which all Christians are to attain that perfection in Christ which is necessary for every one, nay, that deeper kind of knowledge is itself the ultimate end of Christian renovation of life (iii. 10, *ἀνακαινούμενον εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν*). As we thus find our author thoroughly participating in the questioning spirit of his time, it is the more important to observe in what way his Christian *γνώσις* differs from that which he was opposing as unchristian. The former can be no other than

ἐπίγνωσις τοῦ μυστηρίου τοῦ θεοῦ Χριστοῦ, the development of the treasures of knowledge, which are already implicitly contained (ἐκφράζειν) in the historical revelation of God by Christ. The *heretical* γινῶσις, on the other hand, οὐ κρατεῖ τὴν κεφαλὴν, puts in the place of the historical revelation of Christ, its own visionary revelation of angels, and the vain suggestions of a fleshly reason (ii. 18 f). The former γινῶσις also goes beyond the historical region of appearance, and reaches back to that which is eternal, heavenly, and transcendent (the idea); but it does not tear away that which connects these two spheres, and therefore, in its highest flights of speculation, it ever remains upon the solid ground of historical fact, and in harmony with the traditional beliefs of the community (βεβαιούμενοι τῇ πίστει καθὼς ἐδιδάχθητε, ii. 7). The latter, on the contrary, in losing its connection with the historical head of the community, allows itself to be removed ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, οὐ ἠκούσατε τοῦ κηρυχθέντος ἐν πάσῃ ἀτίσσει τῇ ἐκ τῶν οὐρανῶν (i. 23), i. e. it loses its connection with the common consciousness of universal—"catholic"—Christianity; it becomes heretical.

THE EPISTLE OF BARNABAS.

The mixed Alexandrine and Pauline spirit of the Epistle to the Hebrews receives its most distinct and characteristic expression in the Epistle which has come down to us under the name of *Barnabas*, once the companion of Paul, to whom it was first ascribed by Clement, the Alexandrine Father. Internal evidence, however, shows that it can hardly have been written by this wavering follower of Paul and quondam Levite; it is without doubt the work of a Gentile Christian, who had been educated in the Alexandrine school, and whose tendencies were hyper-Pauline. He addressed it to Gentile Christian readers towards the end of the first century, in order to warn them against Judaizing errors (ut non incuramus tanquam proselyti in illorum

legem, cap. 3).¹ This Epistle marks a notable *turning-point* in the history of the doctrine of Paul. On the one hand, it exhibits its anti-Judaistic tendency when it had reached that extreme limit, which it was on the point of changing in an unorthodox direction, and becoming heretical Gnosticism; on the other hand, it shows at the same time the positive body of Pauline doctrine in such a state of weakness and decadence, that its amalgamation with other doctrinal views, to form the confused compound of which the doctrine of the Catholic Church consists, was inevitable.

The fundamental idea of this Epistle, with which the whole of the first and theoretical portion of it (ch. ii. to xvii.) is occupied, is thus expressed by its author in the first chapter—*ἵνα μετὰ τῆς πίστεως ὑμῶν τελείαν ἔχητε καὶ τὴν γνώσιν*—he wishes to impart to his readers, in addition to their faith, the higher perfection of wisdom. The object of this higher wisdom which went beyond faith, is the religious past and future (*præterita et futura*, ch. i. and v.), or “the three dogmas (i.e. fundamental truths) of the Lord—the hope of life (prophecies of Christ in the Old Testament), commencement (in the present), and completion (in the millennial kingdom of the Messiah).” With regard to the last, however, the writer expressly declares later on (ch. xvii.), that he will pass it over, on account of the difficulty of understanding it, and therefore confine himself to the present and the past. It is the relation between these with which he is in fact mainly occupied; namely, the religious history of the Jews, in its relation to the present, to Christianity. He desires to impart to his readers some profound disclosures which have been made to him by the Spirit regarding this ques-

¹ Cf. with this and what follows, *Hilgenfeld*, *Apostol. Vater*; *Ritzi*, *Alt kath. R.* p. 294 f.; *Reuss Gesch. d. h. S. N. T.* p. 232 f., and *Hist. de la Theol. Chret. au siècle Apost.* II. 305 f.; *Lepsius*, “Barnabasbrief,” in *Schenkel's Bibelllexikon*; *Hefele*, *Apostol. Vater und Sendschreiben des A. Barnabas*, Tüb. 1840; and especially *Müller*, *Erklärung des Barnabasbriefes*, Leipzig, 1869 (the three last assign the date of the composition of this Epistle to the reign of Hadrian, about A.D. 120, as does also *Goltzner*; whereas *Weizsäcker*, “Zur Kritik des Barnabasbriefes,” Tüb. 1863, assigns to it an earlier date, namely, the reign of Vespasian; but the interpretation of the passage from Daniel in ch. iv. which refers to Nerva contradicts this view).

tion of religious history, which was so important for the Church at that time, in order to guard them by this means against the danger of Judaizing. These disclosures consisted in an *allegorical* and *typical interpretation* of the ceremonies and narratives of the Old Testament, such as we occasionally find in Paul himself, but constantly in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where it is carried out in a methodical way, in order to demonstrate the completion and exaltation of the Old Testament worship in Christ. The typology of the Epistle now before us, however, is distinguished from that of the Epistle to the Hebrews, not only by the far greater accumulation of types of the most diverse character, and by the greater boldness, not to say want of taste, displayed in their interpretation, but chiefly by the difference of the end proposed. In the former, it was not intended, by the typical application of the Old Testament worship to the reconciling work of Christ in the character of a high-priest, to deny the relative claims and the relative truth of the former, but only to prove its relativity, and consequently its merely temporary validity, as compared with its absolute and eternal completion in Christianity. In the latter, on the contrary, not only is the typical anticipation of Christianity in the laws and the history of Judaism set forth in the minutest detail, but no truth or justification whatever, even in a relative sense, is allowed to Judaism. The Jewish law, in its literal externality, is represented as not only abrogated in Christ, but as having been perverted from the very beginning, and as a misunderstanding, caused by the devil, of the purely spiritual will of God. The object of the typology of the Epistle of Barnabas is therefore *two-fold*: in the first place, it is *positive* and *apologetic*, to exhibit what was apparently new in Christianity as having already existed in the past in the types of Judaism; but, secondly, it is also *negative* and *polemic*, to prove, by showing the true spiritual sense of the ritual law, that Judaism, which understands it literally, is a perverted religion.

his arms in prayer; in the brazen serpent which Moses raised in the wilderness; in the number 318 of the persons circumcised by Abraham.

As we have here the fundamental Christian doctrines of Christ being made man, and of his sacrificial death, of baptism for the forgiveness of sins, and of the new birth, typically indicated in the Old Testament, so we also find the ritual law of the Old Testament regarding circumcision, forbidden meats, the Sabbath, and the temple, turned into Christian allegories. Of *circumcision*, it is said in chap. ix. that God desired only a circumcision of the heart and ears (with reference to Jer. iv. 4, vii. 26, ix. 26, and other passages), not that of the flesh; but the Jews, deceived by a wicked angel, had transgressed his command. Should it be objected that (bodily) circumcision is a mark of the covenant, then all the Syrians, Arabians, and Egyptians have it; and it is asked whether these also are supposed to belong to the covenant of God. Moreover, the blessed cross of Jesus is foreshown in the number of persons whom Abraham circumcised by the form of the Greek letters which make 318, namely, T, which represents 300, and IH. (The writer considers this notion to be the pearl of his discoveries, οὐδὲν γρηγορώτερον εἶμαθ' ἀπ' ἐμοῦ λόγον.) In chap. x. the spiritual meaning of the *forbidding of meats* is shown. The prohibition to eat swine signifies that we should not be like men who are fond of pleasure; that against eating eagles, hawks, and the like, refers to idlers and men who prey upon their fellows; that against sea-fish refers to those who are condemned to the depths of darkness through godlessness. But as if these spiritual explanations were not sufficiently profound, still further references to fleshly sins and unnatural abominations are inferred from the silliest fables about the natural history of the hare, the hyæna, and the weasel, whereby for the first time ἔχετε τελείαν περὶ τῆς βρώσεως γνῶσιν. Finally, the directions regarding ruminants with divided hoof is referred to those who ruminate upon the word of God with devout meditation, and lead a righteous life. Moses and David understood all this in a

of our hearts was perishable and weak, like a temple built with hands, full of idolatrous worship, a house of demons, because we did what was hateful to God. But when we received the forgiveness of our sins, and set our hope on the name of the Lord, we were created anew and completely transformed. Therefore God truly dwells in us, as his abode. How? His word of faith, his call of promise, the wisdom of the law, the commandments of his teaching, He himself is as a prophet in us, He himself dwells in us." What is said of the temple applies also to the *sacrifices* (chap. ii.). God has already informed us, through all the prophets, that He does not need our sacrifices (referring to Isaiah i. 11—14; Jer. vii. 22 f.; Ps. iv.). "He has also declared this (visible) sacrifice to be valueless, in order that the new law of our Lord Jesus Christ, which has no compulsory yoke, may have no sacrifice brought by the hand of man," but rather the sacrifice of the heart, according to Psalm li. 19. The Jewish *fasts* have a moral interpretation given to them in the same way in chap. iii, according to Isa. lviii. 6—10.

In order to leave it beyond all doubt that Judaism in its historical form, in so far as it is distinguished from Christianity by a ritual that appeals to the senses, appears to him to have been from the first a thoroughly worthless form of religion, he *distinctly denies to the Jews the covenant relation with God*. Not only is it sin to speak to the Judaizers—"Their (the Jews') covenant is also ours; nay, it is rather ours alone, because they have lost for ever that which Moses obtained; they deserved, as the punishment of their idolatry, that Moses when descending from Sinai should break the tables of the law;" thus "was their covenant destroyed, in order that the covenant of Jesus might be sealed in your hearts by faith and hope in him" (ch. iv.). Moses certainly obtained the testament from God upon the mount, but they were not worthy to receive it on account of

weighty internal evidence, in addition to the consideration that the destruction of Jerusalem must have been fresh in the memory of those to whom it was addressed (cf. Chap. iv., *βλῆντες*, &c.).

Christian; its interest for him became more remote, in proportion as the repugnance of Israel to the gospel increased; and it is probable that the catastrophe which fell upon Israel in the destruction of the temple and of the holy city, gave the last blow to the hope of the future conversion of the people of Israel. In this respect the Epistle to Barnabas shares the universal view of the Gentile Christian Church of his own and of a later time (compare especially the Acts of the Apostles and the Gospel of John). But the point in which he diverges as far not only from Paul, but also from the view of the Church at that time, as he approaches to heretical Gnosticism, is the assertion that the people of Israel never stood in a covenant relation to God, that their supposed sign of the covenant (circumcision) rested on a misunderstanding of the will of God, which was suggested by the devil (*ἄγγελος πονηρὸς ἐσώφισεν αὐτοῖς*, ch. ix.), and that its whole ritual law, including ordinances regarding food, fasts, the temple, and sacrifices, had been from the beginning valueless and perverted, a carnal interpretation of laws (dogmas) spiritually intended. It is true that connecting links for all this are to be found in Paul's writings, and still more in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Paul also places the old covenant, as *διακονία γράμματος*, in opposition to the new, which was *διακονία πνεύματος* (2 Cor. iii.); he also sees in the externality of the ritual law, *στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* and *σάρξ* (cf. above, Part I. p. 71 f.), i.e. sensuous, carnal worship; to him also the Christian alone is the truly circumcised, with the circumcision of the heart, in the spirit, not in the letter (Phil. iii., Rom. ii. 29), and in the Epistles to the Hebrews and Colossians, the Jewish ceremonial law is regarded as a mere *σκὰ τοῦ σώματος*, an unsubstantial, shadowy prefiguring, which has no power to make the conscience pure or perfect (Heb. viii. and ix.) But with all this, the relative truth and the temporary validity of the Old Testament ritual law are by no means denied. that the whole of the Jewish law reposed on divine revelation was to the mind of Paul an incontestable proposition, nothing could be more remote from his ideas than to connect it, even with respect to

τὸν θάνατον, καὶ τὴν ἐκ ἀνεκρίων ῥύσασιν δείξῃ, chap. v.); therein consists the life-giving power of his death (ζωοποιῆται, chap. vii.), that the promise of our resurrection, indicated and established by it, is a life-giving, i. e. comforting and encouraging word for us (τῇ πίστει τῆς ἐπαγγελίας, καὶ τῇ λόγῳ ζοοποιούμενοι, chap. vi.). In his *Christology* the author of this Epistle teaches, with the school of Paul, the pre-existence of Christ, his taking part in the creation, his being the medium of revelation in the prophets; but his being made man is, according to him, no longer, as in Paul's writings, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, his assumption of equality with his human brethren, and so a revelation of the divine image, and of a human pattern for our imitation, but it has rather for its object the veiling of the divine glory, the sight of which without this veil would have been insupportable to us; and at the same time it was an occasion for the Jews to fill up the measure of their sins (chap. v.). This approaches very nearly to the doctrine of the Docetists,¹ and reminds us of the later conception of the Church regarding the overreaching of the devil by the death of Christ, the devil having been tempted by the veil of the flesh to form a plot against God, in the contest with whom his power had thus been broken. But all this is very different to the teaching of Paul. Since the object of faith is essentially the future life which is shown and pledged to us through Christ, it evidently follows that the notion of *faith* is, that it essentially coincides with hope. This so far resembles the Epistle to the Hebrews, only it is still more one-sided, since in the latter the future is also already invisibly present, the

¹ There is no trace of any controversy against the Docetists in any part of the Epistle. "The appearing of Christ in the flesh is here founded, not on its reality, but on its necessity, as the voluntary assumption of a form of existence alien to the Son of God" (*Lipner*). This is represented quite differently in the Epistles of Ignatius, and also as early as in the first Epistle to Timothy, where, ii. 5, the δι' ὧστος is emphasized as decidedly in an anti-Docetist sense, as the fact of Jesus being the son of man is denied in the Epistle we are considering (chap. xii., ἵνα, ἡγοῦσθαι ὅτι υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ). This presupposes a time when as yet no Docetist heresy could have disturbed the unsophisticated view of the apothecosis of Christ.

heavenly world beyond the visible earthly world, with which the believer in Christ enters into immediate connection; while in the Epistle of Barnabas this Alexandrine mysticism, as well as that originally taught by Paul, has been allowed to drop, and thus there remains for faith only the firm trust in the fulfilling of the promises (πίστις ἐπαγγελίας, chap. vi.), which is synonymous with *hope*. Consequently, these two notions are sometimes combined *into one* (the covenant of Jesus is sealed in our hearts, ἐν ἐλπίδι τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ, i. e. by means of hope, which rests in faith on him, namely, on his promise, chap. iv.), and sometimes used as interchangeable (οἱ ἐλπίζοντες εἰς αὐτὸν—'Ιησοῦν—ζήσονται εἰς αἰῶνα, chap. viii.; and xi., μακάριοι, οἱ, ἐπὶ τὸν σταυρὸν ἐλπίσαντες, κατέβησαν εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀναβαίνομεν, τὴν ἐλπίδα εἰς τὸν 'Ιησοῦν ἔχοντες ἐν τῷ πνεύματι· ὃς ἂν ἀλόνσῃ τούτων καὶ πιστεύσῃ, ζήσεται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα xii., οὐ δύναται σωθῆναι ἄνθρωπος ἐκ' αὐτῆς ἐλπίσωσιν' ἐλπισάτω πιστεύσας). Faith thus apprehended can of course no longer be, as it is with Paul, the only means of salvation, but must be supplemented and propped up by other Christian virtues. So in chap. ii., φόβος καὶ ἰσομοιή, μακροθυμία καὶ ἐγκρατεία, are called helpers (βοηθοί) and fellow-combatants of faith: whilst, according to Paul, these virtues proceed from faith as their natural source, they are here placed side by side with it, as joint causes of salvation, just as a συνεργεῖν occurs between faith and works according to James. The unloving separatists who were more Pauline than Paul, and boasted of their justification, are reminded (chap. iv.) that God will judge every one according to his works, without respect of persons. We must take heed, therefore, lest, slothfully relying upon our calling (κλητοί in the Pauline sense), we fall into the sleep of sin, and thereby give occasion to the evil one to gain power over us and thrust us out of the kingdom of God. We must spiritually become a perfect temple of God, by practising the fear of God, and exerting ourselves to keep his commandments. An entire life of faith is of no use, if we do not, in these evil times, strive in a manner worthy of the children of God that the black one

(the devil) may not steal into us. Our perfection as heirs of the covenant will only occur at the opening of the future kingdom of God (chap. vi., cf. ii.).

It cannot be said that this emphasizing of Christian morality, upholding the perpetual relativity of our salvation, and pointing to perfection as the end for which we have evermore to strive, is in itself unlike the teaching of Paul. Paul himself was very well acquainted with this ethical point of view, and inculcates it with no less distinctness when opportunity serves (see above, Part I. p. 225 f.). But whereas according to Paul the moral striving and struggling after perfection is only the natural consequence and development of the new life which is already in us, and walking after the spirit is the mode of action which proves the fact of our being spiritual, here, on the contrary, the "becoming spiritual" appears to be the end to be striven after by our own active exertions in keeping the commandments of God. According to Paul, the definitive attainment of salvation and inheritance of the kingdom of God is likewise conditioned by our moral sincerity, but this in its turn is only possible in virtue of the firm basis of our justification received by faith; according to Barnabas, the faith that we are already justified is in no obscure language blamed as self-exaltation and conceit (chap. iv., *ὡς ἡδὴ δεδικαιωμένοι*). Does this writer therefore intend to combat Paul's doctrine of faith, like James? Certainly not. He too strikes again a genuine Pauline chord, when he says that faith was imputed to Abraham for righteousness, and that he thus became the father of the believing Gentiles (chap. xiii.); that by the appearing of Christ our hearts, which had already become subject to death and given over to the unrighteousness of error, had been ransomed from darkness, and a covenant had been made between us by his word (chap. xiv.); that our hearts are purified, sanctified, renewed, entirely re-created, and made a dwelling-place of God, by the forgiveness of sins (chap. viii. 5, 6, 16); that the new law of Christ has no compulsory yoke, and its true sacrifice is that of the heart (chap. ii.). All these expres-

sions prove thus much, at all events, that the writer *intends* to be quite Pauline. But if we look more closely at the meaning which he connects with these expressions, it is equally clear that he *is not* so. This being newly created (chap. xvi.) depends only upon our having obtained forgiveness of sins and fixed our hope on the name of Christ, but not on our having died to sin and become partakers of the new life of Christ, of the spirit of sonship. So also the "dwelling of God in us" is expressly connected only with the communication of the word of faith, of the calling of promise, of the wisdom of the laws and commandments of his teaching; thus the indwelling of God is a revelation of purer moral laws and higher promises, by which we are driven to amendment and striving after holiness: this is only reducing Paul's mystery of faith to the level of mere morality. "The two moments which are held together in the unity of religious consciousness by Paul's notion of faith—namely, the theoretical belief and the practical action—are again sundered, and consequently with the greater prominence given to works, an increased weight attaches to the word of the teaching."¹

The *positive fundamental idea*, however, which represented Christianity at that standpoint, is that² of the "*new law*" (chap. ii.). This afforded a common ground, on which the followers of Paul, to whom this idea would already have been suggested by Rom. viii. 2 and Gal. vi. 2, and the more liberal Jewish Christians, who likewise spoke of the *νόμος βασιλικός* of love (James ii. 8), could understand each other. *This was the basis of the practical union of the Church.*

¹ Lipsius, *ut supra*, p. 369.

² Cf. Ritschl, *ut supra*, p. 295.

CHAPTER X.

PAULINISM IN ITS TRANSITION TO CATHOLICISM.

(*THE FIRST EPISTLE OF CLEMENT TO THE CORINTHIANS,
THE FIRST EPISTLE OF PETER, THE EPISTLE TO THE
EPHESIANS.*)

PAULINISM having now, through its connection with the Alexandrine philosophy, lost its original peculiarity, to assume a form more agreeable to the common consciousness of the Church, the further development of the Church itself gradually entered on an entirely new course. When that opposition which gives the whole system of Paul its antithetical character, passed away, his fundamental conceptions could no longer be rightly understood, and consequently an alien meaning was all unconsciously imported into them, even on his own ground, among the Gentile Christian communities. The need of antithetically setting the Christian principles in distinct opposition to Judaism, and to a Jewish Christianity which had grown up with it, diminished in proportion as the Gentile Christian communities acquired a feeling of security in their peculiar life and independent position, and were no longer seriously disturbed by Judaistic pretensions. At the same time, however, another need made itself felt more and more, namely, the need of establishing new rules for the guidance of moral life, and especially for that of the

Christian community which was becoming more complicated and active, and to clothe these rules with some kind of authority. Now the Epistles of Paul themselves contain but little material to support this side of Christian life, while, on the other hand, a natural model for the ordering of the Christian community appeared to be given in the theocratic ordinances of the Israelitish nation. What was more natural than that they should lay hold of those Old Testament types? In so doing there was no thought of a restitution of the Mosaic law, in the sense of the Judaizers mentioned in the Epistle to the Galatians. They were, and continued to be, thoroughly conscious of the new ground on which they stood as a Christian community, and on which the old law was obsolete; but standing on this new ground, and impelled by their own practical needs, they sought for a new law as a guiding authority, not so much for the religious conscience of individuals, as for the practical life of the community as a whole; and they naturally connected this new law with the old, and placed it in a certain relation of analogy and anti-type to it. It is the more easy to understand how Christianity itself soon came to be regarded mainly in the light of the "*new law*," since this idea, which was suggested by the practical needs of the life of the community in general, appeared also to set up in particular a higher dogmatic unity above the opposition of Paulinism and Judaism, whereby it recommended itself as a kind of formula of consensus for the establishment of the union of the universal Church.

A remarkable light is thrown on this phase of the development of Paulinism by

EPISTLE I. OF CLEMENT TO THE CORINTHIANS.

This Epistle is a document of the last importance for the history of the development of Paulinism, because it shows how the Gentile Christianity established by Paul alienated itself from the original sphere of Pauline ideas, and in *substance* approached

to the Jewish-Christian type of doctrine, while of Paul's teaching it retained only the *form* of expression, his familiar sayings without their original meaning; and how all this was done without any direct reference (either polemical or conciliatory) to a Jewish Christianity opposed to it. This peculiar character¹ makes the very various interpretations which this Epistle, more than any other early Christian document, has received, quite intelligible. Of these interpretations, those are to be considered decidedly erroneous which seek to find in it the advocacy of a party, whether it be that of the Jewish Christians,² which is plainly contrary to its tenor, or that of Paul,³ making concessions to Jewish Christianity for the purpose of conciliation. In the latter case, we should have expected to find the exact opposite of what the Epistle in fact contains—the favourite expressions of the Pauline party, and the praises of the Apostle Paul must have been avoided, or kept in the background, while the fundamental ideas of Paul's doctrine might have been much more decidedly preserved in the subject-matter itself. And how could a partisan composition calculated to conciliate the Jewish Christians, possibly assume the form of an Epistle to the notoriously Gentile Christian community of Corinth? No, this Epistle is from first to last no other than that which it so simply and clearly professes to be—a friendly letter of remonstrance addressed by the Roman community through the pen of their bishop, at the end of the first century, to the Corinthians, on the occasion of a disturbance of order and peace, and that not in a solitary instance, by the factiousness of unruly and ambitious demagogues, in opposition to the authority of their rightful president,—a calamity which not only seriously endangered the internal prosperity of the Corinthian community, but moreover threat-

¹ Cf. *Hilgenfeld*, *Apost. Vater*, pp. 85 to 91; *Ritschl*, *Alt kath. Kirche*, pp. 274—284; *Lepsius*, *de Clementis Romani epistola*, &c., Leipzig, 1855, *Reuss*, *Hist. de la th.*, &c., II. pp. 318—327.

² *Kostlin*, "zur Geschichte des Urchristenthums," in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1850, p. 247 f.

³ *Schuegler*, *nachapost. Zeit.* II. p. 125 f.

ened to disturb the repose and even the external pence of the Christians beyond their boundaries, and afforded sufficient grounds therefore for the friendly Roman community to address an earnest brotherly exhortation to them.

It is this practical occasion which gives to the whole Epistle its predominating hortatory character, while dogmatic teaching is nowhere introduced for its own sake, but only as one of the motives for practical exhortation. It is true that this fact would in itself not be inconsistent with a genuine Pauline character, for Paul also knew how to draw the deepest and most fruitful practical motives from dogmatical ideas; but his deep mystical intertwining of the dogmatic and the ethical, of the specific Christian principle and its moral development, is entirely different from the way in which Clement brings them into merely external relation: he does not make morality the natural fruit of the spirit of Christ, and thus the manifestation of the favour of God accepted in the act of believing, but he places it by the side of faith as one of the conditions of the reception of the Divine mercy, and it has not its inward and essential ground in the appearing of Christ, but only its outward occasion and its pattern. Now, as certainly, on the one hand, as this is in fact no other than the Jewish-Christian mode of regarding the matter—that of James, for instance—so certainly, on the other hand, does the repeated intentional use of specifically Pauline ideas and turns of expression show that the writer wishes to make a profession of Pauline Christianity.

Truly Pauline, for instance, are the expressions used in speaking of the *death of Christ for our redemption*. In the red thread which Rahab used as a sign to the spies, Clement perceives a prophecy that διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Κυρίου ἰάτρωσις ἔσται πᾶσιν τοῖς πιστεύουσιν καὶ ἐλπίζουσιν εἰς τὸν Θεόν (chap xii). He adduces as a proof of the love of God and Christ towards us, that Christ “has given his blood for us, according to the will of God, and his flesh for our flesh, and his soul for our souls” (chap xlix.) In entering on an exhortation to repentance, he calls upon his

readers to look upon the blood of Christ and see ὡς ἵστιν τίμιον τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σωτηρίαν ἐκχυνθέν, παντὶ τῷ κοσμῷ μετανοίας χάριν ἐπήνεγκεν (chap. vii.). But this last sentence is enough to show that we have nothing to do here with Paul's idea of expiation, with the subjective reconciliation of the world to God by the death of Christ, but that this death has for the writer of this Epistle only the significance of a call to repentance, of an inducement and summons to subjective sorrow for sin, and that only through this does it become the means of reconciliation with God. And, in fact, this call to repentance differs only in degree, and not in kind, from the call of Noah and that of Jonas, mentioned in chap. vii., the effect of which was that οἱ μετανοήσαντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασιν αὐτῶν ἐξιλάσαντο τὸν θεὸν καὶ ἔλαβον σωτηρίαν. These various expressions are quoted from the Old Testament, in which forgiveness is promised to the penitent, and it is said in conclusion, πάντας οὖν τοῖς ἀγαπήτους αὐτοῦ βουλόμειος μετανοίας μετασχεῖν, ἐστήριξε τῷ παντοκρατορικῷ βουλήματι αὐτοῦ. If this ἐστήριξε refers, as appears probable, to the death of Christ, with which subject this section of the Epistle commenced, then it shows clearly that the writer considered the death of Christ to be simply a confirmation and enforcement of the call to repentance contained in the words and the types of the Old Testament. In any case, we have an admonition to be obedient to the will of God, to lay aside all strife and contention, and to prostrate ourselves before God, imploring his mercy and goodness (chap. ix.). With this we may compare his calling those blessed who in the harmony of love do the commandments of God, εἰς τὸ ἀφιεῖναι ἑαυτῶν δι' ἀγάπης τὰς ἁμαρτίας (chap. i.); or the statements quoted in chaps. li. and lii., that God requires nothing from us but that we should confess our sins to Him; and especially the remarkable passage in chap. lvi., We would pray for sinners, that a teachable and humble spirit may be given them, so that they may yield to the will of God. Οὕτως γὰρ ἔσται αὐτοῖς ἔγκαρπος καὶ τελεία ἡ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν καὶ τοὺς ἁγίους μετ' οἰκτιρμῶν μείλα, i. e. "thus will the com-

passionate thought be fruitful and perfectly efficacious with God and the saints," which can have no other meaning than that the intercession of the community for sinners addressed to God and the saints brings about forgiveness.¹ It follows from all this that, according to Clement, the forgiveness of sins is an effect of earnest repentance, of confession of sins, of love which produces harmony with God, and, finally, of the intercessory prayer of the community; there is no thought here of Paul's doctrine of the objective reconciliation of the world by the death of Christ. His death retains only the significance of a means of repentance, which μεταβολὰς τόπον ἔδωκεν, and of a pattern of humility (chap. xvi., ὁρᾶτε, τίς ὁ ὑπογραμμὸς ὁ δεδομένος ὑμῶν εἰ γὰρ ὁ κύριος οὕτως ἡταπεινωθεὶς ἡμεῖς, τί ποιήσομεν ἡμεῖς; as an inference drawn from the quotation from Is. liii.).

But when the objectivity of the principle of redemption has been thus impoverished, we naturally could not expect to find in the doctrine of subjective salvation the fulness of the Pauline ideas. It is true that *faith* is everywhere mentioned as the necessary condition of the reception of salvation, and in one passage is even opposed in the strongest Pauline sense to every work or advantage of our own ("Not by our own means, by our wisdom, or knowledge, or piety, or by the works which we have performed in holiness of heart, are we justified, but by faith, by which the Almighty God has justified all men from the beginning," chap. xxxii.). When he further proceeds (chap. xxxiii.), "What ought we then to do? Abstain from doing good, and cease to love? God forbid that should happen!"—this is certainly not unlike Paul, but, on the contrary, is quite in harmony with Rom. vi. 1; only whereas in the latter passage moral life is deduced from the essence of faith, which is a communion of death and life with Christ, as the necessary fruit of it, Clement

¹ Hilgenfeld, ut supra, p. 90, note, takes a somewhat different view, regarding the community as the tribunal to which the intercessions are addressed. But it is the community which makes the intercession, and the *ἅγιοι* are surely the departed saints.

knows nothing of this, but takes as his motive for the duty of good works, first (chap. xxxiii.), the example of God, who as Creator has done so many good works; and secondly, more especially (chap. xxxiv. f.) the great reward of the glorious promises of which we become partakers by doing good. But we shall become partakers of them "when our mind is firmly directed towards God through faith (*ὅταν ἐστηρικμένη ἡ ἡ διάνοια ἡμῶν διὰ πίστεως πρὸς τὸν θεόν*), when we strive after that which is well-pleasing to Him, fulfil his will, and follow the way of truth." The faith through which it is said that our mind should be firmly directed towards God, cannot, taken with the context, well mean anything else than *trust* in the truth of the Divine promises, a trust which spurs on and strengthens the will to obey the Divine commands. But *πεποιθήσις* is also expressly mentioned as a moment of *πίστις*, and a motive of *δουλεῖν θεῷ*, in a passage which treats of the resurrection, in which therefore the confident hope of the resurrection is meant (chap. xxvi.). And immediately afterwards, this trust in God, who cannot lie in his promises, is plainly called *πίστις*, which is periphrased by *νοεῖν, ὅτι πάντα ἔγγις αὐτῷ ἐστίν* (chap. xxvii.). We have here, then, a notion of faith which approaches more nearly to that of the Epistle to the Hebrews than to the true Pauline notion, but which agrees most exactly with that contained in the first Epistle of Peter, inasmuch as its main tendency is not in the direction of the historical redemption, but towards the salvation to be revealed hereafter. And as in the Epistle of Peter, so here also, to the moment of trust is added that of *obedience*, in which the trust manifests itself by deeds. Faith is simply trust in the fulfilment of the Divine promises, which hold good for him alone who fulfils the commandments which correspond to them, and must therefore also prove its existence by obedience to these commandments. In the writings of Paul also, faith appeared to be a kind of obedience (see above, Part I. p. 167), but in the sense of submission to the favourable will of God, who presents the commandments to us—not to the will of God expressed in the law,

which demands obedience from us. According to him, therefore, the trust in God's will that we should be saved, was itself the primary act of obedience which God demanded of us, from which all moral obedience of works develops itself indeed as a further consequence, but yet without being regarded as the principle of our relation to God, or as the condition of the attainment of God's saving favour. But according to Clement, the obedience which belongs to faith is this, and nothing more—active obedience in following the commandments of God and Christ, a spontaneous course of action, which had its source indeed in trust in the Divine promises, but which does not itself consist in trusting devotion to the favourable will of God. This essential divergence from the genuine doctrine of Paul is very strikingly shown by what is said by Paul and Clement respectively regarding the faith of Abraham. If Paul has said that Abraham was not righteous on account of his works, but that his faith was imputed to him for righteousness, Clement says, *Ἀβραάμ πιστὸς ἐρίθη ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν ἐπήκοον γενέσθαι τοῖς ῥήμασιν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, by which he understands the injunction to leave his own country and go to Canaan, with the promises attached to it, and the command to offer up Isaac (chap. x.). And again (in chap. xxxi.) he asks, *τίος χάριν ἡελογήθη ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν Ἀβραάμ; οὐχὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀλήθειαν διὰ πίστεως ποιήσας*; according to which, the righteousness of Abraham was the fruit of his actions, though these certainly were brought about by faith. This is unquestionably the very opposite of the train of thought which Paul develops in Rom. iv. 3—5, from the same subject-matter, and approaches very nearly to the view of James ii. 21—24. It is not, indeed, quite identical with the latter; for in James, works are added externally to faith to supplement it, and thus faith has only a partial efficacy; but Clement holds faith to be nevertheless the means by which justifying action is brought about, so that this action is not only subjectively impossible, but would not be objectively pleasing to God, if it did not spring from faith, from trustful obedience to the commandments of God, which are

knows nothing of this, but takes as his motive for the duty of good works, first (chap. xxxiii.), the example of God, who as Creator has done so many good works; and secondly, more especially (chap. xxxiv. f.) the great reward of the glorious promises of which we become partakers by doing good. But we shall become partakers of them "when our mind is firmly directed towards God through faith (ἐὰν ἐστηρικμένη ἢ ἡ διάνοια ἡμῶν διὰ πίστεως πρὸς τὸν θεόν), when we strive after that which is well-pleasing to Him, fulfil his will, and follow the way of truth." The faith through which it is said that our mind should be firmly directed towards God, cannot, taken with the context, well mean anything else than *trust* in the truth of the Divine promises, a trust which spurs on and strengthens the will to obey the Divine commands. But *πειθήσεις* is also expressly mentioned as a moment of *πίστις*, and a motive of *δοξαίνει θεῷ*, in a passage which treats of the resurrection, in which therefore the confident hope of the resurrection is meant (chap. xxvi.). And immediately afterwards, this trust in God, who cannot lie in his promises, is plainly called *πίστις*, which is periphrased by *ροῦν, ὅτι πάντα ἐγγὺς αὐτῷ ἐστιν* (chap. xxvii.). We have here, then, a notion of faith which approaches more nearly to that of the Epistle to the Hebrews than to the true Pauline notion, but which agrees most exactly with that contained in the first Epistle of Peter, inasmuch as its main tendency is not in the direction of the historical redemption, but towards the salvation to be revealed hereafter. And as in the Epistle of Peter, so here also, to the moment of trust is added that of *obedience*, in which the trust manifests itself by deeds. Faith is simply trust in the fulfilment of the Divine promises, which hold good for him alone who fulfils the commandments which correspond to them, and must therefore also prove its existence by obedience to these commandments. In the writings of Paul also, faith appeared to be a kind of obedience (see above, Part I. p. 167), but in the sense of submission to the favourable will of God, who presents the commandments to us—not to the will of God expressed in the law,

which demands obedience from us. According to him, there^{pevs} the trust in God's will that we should be saved, was itself the primary act of obedience which God demanded of us, from which all moral obedience of works develops itself indeed as a further consequence, but yet without being regarded as the principle of our relation to God, or as the condition of the attainment of God's saving favour. But according to Clement, the obedience which belongs to faith is this, and nothing more—active obedience in following the commandments of God and Christ, a spontaneous course of action, which had its source indeed in trust in the Divine promises, but which does not itself consist in trusting devotion to the favourable will of God. This essential divergence from the genuine doctrine of Paul is very strikingly shown by what is said by Paul and Clement respectively regarding the faith of Abraham. If Paul has said that Abraham was not righteous on account of his works, but that his faith was imputed to him for righteousness, Clement says, *'Αβραάμ πιστὸς εἰρέθη ἐν τῷ αὐτὸν ἐπίσκοον γενέσθαι τοῖς ῥήμασιν τοῦ Θεοῦ*, by which he understands the injunction to leave his own country and go to Canaan, with the promises attached to it, and the command to offer up Isaac (chap. x.). And again (in chap. xxxi.) he asks, *τίνος χάριν ὑψολογήθη ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν Ἀβραάμ; οὐχὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀλήθειαν διὰ πίστεως ποιήσας*; according to which, the righteousness of Abraham was the fruit of his actions, though these certainly were brought about by faith. This is unquestionably the very opposite of the train of thought which Paul develops in Rom. iv. 3—5, from the same subject-matter, and approaches very nearly to the view of James ii. 21—24. It is not, indeed, quite identical with the latter; for in James, works are added externally to faith to supplement it, and thus faith has only a partial efficacy, but Clement holds faith to be nevertheless the means by which justifying action is brought about, so that this action is not only subjectively impossible, but would not be objectively pleasing to God, if it did not spring from faith, from trustful obedience to the commandments of God, which are

know in promise. The line of thought which he here pursues is precisely that of Heb. xi., and he follows the writer of that Epistle also in his choice of examples. It is just his intermediate position between Paul and James that makes Clement to say with the one, οὐ δι' ἑαυτῶν δικαιούμεθα οἷδε διὰ . . . ἔργων ὧν κατεργασάμεθα, ἀλλὰ διὰ πίστεως (chap. xxxii.), and with the other, ἔργοις δακαιοῦμενοι καὶ μὴ λόγοις (chap. xxx.). According to this, he has in his mind, like James, merely an unreal faith which is only strong in speech (dogmatic or ecclesiastical disputes), but does not prove its existence by deeds. It is of course quite right that he should long for a piety which manifests itself in acts, in conjunction with such a faith as this; but by making Christian piety to consist essentially in "doing righteousness," he betrays how completely he has lost the Pauline idea of justification by faith.—Besides the passages already quoted, we may also adduce the conclusion of chap. xxi. in support of what has been said: "Christian children should learn what power humility has with God, what efficacy holy love has with God, how grand and beautiful the fear of God is, and how it preserves all who live holily in it with a pure mind" (instead of the Old Testament idea of "walking in the fear of God," Paul had substituted, "walking in the spirit of Christ, in the new life") Chap. xxii. proceeds as follows: "But all this is confirmed by faith in Christ, for he thus calls to us by the holy spirit—Come here, my children, and listen to me; I will teach you the fear of the Lord"! Whether these words are a free quotation from Scripture, or from an apocryphal writing, it is in any case worthy of remark, that faith in Christ has here ascribed to it only the significance of a confirmation of the Old Testament religion of the fear of God, and Christ is simply represented as a teacher of this. So, again, it is said (chap. ii) of the Corinthian community, as the highest praise of their past life, that during that time they "had done all things in the fear of the Lord, having his προστάγματα καὶ δικαιώματα written on the tablets of their hearts." It is true that higher predicates are also ascribed

whom God has put in the place of Israel according to the flesh (cf. Rom. iv. 11—16; Gal. iii.). When, further, among the commandments and ordinances of God which the Christian is to observe and follow, commandments are quoted from the Old Testament (chap. xiii. 40 f.), and when passages from the Psalms and Prophets are quoted as the actual words of Christ himself (chap. xvi. 22), nothing is further from the mind of the writer than a recognition of the lasting obligation of the Mosaic law upon Christians, but he is proceeding upon two assumptions—first, that Christ (as pre-existent or through his spirit) had spoken by the prophets (cf. 1 Pet. i. 11), and secondly, that the Old Testament ordinances had a typical significance for the people of the new covenant. Notwithstanding this, however, the binding authority of the Old Testament is not imposed on Christendom in the sense of the Judaizers, but the Old Testament is, in the sense of the most advanced Paulinism, placed at the service of the new covenant, as Christianity before Christ. The practical result of this latter view may ultimately approach very nearly to that of the former; but the point of departure, the whole point of view, is essentially different, nay, diametrically opposite;—we have in the former, the narrow spirit of Judaism which desired to make the national theocratic form of the old covenant a permanent law for the new, and thus to degrade Christianity to a merely new form of Judaism; in the latter, we have the independent Christian consciousness, which, free from all national theocratic connection with Judaism, regards Christians, by virtue of the higher right of spiritual succession, as the true heirs of the covenant promises of the Old Testament, and consequently holds itself justified in taking the Old Testament into the service of the new, non-Jewish people of the covenant—which, in a word, completely christianizes the Old Testament.

This is the light in which we must look at all the details given in the Epistle before us regarding the relation of the offices of the Christian community to the priesthood of the Old Testament.

body of Christ, καθὼς καὶ ἐτέθη ἐν τῷ χαρίσματι αὐτοῦ. This agrees perfectly with the thought expressed by Paul in 1 Cor. xii.—xiv.: all the members are in themselves equal (πλησίον); the subordination of some to others does not depend on any dogmatic character belonging to the office, but generally on the necessity of associated membership, and particularly on the endowments (χαρίσματα) of individual persons. And this is in accordance with what is said in chap. xlv., that the presidents were appointed at that time with the consent of the whole community, by men of high repute amongst them (κατασταθέντας ὑπ' ἐλλογίμων ἀνδρῶν, συνευδοκησάσης τῆς ἐκκλησίας πάσης). Finally, the actual deposition of presbyters by quarrelsome members of the laity, which occurred in Corinth, is not stigmatized, as we find it at a later period in the Epistles of Ignatius, as rebellion against God and Christ, and high treason against the Church, but only blamed as a personal wrong towards those who are thus treated, and as unreasonableness and ingratitude to servants who had deserved well of the community (λειτουργήσαντες ἀμέμπτως . . . οὐ δικαίως νομίζομεν ἀποβάλλεσθαι τῆς λειτουργίας, *ibid.*).

From all this it is plain that there is no trace to be found here of an office with a hierarchical character attached to it, neither does that separation and establishment of distinct offices which we find at a later period, as yet exist. The presidents of the community are still promiscuously called πρεσβύτεροι (chaps. xlv, liv., lvii) and ἐπίσκοποι (chap. xlii.), their office ἐπισκοπή (xlv), just as in Acts xx. 17 and 28; Tit. i. 5 and 7. The monarchical episcopacy can hardly at that time have formed itself out of the college of presbyters, otherwise the στάσις must have been directed mainly against the bishop, and not, as is repeatedly said, against the πρεσβύτεροι.

We have hitherto found in this Epistle of Clement a Paulinism which, without intentionally making concessions to a Jewish-Christian party (to which no reference nor even the slightest allusion is anywhere made), has nevertheless, in the course of its own development within the Church, passed into an inter-

mediate position between original Paulinism and Jewish Christianity. We shall now, in conclusion, have to estimate the significance of the fact that *the Apostle Peter is honourably mentioned* by the writer, *by the side of, nay even before, Paul* (chap. v., cf. 47, ἀπόστολοι μεμαρτυρημένοι). Even here the follower of Paul betrays himself, by the far more ardent praise which is given to Paul, as compared with the brief mention of Peter. Nevertheless, the fact that he is put first is evidence that towards the end of the first century the views of the Apostle Peter were firmly established even in Jewish Christian communities which had followed the teaching of Paul, and that the relation between these two principal authorities could only be regarded as that of friendly coadjutors. But to draw from it the inference¹ that this was an accurate representation of their relation in the apostolic times, and that consequently the actual relation between Paul and Peter had been throughout a peaceful one, is more than we are justified in doing, for the simple reason that, on precisely the same grounds, the further assumption might be made that the doctrine of Clement regarding faith and works and the forgiveness of sins, with its Catholic tendencies, was an accurate representation of the original gospel of Paul, and consequently that Paul had never opposed the righteousness of works, as we find nevertheless that he has done in all his Epistles. The truth of the matter will rather turn out to be that, as the dogmatic opposition between the gospel of Paul and the "other gospel" reflected itself in the time of the Apostles in the rivalry of Paul and Peter, the leaders of the contending parties, so the weakening of this dogmatic opposition in the consciousness of the Gentile Christians caused the remembrance of the personal rivalry of Paul and Peter, as the representatives of the two parties, to die away; the necessity that ensued of comprehending the moderated elements of both these diverging lines of thought, in a common avoidance of extreme heretical views, conduced to make the recollection of collisions of principle, and disputes which had

¹ As *Ritschl* does, ut *supra*, p. 270.

occurred in apostolic times, appear odious and disquieting. Thus the growing conviction of the Church regarding the harmonious relation of the original lines of thought of the Apostles was in part the natural result of the change in its dogmatic views, and in part also the natural postulate of the new felt need of union in the Church.

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF PETER.

This Epistle has undergone the same treatment as that of Clement on which we have just commented; it has been assigned by some writers to the party of Paul, by others to that of the Judaizers, and with as much reason in the one case as in the other. That its author belonged to the school of Pauline theology is proved beyond doubt by the extent to which he is influenced by the Epistle to the Romans, by his following closely in many instances the Epistles to the Hebrews and to the Ephesians, and by his adopting on essential points the terminology of Paul. But he avails himself no less frequently of the Epistle of James; and the fact that he is familiar with the Old Testament, though only in the Septuagint version (for it is this that he usually quotes), indicates that he is a Jewish Christian of Hellenistic origin. Like the writers of the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Epistle of Clement, he applies Old Testament ideas and titles of honour to the Christian community. He calls it the people of God, the peculiar people, the holy people, the chosen race, a royal priesthood, the heritage (*κληροι*) of God—using the words in the theocratic spirit of the Old Testament (II. 9 f., v. 3). But so far is all this from leading us to the conclusion that our author has a Judaistic bias, that the tendency of his writings must, on the contrary, be called distinctly anti-Judaistic; for he neither sympathizes with Israel as a nation, nor with the Mosaic law. The Jews are in his eyes the disobedient people, for whom the precious corner-stone laid in Zion has become "a stone of stumbling and offence," against

which "they have fallen, to which they were also ordained" (ii. 7 f.). This is exactly the standpoint of the later and more advanced Paulinism (cf. Acts of the Apostles), which is far removed from the sympathy of the Apostle Paul with Israel his nation (cf. Rom. ix.—xi.). And though our author so freely applies the titles of the covenant people to the Christian community, he attributes no lasting validity to the law; indeed, he never even mentions it, or refers his moral exhortations to it, substituting sometimes the will of God in general, and sometimes the special Christian motives and rules for the imitation of Christ, and gratitude for the redemption, and the hope of being glorified in Christ (iv. 2, ii. 21—25, i. 13 f., 13 f.). This evidently indicates an author who is very far removed from anti-Pauline Judaism, from the "gospel of the circumcision;" but, on the other hand, we miss the specific Pauline watchwords of which the dogmatic contest of the two parties had made a shibboleth; there is no allusion, for instance, to "justification by faith."

This impartial omission of the watchwords of either party, this use of the Epistles of Paul and of James indifferently, and, finally, the commendatory mention of Paul's helper, Silvanus (τοῦ πειττοῦ ἀδελφοῦ ὡς λογιζομαι, v. 12), alongside of Mark, the traditional helper of Peter (ver. 13)—all these circumstances together certainly favour the conjecture that the author purposely took up an intermediate conciliatory position between the two great parties. But although the possibility of this must be admitted, it is certainly too much to say¹ that the main object of the composer was to bring about a reconciliation. If that were the case, he surely could not have pursued his object in so cursory and indirect a manner, and that only at the close of the Epistle, merely ignoring the contested points in the other

¹ As Schweizer does, *nachstest*, *Zeitalter*, II p. 22 "Our Epistle is the attempt of a follower of Paul to reconcile the divided parties of Paul and Peter, by putting into the mouth of Peter a testimony to the orthodoxy of his brother Apostle Paul, together with a statement of Paul's doctrinal system somewhat coloured by the views of Peter."

parts. We should rather have expected him to make the union of the two sections of the Church the express object of a dogmatic discourse, somewhat after the manner of the Epistle to the Ephesians. Nothing of the kind, however, is to be found in the Epistle before us,¹ the main purpose of which is unmistakably an exhortation to patience and endurance under a severe persecution from without, and to a blameless life, by which the Christian community would avoid giving any occasion for a justifiable persecution. In this case, therefore, as in that of the Epistle of Clement, it is simply a practical hortatory object, and no dogmatic tendency of any kind, that impels the author to write. This fact, however, only gives the greater weight to the Epistle, as a testimony to the actual existence of a practical common consciousness of the Church, in which the teaching of Paul had lost so much of its decidedly antithetical character and its distinct peculiarity (and this had occurred quite unintentionally and unconsciously), that his followers already felt themselves to be essentially at one with their original opponents.² This change had already been completed (cf. the remarks made above on the Epistle of Clement), under the pressure of circumstances, at the beginning of the second century; for it is, without doubt, the persecution of Trajan which marks the situation of the readers of the first Epistle of Peter.³

¹ The words *ἐπιμαρτυρῶν ταύτην εἶναι ἀληθὴν χάριν τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰς ἣν ἐσθῆκατε* (v. 12), cannot be regarded as a testimony of orthodoxy given by Peter to Paul, but they are intended to warn those to whom they are addressed against allowing themselves to be perjured as to the truth of their Christian belief by the persecutions they had suffered.

² Cf. *Reuss*, *Gesch. der heiligen Schriften*, p. 139: "This Epistle does not engage in any of the doctrinal disputes of that time; and if it may be said that it occupies the position of mediator between the opposite Christian parties, it does so, not of set purpose, nor in so many words, but by its general tone and temper." Similarly *Kostlin*, *Johnn. Lehrb.*, p. 480. "This Epistle, more than any other, may be regarded as an original account of the shape in which Paulinism first began to find itself in harmony with the collective consciousness of the Christian community of that time."

³ Compare *Schreyler's* admirable arguments on this subject, ut *supra*, II. p. 14 f. Also *Hilkefeld*, in his "Protestantismus," p. 273 f. *Weiss's* attempt to claim for the Epistle of Peter an earlier date than that of Paul, in order to use it as evidence for the views of the primitive Christians, must be regarded as altogether futile.

There is but little that is peculiar in the dogmatic standpoint of this Epistle; and indeed it is this very absence of peculiarity that characterizes it. In the *person of Christ*, the *σάρξ* as the element of deadness is distinguished (iii. 18) from the *πνεῦμα* or life-giving element in a way that reminds us of Rom. i. 3, 4. That this *πνεῦμα*, however, is not that of ordinary humanity, but is, on the contrary, a pre-existent subject, like the *πνεῦμα ἁγιοσύνης* of Paul, which constituted the pre-existent personality of Christ (cf. chap. iii.), may be inferred from i. 11, where the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ* is represented as the principle of revelation in the prophets of the Old Testament; and this is a confirmation of the view that the higher Christology of Paulinism was a means of Christianizing the Old Testament, of proving that Christianity was the truth of that which was old, was itself the old. But special importance is given to the resurrection and exaltation of Christ, his going to heaven, his being on the right hand of God, his elevation above the angels, his reception of the glory, the *ἀποκάλυψις* of which is to come—an object of hope, which is supported by faith in the exaltation of Christ; and this is what gives to the latter its great importance (i. 3, 7, 13, iii. 22, iv. 13, 11). The doxology in the last of these passages, according to which not only the *δόξα*, but also *τὸ κράτος εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων*, is attributed to Christ, goes indeed beyond the older Pauline Christology, inasmuch as the latter, supporting the monotheistic view, closes with the restoration to God of Christ's sovereignty (1 Cor. xv. 28). There is, therefore, so much the less ground for interpreting the words in i. 20, *προγεγνησμένον μὲν πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*, as if they implied a mere ideal predestination of Christ without a real pre-existence, and seeking in them a proof that our author's Christology was the older one which preceded that of Paul. It is true that the actual meaning of *προγεννώσκειν* is only to "foreordain," and that the object of this ideal act may as well be one which is to come into existence in the future, as one which already exists (at the time of *προγεννώσκειν*), since the *προγεννώσκειν* does not refer to the existence, but

to the destined action or suffering of its object, as something that is to occur in the future. But in the passage before us, the pre-existence of that which is *προεγνωσμένος* is distinctly suggested by the antithesis, *φανερωθέντος δὲ ἐπ' ἐσχάτον τῶν χρόνων*: for it is most natural to use the expression *φανεροῦσθαι* of a subject which was already existing, but still concealed, and which has manifested itself by coming out of its concealment. This passage also therefore confirms the inference that has been drawn from those before quoted, namely, that the writer of this Epistle held the higher Pauline Christology.

The importance which he attaches to the death of Christ as the means of our redemption is also truly Pauline. But he has hardly connected its genuine Pauline sense with the idea of the redeeming death of Christ. We find no allusion to a vicarious expiatory sacrifice for the reconciliation of our guilt, and for our liberation from the punishment of sin, from the anger of God, from the sentence of death, and from the curse of the law. There is indeed a sort of faint echo of these Pauline thoughts in the language which the writer borrows from Paul in speaking on three occasions of the death of Christ—in iii. 18, *Χριστὸς ἅπαξ περὶ ἁμαρτιῶν ἔπαθε, δίκαιος ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων*: ii. 24, *ὃς τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκεν ἐν τῷ σώματι αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον*: and i. 18, 19, *ἐλυτρώθητε τιμῇ αἱματι ὡς ἁμοῦ ἀμώμου καὶ ἀσπίλου Χριστοῦ*: but if we examine these passages more closely, we find that every one of them refers, not to the reconciliation of the guilt of sin, but to the doing away with the life of sin, to the moral amendment of the sinner. According to i. 18, we are ransomed by the blood of Christ, *ἐκ τῆς ματαίας ἀναστροφῆς πατροπαράδοτου*, from the enslaving power of a vain life, devoted to that which is transitory and worthless, according to the custom of our fathers; which reminds us of Tit. ii. 14, *ἵνα λυτρώσῃται ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἀνομίας καὶ καθαρίσῃ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τοῦ ῥήματος, ζήλωτην καλῶν ἔργων*. Liberation from lawlessness and moral purification is here the object of *λυτροῦν*; while with Paul, on the contrary, it is liberation from the law and justification through faith. According to

iii. 18, the leading us to God, *ἵνα ἡμᾶς προσαγάγῃ τῇ Θεῷ*, is made the object of Christ's suffering for sin (cf. Rom. v. 2; Eph. ii. 18, *προσαγωγῇ*; and Heb. x. 19 f., *εὐσδοκῶν τῶν ἁγίων . . . προσερχώμεθα*), the removal of our previous separation from him, which is certainly a more general notion, in which the removal of the guilt as well as the power of sin may be included. But that the latter is chiefly, if not exclusively, meant, is shown by the third of the passages we have quoted, ii. 24 f. When it is here said of Christ, that he "carried up our sins in his body on to the tree" (*ἀνήνεγκε . . . ἐπὶ τὸ ξύλον* cannot be otherwise translated), the sense is evidently that by his death upon the cross he took away our sins, removed them, so that they no longer defiled our life; and this is afterwards still more plainly expressed by the sentence which declares the purpose of his act, *ἵνα ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἀπογενόμενοι τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ζήσωμεν*. The removal of sin by his death on the cross means therefore that we free our moral life and actions from sin, and set it in the service of righteousness. But how is this subjective moral renovation to be the direct consequence of the objective death of Christ? Paul's conception of the mystical communion of Christians with the death of Christ might suggest itself as the intermediate link, according to which conception his death is so far the doing away of sin in the flesh (Rom. vii. 3), as it becomes the ethical dying of the old man in all who enter by faith into mystical union with the crucified one (Rom. vi.; Gal. v. 24; 2 Cor. v. 14 f.). And, in fact, there is something that sounds very like this idea in the Epistle before us; iv. 13 speaks of *ἡ κοινωνία τοῖς τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθήμασι*, the effect of which consists not only in the future partaking of Christ's glory, but also, according to ver. 1, in the fact that *ὁ παθὼν ἐν σαρκὶ πάντας ἁμαρτίας*—a sentence which cannot but remind us of a similar expression which occurs in Rom. vi. 7, *ὁ ἀποθαιὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας* ("he who has entered by baptism into communion with the death of Christ, has thereby become legally free from sin"). But close as is the analogy between these sentences, and highly probable as it is that the author of the Epistle of Peter

had Pauline formulas before his eyes or in his memory when he wrote thus, yet it is also certain that the real meaning of the two is widely different. There is no trace in this Epistle of Peter of the mystical communion of the faithful with the death of Christ, or with the ethical dying with him in faith and in baptism. The communion with the sufferings of Christ is rather meant in the sense of Rom. viii. 17, as a suffering in a literal sense undergone in imitation of the crucified one, and for his sake. Similarly also the words of iv. 1 have only the simple *moral* signification, that suffering in our bodily life makes us cease to sin, i. e. makes sinning distasteful; which is of course a very different thing from that *mystic* communion with the death of Christ in which sin is overcome in principle. Hence we are forced to conceive the redeeming effect of the death of Christ likewise as brought about morally by its producing as a *powerful* example a resolution to imitate his obedience (Χριστοῦ οὖν παθόντος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν σαρκί, καὶ αὐτοὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔννοιαν ὁπλίσασθε, iv. 1; and Χριστὸς ἔπαθεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ὑμῖν ὑπομιμνήσκων ἐπιγραμμὸν, ἵνα ἐτακολοιθῆσθε τοῖς ἰχνέσιν αὐτοῦ, ii. 21). This imitation of Christ, therefore, in doing and suffering, is the real release from sin; and the death of Christ is accordingly only the intermediate cause, which as an awakening example makes us turn from the error of sin and return to the shepherd and bishop of our souls, and *by this means* takes away our sins. The passages, ii. 21—25, i. 18 f., iv. 1 f., agree in leading us to the same conclusion.

One peculiarity of the Epistle of Peter is the extension of the redeeming work of Christ to the dead who died before his coming. "For to this end was the gospel preached also to the dead, that they might be judged according to men in the flesh, but might live according to God in the spirit" (iv. 6); their judgment is to be limited to the death of the body, and not to affect the spirit; this, on the contrary, is to be made partaker of the life of God (in imperishable glory) by means of the preaching of the gospel, which they were allowed to hear (in the lower world, we must suppose). This passage again strongly reminds

us of Rom. viii. 10, τὸ μὲν σῶμα νεκρὸν δι' ἁμαρτίαν, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα ζῶν διὰ δικαιοσύνης. But here again there is the same difference that was pointed out above between 1 Pet. iv. 1 and Rom. vi. 7; what Paul meant, at least primarily, in an ethical and spiritual sense, takes here the external significance of being dead as regards the body, and of being alive as a spiritual being in the other world. Moreover, it appears from the latter passage that the eschatological hope of the writer was directed, more in the Alexandrine fashion, to the continued life of the incorporeal spirit, than, in the Hebrew way of thinking, to the resurrection of the body; and so he also uses the expression πνεύματα (iii. 19) for the dead, like the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (Heb. xii. 23). But he also intimates, in a most remarkable passage, how he conceived the preaching of the gospel to the dead to have been effected; it was Christ himself who after his resurrection, in the life of the spirit (ἡτοιμαθεὶς πνεύματι, ἐν ᾧ—), went and preached to the spirits in prison (the lower world), who had once been disobedient, at the time when the long-suffering of God waited in the days of Noah. It appears to me that this interpretation of the passage (iii. 18 f.) is unquestionably the only one of which its language is susceptible, though attempts to explain it otherwise have been made by commentators. The only real difficulty here is, that this preaching of Christ to the lower world is not referred to the dead in general, but only to the sinners in Noah's time who perished in the flood. It is possible that these, as the most striking example of the κρηθῆναι κατ' ἀνθρώπους σαρκί (iv. 6), are taken as representatives of the whole world of sinners who had perished. The thought is otherwise simple, and is only another application of what was said in still simpler language in iv. 6; and πορευθεὶς in ver. 19 is evidently parallel to πορευθεὶς εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν in ver. 22, and therefore, as the counterpart to the ascent into heaven, can surely mean nothing else than the "descent into hell." These two then, the ascent into heaven and the descent into hell, taken together, comprise the whole circuit of the redeeming and saving efficacy of Christ,

attaches to it; for with him faith is obedience with respect to the dispensation of God's favour, submission to the will of God to save us which is presented for our acceptance in the gospel, which submission afterwards issues in the moral obedience of our life, in fulfilment of the will of God regarding the law; here, on the other hand, and also in the Epistle to the Hebrews and that of Clement, obedience of life, Christian morality, is a moment of faith itself; for faith which has not its reality in itself, in the appropriated objective blessing of salvation, but is directed to the still ideal future blessing of salvation, and is so far only subjective feeling—*this* faith can only assure itself of its reality by its moral effects, and can only become objective by obedience in doing and suffering. Accordingly, beside *ἐλπίς*, we have *ὑπακοή* as the characteristic of the Christian state; Christians are called *τίκτα ὑπακοῆς* (i. 14); they purify their souls in obedience to the truth unto sincere brotherly love (i. 22); and obedience precedes the sprinkling of the blood of Christ, i. e. the forgiveness of sins, as a presupposition which is the condition of it. At all events, this interpretation, which is suggested by the order of the words, entirely accords with the result of our previous discussion regarding the significance of the death of Christ, according to which it has not an immediately expiatory effect, but only does away with our sins by being the motive of our moral amendment, and does not redeem us primarily from the guilt of sin, but from the life of sin. From these considerations we shall be the more ready to conclude that the *ῥαντισμὸς αἵματος* (i. 2), an expression which is taken from the Epistle to the Hebrews, implies a moral cause which brings it about, and is therefore conditioned by *ὑπακοή*.

The writer describes the act of becoming a believer as *ἀναγεννᾶσθαι*, as the beginning of a new life; but he understands this, like James in a parallel passage (cf. i. 23 with James i. 18), of the morally renovating effect of the *word*, which as moral truth demands obedience, and as the word of promise awakes living hope (ver. 23, *διὰ λόγου ζωῆς θεοῦ καὶ μένοντος*, cf. ver. 22, *ὑπακοή*).

της ἀληθείας, and ver. 3, ἀναγενήσας εἰς ἐλπίδα ζωῆς). This is not the same, however, as that *καὶνὴ κτίσις* of Paul, in which *ζῶ οὐκέτι ἐγὼ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός*. The author has likewise adopted from Paul the notion of the Christian *πνεῦμα*; it is the principle of sanctification (*ἐν ἀγιασμῷ πνεύματος*, i. 2), of the purification of the soul to sincere brotherly love (*τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν ἡγνίζοντες διὰ πνεύματος εἰς φιλαδελφίαν ἀνυπόκριτον*, i. 22), the element of life, of the hidden man of the heart, which is opposed as imperishable substance to all perishable adornment (iii. 4); it rests, as the spirit of the glory of God, upon the slandered Christians, making them inwardly blessed by its power to comfort, amid all their external sufferings (iv. 14); and especially the preaching of the gospel is effected by the holy spirit sent from heaven (i. 12) as the spirit of enlightenment and of the higher knowledge. According to this, our author makes out that the holy spirit is the principle of Christian life in every one of its aspects, with regard to knowledge, feeling, and will; and here, while widely differing from James, he is thoroughly Pauline. Moreover, he connects neither the new birth nor the communication of the spirit with *baptism*, which is the more striking as this especially was a point on which Paulinism had always been at one with Jewish Christianity, so that it could hardly have been passed over if dogmatic reconciliation had been his real aim. What is said of baptism in iii. 21, namely, that it is the *συνειδήσεως ἀγαθῆς ἐπερώτημα εἰς Θεὸν δι' ἀναστάσεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, is not quite clear, as the words may be taken in many senses. The most probable interpretation, because it is consistent with the construction of the words and simple in its sense, appears to me to be that of Luther, who takes *ἐπερώτημα* to mean a vow, contract (stipulatio), conclusion of a covenant, according to which the meaning is, that in baptism there is not merely a cleansing of the body, but a good (upright) conscience binds itself to God by a solemn vow, no longer to be willing to live to sin, but to live to righteousness, to live no longer according to human desires, but according to the will of God (iv. 2, ii. 24); the con-

which he applies them, that he has penetrated only in a slight degree into the vein of thought peculiar to the Apostle, to whom words he attaches a more general meaning, and a moral rather than a dogmatic sense. It is a popularized, and for that very reason a diluted and faded Paulinism, which certainly ceased to retain any party colouring as such, and might also very well pass under the name of that Apostle whom the Roman Church even at that time was pleased to name before Paul, but in intimate connection with him (cf. 1 Clem. v.).

THE EPISTLE TO THE EPHESIANS.

Of all the forms which Paulinism went through in the course of its transition to Catholicism, that of the Epistle to the Ephesians is the most developed and the richest in dogma. The author, a Jew by birth, but occupying as a Christian the most advanced Pauline standpoint, addresses himself in the name of Paul to the Gentile Christians, who were not only in danger of falling back into heathen immorality, but also, from overvaluing their supposed higher wisdom, were promoting division in the community, and perhaps even aiming at a separation from the Jewish-Christian part of it (iv. 17 f., v. 3 f., especially ver. 6, *αἰοῖς λόγοις τοῖς τῆς ἀπειθείας*, and iv. 14, *πατὶ αἰῶμι τῆς οὐλοσύνης, ἀβείβη τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τεινεργίᾳ πρὸς τὴν μεθολίαν τῆς ἐλπίδος*). In opposition to this practical libertinism and dogmatic hyper-Paulinism, whose speculation undermined the foundations of sound morality as well as those of historical Christianity, the writer reminds them, first of all in general terms, that they had not learned Christ so—that is, as they were now practically and theoretically adapting him to themselves—inasmuch as they had heard of him, and had been instructed in him, as he is the truth in (the historical) Jesus (iv. 20, 21). This presupposes that heretical views, similar to those that are controverted in the Epistles of John, had been presented to his readers, involving an abstract separation between the transcendent Christ and

the historical Jesus, by which Christianity was dissipated into a metaphysical abstraction, and thus deprived at the same time of its ethical content. Although the abstract Christ of those Gnostic dualistic theories might perhaps be reconciled with heathen libertinism, this was impossible—says the author to his Gentile Christian readers—for that Christ, of whom they had learnt from Paul how he had become concrete truth in Jesus, and therefore requires also from Christians a new life in the truth,—a connection of practical truth (morality) with dogmatic Christological truth, such as we find also in the Epistles of John. But, in the next place, the writer of the Epistle to the Ephesians exhorts them especially to preserve peace within the Church (iv. 3—16). In order to exhibit most impressively the importance of the union of the community, which was endangered by his readers, he represents it as the essential content of the divine plan of salvation, and as the ultimate end of Christ's work of redemption (i. 9 f., ii. 13 f., iii. 3 f.). He thus derives his universalism, very much in the manner of John, directly from the absolute idea of Christianity, whereas Paul was forced to wrest it laboriously from the standpoint of the Jewish Christians, by means of dialectic disquisitions on the law and the promises.

But the question of *the relation of Jews and Gentiles to Christ* has entered here upon an entirely different stage. Paul had to contend, against Jewish particularism, for the equal justification of Gentile Christians; the whole point of his argument was therefore directed against the Jewish Christians; but here it is the exaltation of themselves in opposition to the Church, and the want of love on the part of the Gentile Christians, against which the author turns, while he recalls to their memory the greatness of the Divine goodness and favour, to which they owed their acceptance into the kingdom of the Messiah. It is evident that the whole treatment of the matter undergoes a change with this new point of view. If the national particularism of the Jews, supported by the law, had previously to be opposed, now, on

the other hand, in order to resist the self-exaltation and the desire of separation on the part of the Gentile Christians, the prerogative of the Jews, as the people of promise, is insisted upon, and brought before the mind of the Gentile Christians, in order that they, who were once far off, may the more highly appreciate their admission to share the promises and the inheritance of Israel, as an undeserved act of beneficence and favour, and may now the more gratefully stand fast in this unity. It cannot be said that there is here any un-Pauline concession to the Jewish Christians. All that was specifically Jewish and opposed to Christianity in Judaism,—the law, circumcision, the descent from the seed of Abraham,—is here as completely put aside as of no worth or value, as it was by Paul himself (Eph. ii. 3, xi. 15); only the promises of Israel, that is the Christian privileges of the people of the covenant in the time before Christ, are here insisted on as giving them the precedence over the Gentiles. But Paul himself has repeatedly done this very thing in the most decided manner; he also insists upon the advantage that the Jews had over the Gentiles, from the point of view that the promises, the truth of which is for ever unalterable, belong to them (Rom. iii. 1—3, ix. 4—6, xi. 28 f.). To overlook this would be the very hyper-Paulinism which the writer of the Epistle to the Ephesians has to rebuke in Gentile Christian readers. It is not, then, his dogmatic view of the relations of Christianity to Judaism which is different from that of Paul, but it is the actual situation of the Gentile Christian in the community, and consequently the point of view from which the question has practically to be handled, which has changed. The question is no longer, as in the time of Paul, the possibility of Gentile Christianity, but the bringing about of its complete union with Jewish Christianity; that is to say, the realization of the universal Church. The *idea of catholicity* is raised for the first time in the Epistle before us to dogmatic definiteness and to predominant significance. The dogmatic views of the Epistle to the Ephesians rest wholly on Pauline foundations, but

they have advanced beyond the older Paulinism, in the direction of the theology of John. This is shown by the external dependence of this Epistle on that to the Colossians,¹ and probably also on the first Epistle of Peter,² as well as the close connection of many of its ideas and turns of thought with the writings of John.³

In true Pauline fashion, the universality of the *natural corruption by sin* of the whole human race, Jews as well as Gentiles, forms the presupposition for the universality of salvation. The Gentile Christians before their conversion were "dead through the transgressions and sins in which they walked," and for that reason they were at the same time under the dominion of the powers of evil, whose abode is in the air, and who still work in the children of disobedience by spiritual influence, and are a constant source of trouble to Christians (ii. 1, 2, vi. 12). The

¹ *Honig*, following the initiative of *De Wette*, has recently proved this dependence in his striking article in the *Z. f. w. Th.* 1872, pp. 63—87. And in fact his comparison of parallel passages (pp. 77—87) shows the existence of a dependence of such a kind as absolutely to exclude the identity of the author of this Epistle (whether it be Paul or any one else) with the author of the other; for the author of the Ephesians has in many instances made such a use of his model as can only be regarded as a literary error or misunderstanding. In other passages he has given a turn to the ideas of the Epistle to the Colossians which is certainly very ingenious, but very different from that which was intended, which makes the supposition that the two Epistles had the same author—nay, that they were written at the same period—improbable in a degree that reaches impossibility. Consequently the hypothesis that Paul was the author of the Epistle to the Ephesians in any case falls through. Moreover *Holtzmann's* view, that the author of the Ephesians was the interpolator of the Epistle to the Colossians, is refuted by a close comparison of those very parallel passages which are taken from the interpolated part of the Colossians (the controversy against the false teachers), as is partially shown by *Honig's* researches, and will be still further proved by my observations which follow.

² On this point I may appeal to *Weiss, Petrinisch, Lehrbegr.*, p. 431, who indeed infers from this relation of the two Epistles, on the hypothesis of the genuineness of the Epistle to the Ephesians, that the first Epistle of Peter was composed before the Pauline Epistles, while I, on the contrary, am convinced that this Epistle proceeded from the Pauline school, but was written after the time of Paul; and on this supposition its relation to the Epistle to the Ephesians is a further proof of the later composition and the spuriousness of the latter.

³ *Kösten*, in his "*Johanneischer Lehrbegriff*," pp. 265—278, has proved this connection in detail. His statement of the doctrine contained in the Epistle to the Ephesians may be classed among the best writings on the subject.

condition of the Gentiles is more particularly described, sometimes as moral depravity and sinfulness, sometimes as religious blindness, alienation from God, ignorance, and hardness of heart, all of which are comprehended in the notion of "walking in vanity (emptiness, worthlessness) of mind" (iv. 17—19). This judgment holds a middle place between that of Rom. i. and that of the later Paulinism, inasmuch as its moral condemnation is tempered by the ascription of their misdeeds to "ignorance," as it is also in 1 Pet. i. 14 and Acts xvii. 30. Peculiar to this Epistle, again, is the description of the Gentiles as being "far off" (*μακρὰν ὄντες*, ii. 13)—far off, that is to say, from the theocracy, and the covenant promises of Israel contained in it, and—inasmuch as the pre-existent Christ had already a definite place allotted for his manifestation, in this people of promise, from which Christ was to come (cf. 1 Pet. i. 11, and John i. 11, *εἰς τὰ ἔθνη*)—consequently far from Christ, without relation and connection with him in his pre-existent working (*χωρὶς Χριστοῦ*); in short, the Gentiles are in the world without hope and without God (ver. 12). And here, low as is the position assigned to the Gentiles, yet much more weight is given to the consideration that they are without the blessings of religion, than that they deserve moral condemnation: the Gentiles, as compared with the Jews, are regarded as further off indeed, but at the same time as being in their unblessed state in so much the greater need of redemption—a truly Pauline view, and one which we meet with everywhere in the writings of Luke. If the Jews then, as the people of the covenant of promise, certainly had an incontestable advantage over the Gentiles, this does not hinder the author of our Epistle from virtually giving them the same position as the Gentiles in his moral judgment. They also are *τέκνα φύσει ὁργῆς, ὡς καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ* (ii. 3): in consequence of their natural moral condition, if it were not for the promises of God which depend on his favour, they stand in the same relation to God as the Gentiles, they are objects of his anger, and cannot make the slightest claim to any preference,—a way of looking at the

matter which precisely agrees with Rom. iii. 9, and which in form of expression contradicts all the Jewish arrogation of legal righteousness even more decidedly than Paul himself has done, for after all he said, *ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι, καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἔθνων ἀμαρτωλοί* (Gal. ii. 15). And whereas Paul always attributes to Jewish circumcision, as the legal token of the covenant, a certain advantage over the uncircumcision of the Gentiles (though only up to the time of the fulfilment of the law in Christ), (Rom. ii. 25, iii. 1, 2), and it is still regarded in the Epistle to the Colossians as possessing enough significance to be considered as a type of Christian baptism (Col. ii. 11 f.), it has become so entirely void of significance in the eyes of our author, that he only mentions, historically as it were (ii. 11), the "*so-called*" circumcision and uncircumcision, in a way which implies clearly enough that he regarded them as marks of distinction of a former date, which had become valueless and matters of perfect indifference in his time. Moreover, he cannot have regarded the Old Testament prophecies as an immediate revelation of Christ before his appearing in the flesh, for he says of the secret of Christ, that in former ages it had not been revealed to men in the same way as it is now to the Christian Apostles and Prophets (iii. 5). Perhaps he supposed, like the author of the first Epistle of Peter, that the spirit of Christ bore witness beforehand indeed to Christ in the Prophets, but that they were not fully conscious of the meaning of their prophecies (i. 11 f.)

The gradual superseding of both Judaism and Heathenism by Christianity is pregnantly expressed by the thought that *the Christian community had already been pre-ordained in the divine counsel, before the beginning of the world, as the higher unity of these two opposites.* This predestination has its final cause only in the riches of God's love, in his infinite mercy, and his unconditioned good pleasure—in short, in his favour (*ἐν ἀγάπῃ προορίσας . . . κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ*, i. 5; *πλουτόν τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ*, ver. 7; *κατὰ τὴν εὐδοκίαν αὐτοῦ*, ver. 9; *κατὰ πρόθεσιν τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργούντος κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος*

And this has continued from that time forth to be the precise position of the Christian church with regard to Judaism; so that in fact it is only from a Marcionite point of view that the utterances of our Epistle on this point can be rejected as Judaistic in tendency.

It follows from what has already been said, that the Christology of the Epistle to the Ephesians is no other than that of the Pauline school, and indeed of the advanced section of it. The pre-existence is not only implied in i. 4, *ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*, in ii. 12, *χωρὶς Χριστοῦ*, and v. 31 f., on which more will be said hereafter; but is also explicitly stated in iv. 9 f., where the appearing of Christ is described in the very words of John's Christology as a "descent" (from the upper world of heaven) to the earth, or the lower region of the world;¹ and the identity of him who descended with him who has ascended on high above all the heavens, is emphasized in a way that is strikingly analogous to John iii. 13. In both these passages the argument by which it is sought to establish the reference of the word *ἀναβάς*, &c., in the Psalms to Christ (ver. 8), is founded on the presupposition, that only one who already really belongs to heaven, and who has only left it temporarily to descend to the lower region of the world, is capable of ascending into heaven; and this presupposition, from the standpoint of that Alexandrine dualism of the two worlds which is already apparent in the later Paulinism (the Epistles to the Hebrews and Colossians), and still more definitely forms the foundation of John's theology, is simply self-evident,—but the purpose of the descent from and ascent to heaven is *ἵνα πληρώσῃ τὰ πάντα* (cf. i. 23, *τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι πληρουμένου*). These words evidently presuppose

¹ To explain this passage as referring to the descent into hell, appears to me to be consistent neither with the words (especially as *μῆρη* must be regarded as a spurious reading) nor with the context, which is evidently concerned only with the identity of him who went to heaven, with him who came from heaven, that is to say, with the application of the term "*ἀναβάς*," quoted from the Psalms, to the Logos-Christ who appeared in the flesh. It is true, however, that the later addition of the word *μῆρη* may point to the fact that this passage was already at an early date understood to refer to the descent into hell.

the advanced Christology of the Epistle to the Colossians, for they make Christ appear as the cosmical principle which pervades and rules the universe, in which therefore it subsists (Col. i. 17, τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ συνίστηκε). And, in fact, the Christology of the Epistle before us is not only in no respect on a lower level than that of the Epistle to the Colossians, but it goes beyond it in the direction of John's school. For whereas in that Epistle the interest centres in establishing the exalted position of Christ in the universe, above an un-Christian angel-worship, the Epistle to the Ephesians, on the other hand, is occupied in *bringing again into the closest possible connection with the community* that Christ who has been thus transported above all that is earthly, and exalted to a cosmical principle (the presupposition of this exaltation being of course retained). Our Epistle, then, has not a different Christology, but a different Christological interest, which is essentially the same as that which confronts us still more decidedly in the Epistles of John. As these no longer contend for the absoluteness of Christ, against the Ebionites, but for the identity of the supramundane Christ with the earthly Jesus, against the Docetists, so also is the Christology of the Epistle to the Ephesians directed less to the exaltation of Christ in heaven, than to the fact that the earthly community of Christ belongs to the heavenly Christ as his body and his spouse. We have already concluded, from a comparison of iv. 20 with 21, that in doing so its author is contending at the same time against a dualistic separation such as the Docetists made between Christ and Jesus, after the manner of the false teachers in John. The insisting on the identity of the *καταβάς* with the *ἀναβάς* (iv. 10), may also be referred to this object. And v. 31 f. is especially connected with the same point. The saying of the Old Testament, that a man shall leave father and mother and cleave to his wife, and that these two shall become one flesh, is, in the allegorizing manner of the mysteries (τὸ μυστήριον τοῦτο), interpreted of the relation of Christ to the community, evidently in the sense that the (pre-

existent) Christ had left his (heavenly) Father, to unite himself to the community by entering into the flesh; he has thus not remained in the other world, nor has he entered into the flesh merely in appearance, but he has actually become one and the same flesh with the community (cf. Heb. ii. 14 and 1 John iv. 2). This also explains the new meaning which is given to the notion of *πλήρωμα* in the Epistle to the Ephesians; for there appears to be no doubt that it is used in quite a different sense from that which it bears in the Epistle to the Colossians.¹ There, it is a dogmatic notion, and refers to the fulness of the *Godhead*, of the divine power to save, the dwelling of which in Christ gave him his position as head over all things in the universe and in the community; but in our Epistle it is an ethical notion, the sense of which varies indeed in particular points, but is nowhere that of Col. i. 19 and ii. 9. For according to Eph. i. 22 f., which passage evidently refers to Col. i. 18 f., the *community*, as the *σῶμα* of Christ, is at the same time τὸ *πλήρωμα* τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῇ πληρουμένου, i. e. the filling up, completing of him who fills all in all. There is therefore a certain reciprocity between the two—it is Christ him-elf indeed who fills the universe, but he actually does this only by first receiving his own filling up and completion by means of the community. Christ is thus the absolute principle, but yet he is not this by himself alone, but only in conjunction with the community, in which alone his true nature realizes itself. The community, however, is not a multitude collected once for all, but is a thing that is ever coming into existence and growing, and therefore the reality of that which Christ according to his idea or in his true nature eternally is, is not a reality that exists absolutely, but one that is always coming into existence in time. The beginning of this realization was effected by his exaltation, whereby he was placed in a condition to bestow on the community the gifts and offices neces-

¹ The remarks that follow are entirely opposed to the view of *Holtzmann*, who (ut supra, pp. 222—227) endeavours to establish the identity of this notion in the two Epistles.

sary to its existence and growth; for that reason his exaltation above the heavens is especially referred to the purpose of his filling all things (iv. 10). But the full realization of the πλήρωμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ depends further on the advancing growth of the community towards the unity of faith and knowledge. Only in proportion as it develops itself into a perfect (full-grown and matured) man, i.e. cultivates all its faculties and powers up to the full strength and harmony of an organism corresponding to its idea, does it attain to the degree of mature development at which it actually becomes that which it ought to be for Christ—πλήρωμα Χριστοῦ, so as actually to serve as the full and adequate completion of its head, or to exhibit the idea of Christ as the ideal principle of the universe in complete reality visible on earth (iv. 12 f., εἰς οἰκοδομὴν τοῦ σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ, μέχρι καταστήσωμεν οἱ πάντες εἰς τὴν ἐνότητα τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως τοῦ νού τοῦ Θεοῦ, εἰς ἄνδρα τέλειον, εἰς μέτρον ἡλικίας τοῦ πληρώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ). Somewhat different is the sense of πλήρωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ in iii. 19, which seems to allude to Col. ii. 9 f. in the same way as i. 23 does to Col. i. 19, inasmuch as πλήρωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ sounds like πλήρωμα τῆς Θεότητος, and πληρωθῆτε like ἔστε . . . πεπληρωμένοι. But here again the parallelism is only external; the thought in the two instances is entirely different. In the passage from the Colossians, the religious perfection of Christianity is dogmatically deduced from the indwelling of the fulness of God in Christ, in virtue of which Christians have no further need of adventitious aids to religious perfection by means of extraneous observances of asceticism and angel-worship. In the passage from the Ephesians, on the contrary, πληροῦσθαι is not a dogmatic declaration, but an ethical task to be accomplished (ἵνα πληρωθῆτε), and the πλήρωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ is not a Christological reality, but an ethical ideal (εἰς πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ Θεοῦ), namely, that condition in which the fulness of the powers of the divine life, or the gifts of favour, shall have passed over into the community's own life, through the practical knowledge of the love of Christ. Although, then, the grammatical

sense of πληρωμα (= fulness or being filled, passive) is different from its sense in the two passages previously quoted, in which as applied to Christ it denotes his completing or filling up (in an active sense), yet the theological idea is essentially the same, namely, that the Christian πληρωμα is not something already complete, a Christological reality, but a thing that realizes itself only in the formation and growth of the community to and in Christ. Now if we consider that the notion of πληρωμα is used in the Epistle to the Colossians in an unvarying sense, clearly indicated by the Ebionite Christology which it opposes, but in the Epistle to the Ephesians in a different sense, by no means so well defined as the other, and constantly fluctuating, we may conclude with great probability that the author of the Ephesians took the word from the Epistle to the Colossians, but, as its original sense was no longer familiar to him or no longer sufficiently significant, altered its meaning quite independently, now in one way and now in another, to suit his own purpose.

But not only does the use of these expressions show the Epistle to the Ephesians to be later and dependent; the difference of the thought also points to a more mature development of the theological consciousness in it than in the Epistle to the Colossians. It is no longer occupied in gaining and making good its dogmatic Christological basis, but has already begun to turn it to account in the practical consequences that flow from it for the life of the Church. That Christ as he is in his abstract relation to God and the world possesses the πληρωμα, and is *ὁ τὰ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ πληροῦμενος*, is as firmly held in this Epistle as in the Epistle to the Colossians; but this Christological idea is still an imperfect abstraction so long as it does not receive its concrete filling in the πληροῦσθαι of the community as the πληρωμα of Christ. Precisely in the same way the Christ of John regards his glorification as not completed until, as he already knows himself to be one with his Father, so also his community shall become one in him and the Father; the *ὁῶς α*,

ἀγάπη, χάρις and δόξα which were manifested in Christ—in a word, the πλήρωμα (John i. 16), attained to its full reality only in the united universal Church (John xvii. 21 f.: *ἵνα πάντες ἐν ὧσιν, καθὼς σὺ, πάτερ, ἐν ἐμοὶ καὶ ἐν σοὶ, ἵνα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐν ὧσιν καὶ ἐγὼ τὴν δόξαν, ἣν δέδωκάς μοι, δέδωκα αὐτοῖς, ἵνα ὧσιν ἐν, καθὼς ἡμεῖς ἐν ἰσμεν, ἐγὼ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ σὺ ἐν ἐμοί, ἵνα ὧσι τετελειωμένοι εἰς τὸ ἵνα ἡ ἀγάπη, ἣν ἡγάπησάς με, ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς*: ver. 13, *ἵνα ἔχωσι τὴν χαρὰν τὴν ἐμὴν πεπληρωμένην ἐν ἑαυτοῖς*). And with this finally is connected the further peculiarity, that the Christ of the Epistle to the Ephesians, more than the Christ of the older Pauline teaching, but like the Christ of John, is represented as acting independently in the work of redemption and the guidance of the community. Whereas throughout the writings of Paul, and also in the parallel passages of the Colossians, which the writer of the Ephesians had before him (i. 20 and ii. 14), it is God who institutes reconciliation by means of Christ; according to the Ephesians (ii. 14—17), it is Christ who effects in his own person the reconciliation of these parties who are estranged from each other, and who himself announces the peace that has been made; he is no longer the expiatory sacrifice ordained by God, but appears—just as in the Epistle to the Hebrews—as the sacrificing priest who offers himself as a well-pleasing sacrifice (v. 2). And while, according to Paul, it is God himself who distributes the gifts and offices in the community (1 Cor. xii. 28), according to Eph. iv. 7—21, this is a function of the exalted Christ. If we reflect that, even according to the Epistle before us, Christ is as essentially connected with the community as the head with the body that completes it, we shall perceive, in the more independent position of Christ, only the natural expression of the self-consciousness of the community when it had gained sufficient strength for internal autonomy and external independence. But since Christian autonomy only exists in dependence on God, and is not conceivable apart from this, this more independent position of Christ towards God is necessarily supplemented by his more decided subordination to

Him; for this reason God is called, Eph. i. 17, "the God of our Lord Jesus Christ," which implies subordination neither more nor less than the words of Christ in John, "the Father is greater than I." In any case, however, no inference can be drawn in favour of a less exalted Christology in the Epistle to the Ephesians as compared with that to the Colossians, for in the latter *ὁ θεὸς τοῦ Χριστοῦ* is spoken of in precisely the same way (ii. 2).

The frequent mention of the *πνεῦμα*, which occurs thirteen times in the Epistle to the Ephesians, against one (and that a doubtful) instance in the Colossians, has essentially the same dogmatic ground as the more independent position of Christ towards God. The reason why the *πνεῦμα* falls into the background in the Epistle to the Colossians is evidently the predominance of the person of Christ, as such, against an Ebionite doctrine of angels, to which the *πνεῦμα* could not be sharply opposed, since it was itself represented by the Ebionites as of an angelic nature. But the reason of its being more prominent in the Epistle to the Ephesians is the greater significance and more independent position of the community, which serves to complete the reality on earth of Christ, its heavenly head, just as the Christ of John has his representative, who is to carry on his work on earth, in the Paraclete sent to the community. As in that Gospel the exalted Christ sends the Paraclete to the community, so here Christ, who has ascended to heaven, distributes his gifts to the community, giving them apostles, prophets, &c. (iv. 7, 11). And if the Paraclete is certainly more distinctly different from Christ in John's Gospel than the *πνεῦμα* is here, yet there also we may perceive an intermingling of the coming of the Paraclete with the return of Christ to his community; and in the same way the preaching of the gospel is partly referred here to the operation of the spirit of revelation, and partly declared to be the function of Christ at his (second) coming; for the words of ii. 17, *καὶ ἔλθων ἀναγγελίσσας εἰρήνην*, cannot surely refer to anything but the invisible return of the exalted Christ in the spirit of evangelic truth, since they denote a consequence

of the work of reconciliation before spoken of, and since the *εἰρήνη* that was announced was the result of his death which procured peace, and therefore could not be proclaimed before it; the announcement of peace to the Gentiles (*τοῖς μακρὰν*) especially could not have been made by the earthly Christ, because in fact it only began with the preaching of Paul to the Gentiles. The Pauline author of this Epistle has also a very distinct consciousness of this; otherwise he would not have made his Paul say, *ἀλλὰ ἀπολάλψω ἐγνωρίσθαι μοι τὸ μυστήριον*, nor so studiously have exhibited Paul's *σύνεστιν ἐν τῇ μυστηρίῳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, as well as the favour specially granted to him of preaching to the Gentiles (iii. 3, 4, 8). It is true that, as if to extenuate this advantage of Paul, it is immediately added that the mystery of the ordinance of salvation for the Gentiles also had been imparted by the spirit of revelation to "the holy Apostles and Prophets" in general. If the prominence given to Paul shows a historical recollection of what had actually taken place, this placing together of "the holy Apostles" as colleagues who were perfectly unanimous on the question of the Gentiles, is an undoubted indication of the later compromising Paulinism. But that "the (Christian)¹ Prophets" are placed beside the Apostles, is a remarkably suggestive peculiarity of this Epistle. The Prophets are the specific recipients and organs of the spirit of revelation. Now, as they do not merely occupy a transitory position among other officers of the community, dependent on the contingent endowment of *χαρίσματα*, but form together with the Apostles the firm foundation-stone of the community, this involves the presupposition that the spirit of revelation which worked in the Prophets is as much an independent principle of truth for the community,² as the earthly Christ was for the Apostles who were his immediate disciples. But this is essen-

¹ That the *Christian*, and not the Old Testament Prophets are meant, ought, in the face of iii. 5 (*ὡς ἡμεῖς ἀποκαλύφθη τοῖς ἁγ. ἀπ. καὶ προφήταις*), never to have been doubted; but iv. 11 (*τοῖς μὲν ἀποστόλοις, τοῖς δὲ προφήταις ἰδὼσιν*) precludes the identification of them with the Apostles (Hofmann)

² Cf. *Kestlin*, ut supra, p. 373.

tially the idea of John xvi. 12 f. That it is not, on the other hand, quite Pauline, we may see by simply comparing Eph ii. 20 with 1 Cor. iii. 11: in the latter, Jesus Christ is the one and only foundation of the community; in the former, the Apostles and Prophets, with Christ as the corner-stone that holds them together; and still later, the pillar and ground of the truth is simply the Church (1 Tim. iii. 15). Thus, then, this point alone suffices to show that the Epistle to the Ephesians marks the stage of transition from Paulinism to Catholicism. And it is this very strengthening of the self-consciousness of the Church which attains to completely harmonious expression in the co-ordination of the Prophets of the Church with the Apostles in the prominence given to the independent πνεῦμα ἀποκαλύψεως, and in the idea of the completion of Christ by the community as his πλήρωμα.

The Epistle to the Ephesians follows that to the Colossians in describing the *work of Christ* as the reconciliation of those who are sundered, yet in such a way as to give (as in its Christology) an essentially new, that is to say a practical, application to the dogmatic idea. This will be most clearly seen by comparing Eph. ii. 14—16 with the two parallel passages that we have brought together, Col. i. 20—22 and ii. 14. Both writers speak in nearly the same words of ἀποκαταλλάξαι, εἰρήνην ποιῆσαι between ἑχθρούς, and that διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ σταυροῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς σαρκός (ἐν τῇ σαρκί, ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι, Eph), and of removing out of the way a wall of separation between two parties who were to be reconciled (μεσότοιχον τοῦ φραγμοῦ λύσας, τὸν νόμον τῶν ἐντολῶν ἐν δόγμασι καταργήσας, in Eph, and ἐξαλείψας τὸ καθ' ἡμῶν χειρόγραφον τοῖς δόγμασιν, ὃ ἦν ὑπεναντίον ἡμῖν, καὶ αὐτὸ ἥρκεν ἐκ τοῦ μέσου, in Col.). But if we examine this more closely, we find that, as in the case of πλήρωμα and πληροῦσθαι, the author of the Epistle to the Ephesians puts a different meaning into the words taken from the Colossians. For whereas in the latter the enmity to be reconciled by the death of Christ consists in the estrangement of the world in general from God, and more especially of

the Gentile Christians to whom it was addressed, and the wall of partition taken out of the way is the guilt before God which oppresses the world of sinners, or, in other words, the bond of the condemning law which gives this world over to the hostile spiritual powers, and the instrument of union or reconciliation is the fleshly body of Christ, which was put to death—in the Epistle to the Ephesians, on the contrary, the enemies to be reconciled to each other are the Gentiles and the Jews; the wall of division which is to be removed is the law, as a social separation between these two classes of men; and lastly, the body that unites them is the mystical body of Christ, or the universal Church. The *ἐχθρα* which is to be changed into *εἰρήνη* by Christ, is, at all events, in ver. 15 no other than the alienation between τὰ ἀμφοτέρα, τοὺς δύο, τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους, who are described in ver. 15, and afterwards in vers. 17 and 18 (οἱ ἀμφοτέροι), as the *ἐγγές* and the *μακρὰν ὄντες*, i. e. as Jews and Gentiles. It is true that in ver. 16 an ἀποκαταλλάξαι τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους τῷ θεῷ is also spoken of, so that the *ἐχθραν* that follows is certainly ambiguous, and may refer either to the enmity between the ἀμφοτέροι and God, or to that between the two parties included in the ἀμφοτέροι, i. e. between the Jews and Gentiles. The latter interpretation is favoured by the whole train of thought in the context, by the analogy of "*ἐχθραν*" in ver. 15, and by the expression "*ἐν ἑνὶ σώματι*" in ver. 16, which must in any case refer to the union of Jews and Gentiles in the one body of Christ's community. If the direct reference of the clause to ἀποκαταλλάξαι τῷ θεῷ, appears to require with equal force the other interpretation of *ἐχθραν*, even here the difficulty consists simply in the *confusion of two different ideas*, and this is very easily accounted for by the fact that the passage in question is not original, but came from the Epistle to the Colossians, with the words of which a new idea was combined;¹ the words, ἀποκατ. τῷ θεῷ, and the corre-

¹ Compare with the above, *Πδαιγ*, ut supra, p. 81: "It is in the highest degree probable that a passage which borrows its expressions from a terminology that ordinarily belongs to another circle of ideas, is dependent on the parallel passage which pre-

sponding meaning of *ἔχθρα*, are introduced from the earlier Epistle into ver. 16, and as they stand here of course do not fit in with the other ideas of the passage, which does not, like the original, refer to the reconciliation of the sinful world with God, but to that of the Jews with the Gentiles. Moreover, the train of thought in the passage from the Ephesians suffers in other respects from a certain incongruity, which, as we may plainly see, results only from the connection of its expressions with the terminology of the Epistle to the Colossians, which the author had before him. When it is said that Christ has made Jew and Gentile a new man in himself, making peace between them, and that he has, for this purpose, done away with the law of the commandments which separated these two sections, this is perfectly intelligible: but it is less clear how we are to conceive the doing away of the separating boundary-line as effected "in the flesh of Christ," which is thus the place of union for the two parties separated by the law, who are to be reconciled; an idea which is, for this reason, shortly afterwards abandoned, and replaced by the entirely different one, that the reconciliation of those who were at variance has taken place in "the one (mystical) body" of Christ. Here we have again a mixture of two different ideas; the words of Col. i. 22, ἀποκατήλλαξεν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ (διὰ τοῦ θανάτου), are in the first instance separated by our author into their two component parts—ἐν σαρκί and ἐν σώματι—and the former of these is retained in its original meaning, as the flesh of Christ which suffered death. The word in this sense was appropriate enough in the original context, where this fleshly body, which was put to death, is the expiatory means of doing away with the enmity between God and the sinful world; but it is not so appropriate in its new connection, for the slain body of Christ cannot well be regarded as a means of reconciliation for doing away with the enmity

sents these expressions in their ordinary connection." The further arguments also which he uses, regarding the relation of ἐν δόγματιν (Eph.) and τοῖς δόγματιν (Col.), appear to me to be unanswerable.

between Jew and Gentile. Our author feeling this, now takes the other word from the original passage, but gives it a figurative sense, by which it is made to fit in with the new connection of ideas—he turns the real “ἐν τῇ σάρτι” (τῆς σαρκός, &c.) of the Colossians into the figurative “ἐν ἐνὶ σώματι,” which now has absolutely nothing in common with the preceding “ἐν τῇ σαρκί,” with which it originally formed *one* notion.

The two other passages in which our author treats of Christ's sacrifice of himself, also lead us to the conclusion that he was not familiar with the idea of an expiatory death. According to v. 2, Christ has “given himself up for us, as an offering and sacrifice to God, for a sweet-smelling savour;” and according to v. 25, he has offered himself up for the community, that he might sanctify it by cleansing, &c. According to this, the death of Christ appears, not as vicarious expiatory suffering, but as a sacerdotal act of voluntary self-devotion to the community, prompted by love, which is the very thing that makes this act well-pleasing to God, and in which also love and pity are emphasized as the qualities which lie at the root of it (i. 4 f., ii. 4, 8).

The *effect* of this moral act of sacrifice, is the sanctification of the community, i. e. its purifying consecration to Christ, as belonging to him, to union with him as his bride (ἵνα αὐτὴν ἀγιάσῃ καθαρίσας . . . ἵνα παραστήσῃ αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἑνδοξὸν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν . . . ἵνα ἡ ἁγία καὶ ἄμωμος). But this purifying devotion is produced by the forgiveness of the sins whose polluting guilt has separated man from God; by this they are redeemed from their former condition of being dead in sins, and are made alive in Christ; they are taken out of their alienation from God, and brought near to Him, so that they now have access to God through Christ (ἐν ᾧ ἔχομεν τὴν ἀπολύτρωσιν διὰ τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ, τὴν ἄφεσιν τῶν παραπτωμάτων, i. 7; νεκροὺς ὄντας τοῖς παραπτώμασι συνεζωοποίητε τῷ Χριστῷ, ii. 5; οἱ ποτε ὄντες μακρὰν, ἐγγὺς ἐγενήθητε ἐν τῇ αἱματί τοῦ Χριστοῦ, ii. 13; οἱ οὖν ἔχομεν τὴν προσαγώγην πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, *ver.* 18). In all these turns of thought this Epistle

closely follows the direction of the later Paulinism which had been taken by the Epistles to the Hebrews and Colossians; all these ideas—καθαρίζειν, ἀφεσις τῶν παραπτωμάτων, νεκρὸς τοῖς παραπτώμασι, συνεξωποίησε τῷ Χριστῷ, ἐγγὺς γενέσθαι—have their exact parallel only in the Epistles just named, and not in the genuine Epistles of Paul. (Καθαρίζειν occurs often in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and indeed in a parallel sense with ἀγιάζειν, and connected with ἀφεσις, Heb. ix. 22, 13 f., x. 2; ἀγιάζειν is found in connection with the sacrifice of Christ, x. 10, xiii. 12; ἀφεσις does not occur in Paul's writings, but in Col. i. 14, Heb. ix. 22, x. 18, and very frequently in Luke and the Acts of the Apostles; νεκρὸς, applied to the state of the natural man under the dominion of sin, is not found in Paul, but in Col. ii. 13, Heb. vi. 1, and in ix. 14 in the connection γὰρ ἔργα; in Rev. iii. 1, ζῆς καὶ νεκρὸς ἐστὶ, and in the Epistle to the Ephesians three times—ii. 1—5, v. 14; συνεξωποίησε only in Col. ii. 13; for ἐγγὺς γενέσθαι, and προσαγωγὴν ἔχειν, cf. ἐγγίζομεν τῷ θεῷ, Heb. vii. 19, and προσέρχεται τῷ θεῷ, which occurs so often in Hebrews.) It is a peculiarity of the Epistle before us that to συνεξωποίησε and συνήγαγε is added συνεκάθισεν ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ, ii. 6, by which is meant the placing of Christians in personal communion with God by the mediation of Christ, and therefore the same notion as is expressed in ii. 18, δι' αὐτοῦ ἔχομεν τὴν προσαγωγὴν . . . πρὸς τὸν πατέρα. The idea of Phil. iii. 20, ἡμῶν τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει, is indeed akin to this, but it is not identical with it, since this πολίτευμα does not refer to the "sojourn," the actual condition of the Christian, but to his "home," where he has indeed his right of citizenship, but not as yet his actual permanent abode; on the contrary, he is waiting for the coming of his Redeemer thence (ibid.), which presupposes that till then he does not ἐνδημεῖ πρὸς τὸν κύριον, but ἐκδημεῖ ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου (2 Cor. v. 6—8). This very "dwelling with the Lord," which Paul only hoped for in the future life, is connected in this passage of the Ephesians by the words, "set in heavenly places with Christ," with the present inward state of Christians; and this

goes beyond the Epistle to the Hebrews, inasmuch as according to that Epistle we have on the one hand indeed already arrived at the heavenly Jerusalem (xii. 22 f.), but on the other hand are only connected by the anchor of hope with the sanctuary above, whither Christ as our forerunner has first entered alone (vi. 19 f.). It also goes beyond the Epistle to the Colossians, according to which the life of Christians does not yet entirely belong to them, but is hidden with Christ in God, until the manifestation of Christ, and therefore awaits them in the future life in heaven. In contradistinction then to the earlier Paulinism, the Epistle to the Ephesians, in the passage we have quoted, lays less stress on the transcendence of the final consummation, and more on the immanence of the present Christian consciousness of salvation, a tendency which we find again most distinctly in John (cf. John i. 51, *ἀπάρτι ὤψεσθε τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνεωγῶτα*, and v. 24, *ὁ πιστεύων ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον, καὶ εἰς κρίσιν οὐκ ἔρχεται, ἀλλὰ μεταβέβηκεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωὴν*, and other similar passages). Further, among the various descriptions of Christian salvation, we miss here, as in the Epistle to the Colossians, the specifically Pauline notion of *δικαιοῦν*, *δικαιοσύνη* *θεοῦ*; but—as in the Epistle to the Hebrews—it is rather the word that is wanting than the idea itself, for this underlies all the expressions that have been brought together above as their foundation, inasmuch as all these (and also *συνεξωπολήσε, συνήγαγε, συνεκάθισεν ἐν οὐρανοῖς* and *ἀγιάζειν*) denote the establishment of a new objective relation to God, translation into the state of favour, belonging to God, and peaceful intercourse with Him, but not a subjective renovation of life, or moral sanctification.

With regard to the *objects* to which the work of Christ is directed, it is worthy of remark, and entirely agrees with the inferences drawn above from the Christology, that the work of Christ is, on the one hand, limited to the community, to those who have been elected from all eternity; and, on the other hand, extended to the *universe*, comprising all things in heaven and earth (the former in v. 25, *ἡγάπησε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν καὶ ταυτὸν*

παρέδωκεν ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς, ἵνα αὐτὴν ἀγιάσῃ, ἔνδοξον τὴν ἐκκλησίαν παραστήσῃ, &c.; the latter in i. 10, ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ, τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς, καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς). As Christ is designated as in very deed the principle which fills the universe (ὁ τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσι πληρούμενος), but at the same time as from all eternity the head of the community (ἐν ᾧ ἐξελίξατο ἡμῶς πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου), so that he needs it for his own completion, for the fulfilment of his whole being, because in it alone he is actually the principle of life that determines all things—so in corresponding fashion the historical working of Christ, in which alone his eternal being develops itself, extends directly over the community, indirectly over the universe. And as Christ first of all by his devotion gains the community for himself, and as its living head inspires and animates it, as it grows in him, with his spirit, so he becomes, the more this narrow circle extends itself, more and more a “head over all,” comprehending the universe in himself (κεφαλὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα, i. 22). This cosmical position, as the head of the universe comprehending all things within himself, is ascribed to Christ indeed by this Epistle in common with the Epistle to the Colossians, in which the words of i. 20 especially (δι’ αὐτοῦ ἀποκαταλλάξαι τὰ πάντα εἰς αὐτὸν, εἴτε τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, εἴτε τὰ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς) form an exact parallel to the passage before us; but yet a peculiar modification of the idea appears to be indicated by the choice of the expression ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι, inasmuch as this word proceeds from the notion which usually indicates the position of Christ towards the community, as κεφαλὴ τῆς ἐκκλησίας. Accordingly, Christ is ordained to this, and the divine “dispensation of the fulness of times” (the government of the world going on through the ages) has for its object that the same position which he assumes at first towards the community—as its all-comprising head—should finally, and through these means, be assumed by him towards the universe; and that in this also he should comprehend in absolute unity and harmony all things both in heaven and on earth, which were before separated and held apart by exclusive

barriers, as he had at first in the community comprehended in one body the two classes of men who were before divided, namely, Jews and Gentiles. The importance of that, to which the whole purpose of this Epistle is directed, namely, the comprehension of the Gentile and Jewish Christians in the perfect unity of the universal Church, could not, in fact, be more grandly expressed than by pointing out, that this process of uniting the community on earth, was not only an analogue and type of the absolute process of the universe, but in truth an essential moment of it. For this reason the community serves also to display to the powers and principalities of the heavenly world the manifold wisdom of God, because they perceive in its historical development the beginning of the realization of the absolute plan of the universe itself (iii. 10). Thus we have in this profound doctrine of the Epistle to the Ephesians only another instance of the same distinguishing peculiarity of it which we have so often noticed, viz., that to the theological statements which appear in the Epistle to the Colossians, in the form simply of dogmatic declarations regarding the person and the historical reconciling work of Christ, and which there serve only to bring to light the absolute oneness and comprehensive importance of this, it gives a practical application in the interest of the Church, and turns it to account as the foundation of its endeavours to bring about a union. In this respect the Epistle is thoroughly original.

The *subjective appropriation of salvation* is brought about by baptism and faith. *Baptism* is in v. 26 designated as the means of purification, by which the consecration of the community as the pure bride of Christ, rendered possible by his death, is completed (*καθάρσις*, Aor. Part., shows the way in which *ἀγίαση* is effected). But the purifying effect of baptism depends on two things—on the *λουτρὸν τοῦ ὕδατος* and the *ῥήμα*; this is the same union of the sensible medium with the spiritual agent as we find in John iii. 5, where “water and spirit” are placed together, the latter being manifested and becoming operative in the “word.”

The presupposition in both cases is, that the efficacy of the spirit or of the word is mystically united with the act of washing with water, one being inherent in the other, as essence and manifestation. The further notion that the effect of baptism is connected with purification (from defiling sin and guilt), and not directly with the reception of the spirit, and the new birth by the spirit, is a deviation from the views of Paul and John, the nearest approach to which is found in 1 Peter iii. 21 (compare what has been said above).

Besides baptism, *faith* is in true Pauline fashion called a means of the appropriation of the saving favour of God (τῇ γὰρ χάριτί ἐστε σεσωσμένοι διὰ τῆς πίστεως, ii. 8). In consequence of their having believed in the word of truth, the gospel of salvation, Christians have received the promised Holy Spirit as a seal and pledge of the certainty of their inheritance (i. 13). Through faith in Christ, we have in him peace (of conscience) and free access in trustfulness (to God), iii. 12. These expressions for the subjective certainty of salvation, for the consciousness of being in a state of favour, are common to this Epistle and the Romans (προσαγωγή, Rom. v. 2), to the Hebrews and the first Epistle of John (παῖρησία = a peaceful conscience, Christian certainty of salvation, is not found in Paul, but in Heb. iii. 6, iv. 16, x. 19, x. 35; 1 John ii. 28, iii. 21, iv. 17, v. 14; the notion of "sealing" the faithful by the Holy Spirit given as a "pledge," is taken by our author from 2 Cor. i. 22). Finally, faith is also the subjective instrument by means of which Christ dwells in the hearts of Christians (κατοικῆσαι τὸν Χριστὸν διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν, iii. 17). Certain as it is that the Epistle to the Ephesians in the passages that have been quoted shares the mystical view of faith held by Paul and John, it is remarkable that we find in it also sayings that recall the objective notion of faith which became at a later period the view of the Church. For instance, iv. 13, *καταντῆσωμεν οἱ πάντες εἰς τὴν ἐνότητά τῆς πίστεως*, and ver. 5, where *μία πίστις* is placed between *εἰς κύριον* and *ἐν βάπτισμα*, two purely objective moments, and

where consequently the *μία πίστις* which is placed between them can mean nothing but the objective content of faith—faith as held by the Church; which doctrine we shall find still more decidedly and more frequently in the later pastoral letters.

A decisive mark of the lateness of this writer is the great stress laid on knowledge, though this is not peculiar to this Epistle, but common to all the later literature of the Pauline school (cf. especially the Epistle to the Colossians), and of the school of John (compare the accumulation of such expressions as *γνώσις*, iii. 18 f.; *ἐπίγνωσις*, i. 17, iv. 13; *σύνεσις*, iii. 4; *φρόνησις*, i. 8; *σοφία*, *ibid.*; *σοφία καὶ ἀποκάλυψις*, i. 17; *ἀποκάλυψις*, iii. 3; *γνωρισθῆναι* and *ἀποκαλυφθῆναι*, iii. 5, 10; *φωτίειν*, *πε φωτισμένοι*, *ἀφθαλμοί*, iii. 9, i. 18). Various objects of this Christian knowledge are specified—the Son of God, iv. 13, i. 17 (as the Christological foundation of the growth and union of the community); the love of Christ which is beyond all knowledge, iii. 19 (as the central point of evangelical truth, from which all its dimensions are to be measured, cf. ver. 18); the hope of the divine calling; the riches of the glory of his inheritance among the saints, i. 18 (as the ultimate object of the Christian life of faith); finally, that which comprehends all these, the secret of the eternal plan of God, the object of which is to comprehend all that is separated in heaven and earth, and here especially the Jews and Gentiles in unity in Christ, i. 10, iii. 3—6 (i.e. the idea of Christianity in its absolute truth and necessity absorbing not only all former religious differences, but everything that is finite).

The *life of salvation* is represented as a continuous process of sanctification, which has its negative and its positive side. As to the former, it consists in laying aside the old man (iv. 22)—a notion which our author has taken from Col. iii. 9, but which (and this indicates a train of thought already far removed from the early Paulinism) he considers it necessary to explain by a preliminary paraphrase (which by no means corresponds with the original fulness of meaning of that Pauline expression), namely, *κατὰ τὴν προτέραν ἀναστροφὴν*, which, taken with the

context, can only be considered as an explanatory amplification of the notion, τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον. On its positive side, sanctification consists in ἀνανεοῦσθαι τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοῦς, καὶ ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καινὸν ἄνθρωπον τὸν κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ὁσιότητι τῆς ἀληθείας (iv. 23 f.). Here we are at once struck by the resemblance to the corresponding passage in Colossians; ἀνανεοῦσθαι has been suggested by νέον in the latter, καινόν by ἀνακαινούμενον, and κατὰ θεὸν κτισθέντα by κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος αὐτόν, the inaptness of the last expression showing clearly that the Epistle to the Ephesians is the dependent one; for to renew ourselves after the image of him who has created the new man in us, i. e. Christ, is an incomparably simpler and more natural idea, than that the new man is created after God, by which it is not clear whether the first creation of Adam is meant, or the new creation by the second birth of the Christian. Moreover, it is to be observed that ἀνανεοῦσθαι τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοῦς, i. e. "with respect to the spirit of the mind," is a very un-Pauline turn of thought; the expression πνεῦμα τοῦ νοῦς is not to be found anywhere else, and is harsh, inasmuch as πνεῦμα is in no other instance used to qualify or determine νοῦς, or to denote any aspect, property, or predicate of it in any way. Paul, it is true, also speaks of an ἀνακαίνωσις τοῦ νοῦς, but he never refers to πνεῦμα as the object of renovation; even if it be not un-Pauline to speak of the renewal of the πνεῦμα of man by the πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ, it is certain that the expression does not once occur in the older Epistles.

The Christian moral life is called a walk worthy of the calling by which we are called (iv. 1), an imitation of God and Christ, especially in *love* (v. 1, 2), a walk such as becomes children of *light*, the fruit of which consists in all kindness and righteousness and truth (v. 8 f.), an idea that is still more akin to 1 John i. 5—10, than it is to Thess. v. 5 f. That, together with faith, love is especially emphasized, is certainly quite Pauline, but the way in which they are connected, ἀγάπη μετὰ πίστεως, is nevertheless peculiar, and different from πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη

Again, that turn is very decidedly given to the idea of love which became common at a later date, namely, that it is the cementing bond of the fellowship of the Church, therefore the mind which characterizes the Church, the tendency to Church union (iv. 2, 3, 15, 16); in this sense, truth and love, as the opposite of heresy and schism, are the means of building up the community (iv. 15, ἀληθεύοντες ἐν ἀγάπῃ αὐξήσωμεν εἰς αὐτὸν τὰ πάντα, cf. 2 John 3, ἐν ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ἀγάπῃ). To say that *good works* are more strongly emphasized than in the older Epistles of Paul, is as correct as it would be mistaken to see in this fact a departure from the standpoint of Paul; the unservicableness of works, and the unconditional nature of God's favour as the only cause of salvation, are declared with the utmost possible distinctness (ii. 5, 8, 9, οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἵνα μή τις καυχῆσθῃται). But because the Pauline opposition to the *εργα νόμον* was less necessary for the Pauline, nay hyper-Pauline, readers of this Epistle, than the enforcement of practical morality in a good life of active work, this view of Christian ethics is with good reason made more prominent than the older dogmatical teaching of Paul. We have already seen that this was the case in the first Epistle of Clement and the first of Peter, only with this difference, that in the Epistle to the Ephesians the harmonizing of the ethical point of view with the Pauline doctrine of God's favour is carried out more distinctly, and also more successfully, than in those Epistles. For instance, the moral necessity of good works is connected with the unconditional nature of favour in a thoroughly original manner, by showing that the former are included in the predetermined purpose of the latter, so that they do not indeed form a condition of salvation which precedes or goes with anything else (with faith, according to James ii. 22, συνήργει), but are a task which is set and made practicable by means of the favour which is received freely and without price (ii. 10, αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἑσμέν ποιήματα, κτισθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ ἐπὶ ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς οἷς προητοίμασεν ὁ Θεὸς, ἵνα ἐν αὐτοῖς περιπατήσωμεν).

Finally, it is to be remarked that Christian morality is espe-

cially regarded in this Epistle as being also a *warfare with the powers of darkness*, with the spirits of evil, who have their abode in the heavenly region, or rather in the sphere which is between heaven and earth, in the air (vi. 11, 12, ii. 2). Paul indeed had also spoken of ὁ θεὸς αἰῶνος τοῦτον, who darkens the minds of the unbelieving (2 Cor. iv. 4), but he regarded the moral warfare of the Christian as directed only against the flesh, which was ever striving against the spirit, not against the spiritual powers of evil; even the Epistle to the Colossians recognizes no warfare of this kind, but according to it, on the contrary, the hostile powers of the invisible world were conquered by the death of Christ upon the cross, stripped of their armour, and led away in triumph. On the other hand, in the writings of John, together with the higher significance given to Christ, his adversary also, the devil, is exalted into the most distinct concretion of a personal principle of evil, of godlessness, and of opposition to Christ; and not only the immediate work of Christ himself, but this work as carried on by the community, is represented as a warfare between the devil and his children (τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου) on the one side, and Christ and his children on the other (1 John iii. 8—10, ii. 13; John xvii. 15). Between this more developed conception and that of Paul, the view of the Epistle to the Ephesians occupies an intermediate place,¹ another proof of the consistency of its position in the course of the development of dogma.

Let us now, in conclusion, bring together the different expressions applied in this Epistle to the *community*, which is of such central importance in it, some of which have already been noticed. It is, according to ii. 20—22, the *house*, the temple of God, which has for its foundation the Apostles and (Christian) Prophets, with Christ as the corner-stone which holds it together, and it is built up by the harmonious putting together of the different stones of the building, namely, the Jewish and Gentile Christians. It is, further, *the body*, which is filled and penetrated

¹ Cf. Kostlin, *ut supra*, p. 75.

CHAPTER XI.

THE PAULINISM OF THE CHURCH IN ITS STRUGGLE WITH HERETICAL GNOSTICISM.

(*THE PASTORAL EPISTLES AND THE EPISTLES OF IGNATIUS.*)

As, half a century earlier, the rights of Paul's Gentile converts had been established, more by the power of actual circumstances than by any dogmatic arguments, so now again the union of parties, to form the universal Church which was so earnestly longed for by the author of the Epistle to the Ephesians, came about quite spontaneously, under pressure of the circumstances of the time. As a one-sided fantastic speculation, exchanging the firm ground of history for the imaginary world of mythological æons, began more and more to endanger the foundations of historical Christianity, all the more prudent elements of the latter were naturally compelled, in the interest of self-preservation, to unite against the common foe. Consequently, from the time when the Gnostics came forward more decidedly, we find the old opposition between Paulinism and Jewish Christianity retiring more and more into the background, behind a new opposition—between heresy and the Church; and this took place without any particular concession or compact being required, simply according to the old rule, that old party divisions disappear when a new and more dangerous common foe appears upon the field. It is quite possible that the new adversary may

have some kindred views and points of contact with the opponents who have been contending with each other; in that case, there will also be traces of the old opposition in the new one; but nevertheless it has become a new opposition, for that which was before the main object of contest, is now reduced to a matter of secondary importance, to a *moment*. And so it happened here. Gnosticism, which really grew out of Jewish Christianity, had at the beginning a very decidedly Jewish colouring, which did not until a later period (and even then not in all the schools of Gnosticism) give place to a decided anti-Judaism. We therefore find that in the Pauline Epistles written against the false teaching of the Gnostics (in the Epistle to the Colossians, the Pastoral Epistles, and those of Ignatius), Judaism is constantly attacked together with Gnosticism; not as if these had been at any time two distinct classes of opponents, or as if these Judaizers had been like those of the older Pauline controversy; but they were in every instance Gnostic Judaizers and Judaizing Gnostics, and the controversy usually brings these two sides into immediate connection¹

The less, however, the Judaism of this date resembled that of Paul's time, and the more decidedly it separated itself as Gnostic hereby from the Jewish Christianity of the Church, the more easy was it for a Paulinism which followed the Church and was directed against *this Gnostic Judaism*, to feel itself essentially at one, in dogma and system, with the *Jewish Christianity of the Church*.² This indicates the general standpoint of the latest

¹ H. Lersch's ingenious attempt to distinguish between the Gnostics and the Judaizers, as two different sets of opponents, in those three phases of the Pauline controversy, viz. 1. Gnosticism, has not been successful in any one of the three positions.

² The second Epistle of Peter presents an exact parallel to this, regarded from the other side. The Jewish-Christian author of it (about the time when the pseudo-Ignatian Epistles were written) is opposing a Gnostic sect which indeed had sprung out of Paulinism (in 16), but which must be carefully distinguished from the true Paulinism, namely, that of the Church, this Jewish Christian, who is devoted to the Church considers himself as distinctly in harmony with *this Church Paulinism* (as he expressly testifies, in 16), but he combats Gnostic Paulinism as a fundamental error. This very apparent parallel may be considered as a further proof of the correctness of the above view.

had once started on this free handling of the supersensuous world, they no longer restricted themselves to the traditional angelic and spiritual powers, but added personified ideas to these imaginary products of their own speculation, by which an endless extension of genealogies (*γενεαλογίαι ἀπέραντοι*, 1 Tim. i. 4) was rendered possible, as these abstractions could be multiplied at pleasure. In this way the *world of aëons* peculiar to the Gnostics was produced from the earlier world of angels and spirits. It is quite possible that the Gnostics had already given this name to the fabulous creations of their mythologies and genealogies, for in 1 Tim. xvii., βασιλεὺς τῶν αἰώνων may very well be understood in the sense that the true idea of the nature of aëons (the ages of the world, subjected to the divine rule) is intended to be opposed to the heterodox notion. Still, this cannot be affirmed with any certainty, nor is the fact material; for in any case these false teachers must be sought among those Gnostics who were the forerunners of the more developed Valentinian Gnosticism, concerning whom recent inquiries have shown that they arose from Jewish Christianity (whether that of Palestine or of Babylon is uncertain), with a strong infusion of Syro-Chaldaic elements; that their speculations were carried on at first mainly in the realm of Old Testament history and Rabbinical tradition (cf. Ἰουδαϊκοὶ μύθοι, Tit i. 14); and that the more ample filling up of the supersensuous world with aëons took place gradually by the addition of a world of personified phenomena to the original cosmological forms (angels, star-spirits, and the like), which latter were then gradually supplanted by the former.¹ We cannot, on the other hand, suppose that their doctrines were those of the more developed system of Valentinus or Marcion, because these either set aside entirely the Mosaic law,

¹ Compare on this point *Lipšütz*, "Der Gnosticismus," extracted from *Risch* and *Gruber's Allg. Encycl.* pp. 115—136 (the example of the pseudo-Simonian system, p. 123, is especially interesting). See also in the same work, p. 111, the note on the false teachers of the Pastoral Epistles, "a development of the same Esene Jewish Christianity as that of the false teachers of the Colossians, which had already advanced to decided Gnosticism."

spiritual powers of evil, to whose dominion men were supposed to be subject by reason of their material body, especially as uncircumcised. But that matter in itself is evil, because not the creation of the good God, but of a power opposed to God (the *δημιουργος*, for instance), was not necessarily involved in that opinion, and was probably far from the mind of those false teachers; but it certainly seems to have been the basis of the asceticism of the false teachers of this Epistle, as we may conclude with the highest probability from the antithesis of 1 Tim. iv. 4, *πάν κτίσμα Θεοῦ καλόν*, compared with Tit. i. 15. With their dualistic view of material life was also connected their prohibition of marriage (ib. ver. 3), for they considered that the intercourse of the sexes extended material life, and therefore the realm of opposition to God. In this respect also they went beyond the Colossian false teachers; it may be that they desired to apply the prohibition in Col. ii. 21, *μηδὲ θύγης*, to sexual contact; at least this is not impossible. Their denial of the resurrection, and their changing its meaning into an already present and therefore spiritual renovation of life, may likewise have been connected with a dualistic view of material life (2 Tim. ii. 18). If these ascotics are accused, among other vices, of incontinence, love of pleasure, and love of greed, we must remember that the picture of morals in 2 Tim. iii. 1—7 is but a rough sketch; and according to ver. 2, *ἔσονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι*, seems to refer rather to the spirit of the age in general, than to a particular sect. The love of gain is certainly attributed to them in Tit. i. 11 also, and in 1 Tim. vi. 6.

The way in which the contest is carried on with the false teachers is very different here from what it was in the Epistle to the Colossians. They are not refuted by reasons drawn from their own deepened Christian consciousness, from the nature of redemption, and of the Redeemer; the true knowledge is not opposed to their false knowledge. The Epistles before us no longer concern themselves with anything of this kind. But to the heretical doctrines they simply oppose the doctrines of the

Church, as being alone "sound," alone "consistent with piety," as the tradition handed down by the organized Church "as the basis and the fortress of the truth," and as having already become a "law of faith," a "doctrine of faith," on which alone a sound morality could be established, while the false teachers must necessarily have a bad conscience. This indicates the fundamental character of these Epistles—it is precisely that of nascent Catholicism, which revolved about the two poles of the tradition of the Church and practical piety. It is self-evident that the material doctrines, which indeed rest entirely on a Pauline foundation, are thus, nevertheless, modified in some not unimportant respects.

Christianity is described in 1 Tim. vi. 1, i. 10, as "the doctrine;" and the Christianity of the Church, in contradistinction to heresy, is "sound doctrine," "the sound words of Christ," "the doctrine consistent with piety" (i. e. in harmony with the common consciousness of the Church), *ibid.* and vi. 3, 2. i. 13, and many other passages. The common consciousness of the Church has already become so strong, that it has become a rule binding on the faith of individuals, a law of faith. Thus in 1. i. 5, we must not understand *παραγγελία* to mean a moral command, for this would not have love as its end (*τέλος*), but as its content, and besides it could not be directly opposed to the theoretic ravings of the false teachers; it must therefore, like *ἐντολή* (vi. 14), mean the rule of faith,—they are to be kept pure, undefiled by false doctrine, and maintain themselves in love, which is the end of this *παραγγελία*, in opposition to heresy, which tends to anger and strife (i. 4, vi. 4). Thus faith itself has acquired the objective significance that it is essentially the true faith of the Church—nay, precisely the true content of faith, the Church's doctrine of faith. Thus in 1. i. 4 we have *οικονομία θεοῦ ἢ ἐν πίστει* = God's institution of salvation which is contained in faith, where faith is evidently not subjective faith, but the objective truth of faith (*fides quæ creditur*). Similarly in ii. 7, *εὐδόσκαλος ἐθνῶν ἐν πίστει καὶ ἀληθείᾳ*, where *πίστις καὶ ἀληθεία*

are to be taken simply as *ἐν δια δυνάμει* = the truth of faith; further, in iii. 9, *μυστήριον τῆς πίστεως* = the Christian doctrine of faith, which as regards those without, the world, is hidden, a secret; iv. 6, *λόγους τῆς πίστεως καὶ τῆς καλῆς διδασκαλίας*, comp. with ii. 7; thus *πίστις* is equivalent to the right faith; iv. 1, *ἀποστήνουνται τινες τῆς πίστεως*; and vi. 10, *ἀπεκλεισθήσαν ἀπὸ τῆς πίστεως*. 21, *περὶ τῇ πίστεϊ ἐστόχησαν*; also i. 19, *ἔχωρ πίστιν . . . περὶ τὴν πίστιν ἐναντιόησαν*. But now in proportion as the objectivity of the doctrine of faith, as opposed to heresy, is emphasized, the organization of the society which holds and represents it comes naturally into the foreground.

The Church is the pillar and ground of the truth (1. iii. 15), the sure foundation of God (2. ii. 19). It is also the place where alone the truth is to be found, the base on which alone the truth is maintained in its integrity, on which therefore every Christian who wishes to partake of Christian truth must take his stand. Paul had, in 1 Cor. iii. 11, declared that Jesus Christ was the one and only immovable foundation; the Epistle to the Ephesians, with its Church tendencies, had (ii. 20) enlarged this, saying that the Apostles and Christian prophets, with Christ as the corner-stone, together form the foundation; but now the Church alone is boldly installed in this position of supremacy. Is it possible to avoid seeing here the course of development from Paulinism to Catholicism? And in addition to *firmness* in guarding the faith, *purity* is also a note and a requirement of the Church; it bears the inscription—"The Lord knoweth his own!" and "Let him depart from unrighteousness, who nameth the name of Christ!" Because it is a community of those whom God recognizes as his own, therefore must every one who belongs to it, who acknowledges the name of Christ, abstain from unrighteousness; only in this way can he be "a vessel unto honour," of precious material and destined to an honourable use; yet even the unworthy members are not to be summarily excluded, but are to be borne with, as in our houses also we have, beside the gold and silver vessels, vessels of wood and earthen-

ware—beside those for honourable use, those for uses that are not honourable; and as the latter are indispensable in the house, so are the unworthy unavoidable in the community, which fact does not of course prevent each individual from taking pains to be a vessel to honour, by separating himself from things and persons that are impure. Thus we see that the question of the discipline of the Church has already become an object of consideration.

Inasmuch as the Church is the bearer of the unchangeable truth and the representative of moral purity, she requires in both respects instruments, which, by virtue of their office, have to watch over order in the Church; we therefore see the practical *constitution of the Church* developing itself more definitely, hand in hand with the dogmatic idea of the Church. A certain progress may be observed in this respect even within the compass of the Epistles before us. In the earliest of these, the second Epistle to Timothy, we find no trace as yet of a real notion of offices. Timothy—and in him every president of a community—is exhorted to approve himself to God as an efficient and blameless workman (ii. 15), loyally to perform his service to the community, to do the work of an Evangelist, with temperance and patience under suffering, to preach the word without intermission, to punish, to exhort, and to teach (iv. 5, 2); above all, to oppose with earnestness, but also with patience and mildness, the unruly who by false doctrine introduce strife into the community (ii. 14, 25). At the same time he is reminded to stir up anew the gift of God which is in him by laying on of hands (i. 6), because God has given us not the spirit of fear, but of power, and love, and of self-control (ver. 7); he is to be strong in the favour of God, that is in Christ (ii. 1), to hold Jesus Christ in remembrance (ver. 8); the Lord will give him insight in all things (ver. 7). He is also repeatedly reminded in his own person to hold fast by the pattern of sound words which he had heard from the Apostle (i. 13), to keep to that which he had learnt and with which he was entrusted, mindful of him from

whom he had learnt it (iii. 14), to avoid youthful lusts, and to seek after righteousness, faith, love, peace, with all who call upon the Lord with pure hearts (ii. 22). In all this we find nothing of the later notion of offices in the Church; his whole work is made to depend, not on his position, but on his personal worthiness; and although mention is made (i. 6) of a certain gift of favour imparted by the laying on of hands, by which the bestowal of a particular office is very probably meant, yet this gift itself requires first of all to be "stirred up" morally by the spirit of power, and love, and self-control, and its recipient ever needs to become stronger in this favour and richer in insight (ii. 1, 7), which is very far removed from the later conceptions of the exalted condition of a bishop. In the Epistle to Titus there is as yet no difference to be observed between the presbyters and the bishop, for in i. 5 there is mention of appointing elders in every city (not one elder in each city, but several, cf. *πρεσβύτεροι*, Acts xx. 17; and *ἐπίσκοποι*, Phil. i. 1; and *πρεσβύτεροι*, 1 Thess. v. 12); afterwards, however, in ver. 7, the enumeration of the qualities necessary for the spiritual office is connected with the notion of the *ἐπίσκοπος*, which the close connection of this with the preceding verse (*γάρ*) only allows us to understand as a synonym for the *πρεσβύτεροι* in ver. 5 (to whom the qualifications enumerated in ver. 7 evidently refer). We find the same use of the two terms as synonymous in Acts xv. 17, *πρεσβυτέροις τῆς ἐκκλησίας*, and 28, *ἡμᾶς τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἱκέτο ἐπιστάτους*. In the first Epistle to Timothy also, the difference between bishops and presbyters does not appear to be any fixed difference of offices, for of offices in the Church only two are mentioned, that of the *ἐπίσκοπος* and that of the *διάκονος*, chap. iii.; the *πρεσβύτεροι* who are mentioned later (v. 17) are evidently to be included in the same category with the *ἐπίσκοπος*. Nevertheless, an actual precedence of the bishop over the other members of the college of presbyters, though at first only as *primus inter pares*, appears to have begun; and it was probably a main object of the Epistle before us to confirm the higher posi-

tion of the bishop by assigning to him in the person of Timothy various pre-eminent official duties, in distinction even from the presbyters. The latter have already gathered themselves into a regular College, the "Presbytery" (iv. 14). From this College the bishop (for Timothy can be no other) receives his ordination by means of laying on of hands and prayer, and with it the peculiar endowment of his office (*χάρισμα, ὃ ἐδόθη σοι διὰ προφητείας μετὰ ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ πρεσβυτηρίου*, *ibid.*). That which in the time of Paul was left to the free disposal of the spirit, who gave to one the gift of *κυβέρνησις*, to another that of *διακονία*, distributing to each one his own, as he (the spirit) would (1 Cor. xii. 11), is now conditioned by the Church's act of consecration. To the bishop belongs the supervision of the doctrine, the management of funds, and the discipline of the Church. The first is especially important, because it preserves the integrity of the Church against heresy; therefore among all the exhortations of this Pastoral Epistle, *ἵνα παραγγείλῃς τισὶ μὴ ἐπεροῦδασκαλεῖν* (i. 3) comes first. He is himself, however, to be apt to teach (iii. 2), a pattern of the faithful in the word (iv. 12), to apply himself to reading (the Scriptures, i. e. in the assemblies of the community), to exhortation and teaching (iv. 13), to take heed to himself and to his doctrine (whether his own or that of others, for the presbyters also shared the ministry of the word and the doctrine, v. 17)—iv. 16. The bishop has also to supervise the management of funds, for he has to take care that capable presbyters, especially those who are at the same time teachers in the community, shall have a double gift of honour out of the common property. The women who aspire to the honourable position of the "widows" provided for by the community, are likewise the charge of the bishop (v. 3, 9, 11); he has to take into consideration both the needs (ver. 4) and the moral worthiness (ver. 5) of the candidates, and to take care that only the aged and approved women, who have deserved well of the community, are admitted to this honourable position; younger persons, on the other hand, in whose case there is no guarantee

that they will keep the vow of celibacy connected with it, he is to reject, and recommend to the family life that is more suitable for them (vers. 9—14). The discipline of the Church also belongs especially to the bishop; he is to take care not too hastily or readily to restore to peace with the community by the laying on of his hands those who have fallen, lest he become a partaker of the sins of others (by making light of repentance) (v. 22). The bishop is to exercise the discipline of the Church even over the presbyters, to hear complaints against them which are publicly made, openly to rebuke before the community those who have erred (doubtless in their official work as presbyters), as a warning to others (ver. 19 f.). Thus our author evidently endeavours to establish the primacy of the bishops as against the presbyters.

It was necessary to enter as we have done into these Church matters, because they mainly give the Epistles before us (especially the first to Timothy) their peculiar impress, inasmuch as they show how, when in danger of heresy, the consciousness of the Church and Church organization grew strong on the lines indicated by Paul. As far as the main dogmas are concerned, we find but few traces of the contest with Gnosticism, and those chiefly in reference to the doctrines regarding God. For the rest, they are the main traditional doctrines of Paulinism, modified by the tendency of the age towards practical piety.

In the doctrine regarding God, his unity is reportedly emphasized (*μόνος θεός*, 1. i. 17; *εἰς θεός*, ii. 5; *ὁ μόνος δυνάστης*, vi. 15); his absoluteness, and that in the sense of unlimited possession of life (*θεός ζωῆς*, 1. iii. 15, iv. 10, *ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανάσιαν*, vi. 16; *ὁ ζωογονῶν τὰ πάντα*, vi. 13), of eternity and imperishability (*ἄφθαρτος, βασιλεὺς τῶν αἰώνων*, i. 17), invisibility and inaccessibility (*ἀόρατος*, *ibid.*; *ψῆς οὐκ ὁρατός, ὃν εἶδεν οὐδεὶς ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ ἰδέν διέταται*, vi. 16); as the only power and dominion over all (*ὁ μόνος δυνάστης*, vi. 15, *βασιλεὺς τῶν βασιλευμένων, καὶ κύριος τῶν κυριευόντων, ᾧ τιμὴ καὶ κράτος αἰώνιον*, *ibid.*), and as blessedness (*μακάριος*, i. 11, vi. 15). Among moral qualities, his truth-

fulness is prominently mentioned (ἀψευδής, Tit. i. 2; 2 Tim. ii. 13), and especially his favour, his love of men, his goodness and mercy (χάρις, φιλανθρωπία, χρηστότης, ἔλεος, Tit. ii. 11, iii. 4 f.—in the superscription of the Epistles, χάρις, ἔλεος, εἰρήνη ἀπὸ θεοῦ); God is also repeatedly described as σωτήρ (1. i. 1, ii. 3, 2. i. 9; Tit. ii. 10, iii. 4); and the universality of his willingness to show favour is expressly asserted (1. ii. 4). In all these expressions we may see a more or less direct opposition to the doctrine of the Gnostics regarding God, which by its mythology represented the Godhead as finite and sensuous, and notably limited the Divine favour in a dualistic sense, by its distinction between Gnostic (spiritual) and non-Gnostic (fleshly) Christians.

This favour of God was given to us in *Christ Jesus* before the beginning of the world, but was revealed by the historical "appearing of Jesus Christ," which is therefore described as the "manifestation of the favour, the goodness and the love of God towards men" (2 Tim. i. 9, 10; Tit. ii. 11, iii. 4). If this favour of the eternal counsel was δοθεῖσα ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ πρὸ χρόνων αἰώνων, then Christ Jesus is the original and therefore the pre-existent channel of it, just as in Eph. i. 4 he is represented as the channel of the election of the community and its apprehensible embodiment. Similarly in 1. iii. 16, ὅς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, the pre-existence of Christ is presupposed; for "to be manifested in the flesh" can only apply to a subject who has previously had his existence as something that is as yet concealed, not in the flesh, but in the realm of supersensuous heavenly life. But when, in Tit. ii. 13, Jesus Christ is expressly called "our great God and Saviour," this goes beyond all the previous Christology of Paul. The words in this passage, ἐπιφάνεια τῆς δόξης τοῦ μεγάλου θεοῦ καὶ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, are almost certainly to be understood as predicates of Christ; this is grammatically the most obvious construction, because the article τοῦ, not being repeated, connects the two genitives θεοῦ and σωτῆρος into a single attributive definition of the one subject Jesus Christ; and besides, it is almost necessary

so to interpret it, because *ἐπιφάνεια* is never applied to God, but constantly to Christ: again, the addition of the word *μεγάλου* is not only no obstacle to this interpretation, but rather supports it; for this would be evidently an unmeaning and superfluous epithet if applied to God, whereas connected with the other predicates for the glorification of Christ it is very appropriate. The absence of any instance elsewhere of such a designation of Christ (*θεός* as an adjectival predicate joined with Jesus Christ) must be allowed with regard to the literature of the New Testament, but not with regard to the other Christian literature of the same period. This passage of the Epistle to Titus certainly forms a striking contrast to 1 Tim. ii. 5, where Christ is expressly and plainly called *ἄνθρωπος*. It is probable that this latter passage was directed against Gnostic Docetism (as the foregoing verse was against Gnostic particularism). We have in this case the same change of Christological interest in these two Epistles as we find in the Epistles of Ignatius, and for the same reason.

The *ἐπιφάνεια* of Christ is sometimes his still future *παρουσία* (Tit. ii. 13 and 1. vi. 14, 2. iv. 1, 8), sometimes the historical coming of Jesus, in whom the eternal favour of God, and its eternal channel, the pre-existent Christ Jesus, was made manifest (2 Tim. i. 10). The word was also current among the Gnostics, and that in the second sense, while it appears to have been principally used by the Church (cf. 2 Thess. ii. 8) in the first sense. In the Epistle to Titus, *ἐπιφάνη* is twice (ii. 11, *ἐπιφάνη ἡ χάρις τοῦ θεοῦ ἡ σωτήριος πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις*: and iii. 4, *ὅτε ἡ χρηστότης καὶ ἡ φιλελευθέρια ἐπιφάνη τοῦ σωτήρος ἡμῶν θεοῦ*) applied to the historical appearing of Christianity. The notion certainly belongs more to John's sphere of thought than to that of Paul; as do the expressions by which the *work of Christ* is described in 2 Tim. i. 10, *καταργήσαντος μὲν τὸν θάνατον, φωτίσαντος δὲ ζωὴν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου*, i. e. he destroyed death and brought life and immortality to light, by imparting to the world through his preaching, by means of his word of self-

revelation, the higher life which was concealed in himself—a connection of ζωή and φῶς which strongly reminds us of John i. 4. The following passages, on the other hand, sound quite Pauline,—1 Tim. ii. 6, ὁ δοὺς ἑαυτὸν ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων: and Tit. ii. 14, ὃς ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἵνα λυτρώσῃται ἡμᾶς: but the addition ἀπὸ πάσης ἀνομίας betrays an un-Pauline sense which is given to the idea of redemption, inasmuch as according to Paul the redeeming death of Christ released us from the law itself, its curse and its bondage, but here, on the contrary, its object is said to be redemption from lawlessness, from the lawless, sinful life of the Gentiles. The second clause, which expresses the purpose, points to the same thing—καὶ (ἵνα) καθάρσῃ ἑαυτῷ λαὸν περιούσιον, ζηλωτὴν καλῶν ἔργων. This καθαρίζειν is not to be understood to refer, as it does in the Epistle to the Hebrews, to the cancelling of guilt, but in this connection it refers to moral renovation, by which the capacity and will to be active in good works is produced, these being the chief characteristics of a people who are the peculiar possession of God. By Paul, this morally renovating effect was only connected with the redeeming death of Christ in a secondary and derivative way, while the religious point of view, of reconciliation with God, took the first place.

The same relation of these two points of view occurs again in the appropriation of salvation, which moreover is far more decidedly than with Paul connected with baptism. This is, according to Tit. iii. 5, the means by which God has rescued us, and it is described as λούτρον παλιγγενεσίας καὶ ἀνακινώσεως πνεύματος ἁγίου. This is a combination of two metaphors, and two modes of viewing the matter—the “bath” would suggest the cleansing effect of baptism for the forgiveness of sins, instead of which the effect of the “new birth” is connected with the “bath,” with which it does not exactly correspond; and this is more fully explained (καὶ expegetical) as “renewing of the holy spirit,” i. e. by the holy spirit, which indeed accords with the train of ideas both of Paul and John, but has no direct parallel in the expres-

sions of either (*παλιγγενεσία* is only found in Matt. xix. 28, where it is applied to the renovation of the world at the second coming of Christ, and *ἀνακαίνωσις* in Rom. xii. 2, used passively of the renewal of the *κοῖς*, whilst here it has really an active sense—the renewing effect of the holy spirit). It is therefore characteristic that, according to ver. 7, *justification* by the favour of God, and the hoped-for inheritance of eternal life, are said to be the purposed consequence of the abundant pouring out of the spirit (and—according to ver. 5, we must add—renewal of the spirit). According to Paul, on the contrary (cf. Gal. iv. 6), the imparting of the spirit is a consequence of the presupposed sonship, in which justification and the heritage of eternal life are put together, so that these two latter are not conditioned by the renewing work of the spirit, but, on the contrary, precede and condition it.

Faith appears comparatively seldom as the means of the subjective appropriation of salvation (it does so in 1 Tim. i. 16 and 2 Tim. iii. 15; on the other hand, it is remarkable that it does not in Tit. iii. 5, where the opposition of the *ἔργα τῆς δικαιοσύνης* seems absolutely to require it in order to make it a genuine Pauline thought). *Πίστις* is found much more frequently, either in the objective sense of the right belief, or of the right doctrine of faith, regarding which we have already gone into some detail, or in the sense of one Christian duty among others, especially that of love (cf. 1. i. 14, *μετὰ πίστεως καὶ ἀγάπης τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*; ii. 15, *ἐὰν μείνωσιν ἐν πίστει καὶ ἀγάπῃ καὶ ἀγαπῶσιν μετὰ σωφροσύνης*; iv. 12, *ἐν λόγῳ, ἐν ἀστροφίῃ, ἐν ἀγάπῃ, ἐν πίστει, ἐν ἀγνείᾳ*; vi. 11, *δίωκε δικαιοσύνην, εὐσέβειαν, πίστιν, ἀγάπην, ἰσομοιήν, πραότητα*; 2. i. 13, *π. καὶ ἀγ.*; ii. 22, *δίωκε δικαιοσύνην, πίστιν, ἀγάπην, εἰρήνην*; iii. 70, *παρηκολούθησάς μου τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ, τῇ ἀγωγῇ, τῇ προθείᾳ, τῇ πίστει, τῇ μακροθυμίᾳ, τῇ ἀγάπῃ, τῇ ἰσομοιῇ*; Tit. ii. 2, *ἡγιασώτας τῇ πίστει, τῇ ἀγάπῃ, τῇ ἰσομοιῇ*). In these combinations, faith is evidently not so much the fundamental religious attitude of man towards God and the root of the moral virtues, as a particular Christian virtue, which, as such, naturally

requires to be supplemented by others; and this is something essentially different from the Pauline formula, *πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη*. Faith thus externalized and deprived of its central religious significance, can of course no longer serve, like Pauline faith, as the fundamental idea of the Christian holy life. Its place is now taken in these Epistles by a peculiar expression, *εὐσέβεια*. This is, on the one hand, more general and indefinite than the Pauline *πίστις*, as it is in no wise specifically Christian, but "piety" in general; on the other hand, however, it comprises in itself precisely the two moments with which our Epistles are mainly concerned—devotion to the Church, piety and loyalty to the awakened common consciousness of the Church, and the practical proof of it which consists in morality and good works. The first is clearly shown by Tit. i. 1, *ἐπίγνωσις ἀληθείας τῆς κατ' εὐσέβειαν*, and 1 Tim. vi. 3, *τῇ κατ' εὐσέβειαν διδασκαλίᾳ*, in both of which passages *εὐσέβεια*, as the rule for the real truth and right doctrine, is evidently the common consciousness of the Church, the form of godliness recognized by the Church, in opposition to the false doctrine which creates anger and strife (1. vi. 4). Again, in 1. iii. 16, *τὸ τῆς εὐσεβείας μυστήριον* is the mysterious content of the faith of the Church, or of the truth, of which the Church is the ground and pillar (vor. 15). On the other hand, *εὐσέβεια* is the practical piety of the blameless and active Christian life; thus, 1 i. 2, *ἵνα ἡριμον καὶ ἡσύχιον βίον διάγωμεν ἐν πάσῃ εὐσεβείᾳ καὶ σεμνότητι*: iv. 7, *γύμναζε σεαυτὸν πρὸς εὐσέβειαν*: and 8, *ἡ εὐσέβεια πρὸς πάντα ὠφέλιμός ἐστι*, in which passages it denotes the opposition of the simple piety of the Church to the refinement of heretical asceticism. In the same way in vi. 6 and 5, the piety which brings contentment is contrasted, as the true prize, with the piety of the false teachers, of which gain was the object. In vi. 11 it is placed before faith, love, patience, and gentleness, evidently as the general idea of a rightly constituted (wherefore *δικαιοσύνη* is placed first of all) religious and moral regulation of life, which includes all these several virtues in itself. Finally, in 1. iii. 5, *μόρφωσις εὐσεβείας* is contrasted with

its *démos*, namely, the power to prove its existence by corresponding fruits of morality.

The whole of the *right Christian moral disposition*, to which the favour that was manifested in Christ would educate men, is summed up in Tit. ii. 12, negatively, as abandonment of ungodliness and worldly lusts, and positively, as a sober, righteous, and pious life; the latter being Christian virtue in its three-fold relation—its religious relation to God and the Church, its social relation to our fellow-creatures, and its ascetic relation to our own personal life. With regard to the latter, the standpoint of our Epistle is far removed from the extreme of monkish asceticism, which it rather controverts, both directly and indirectly, as a heretical peculiarity (1. iv. 3—5, ii. 15, and v. 14 and 23; Tit. i. 14 f.). On the other hand, the same Church that rejected the extreme views of a heretical asceticism, which desired to extend itself at the cost of the Church, is not itself quite free from this tendency of the times, as is proved by the prohibition of a second marriage to the officers of the Church (1. iii. 2, 12, v. 9), and the requirement of a vow of celibacy as a qualification for the honourable position of the so-called “widows.” Hence the meaning of the prudent saying in 1. iv. 8 is made plain—*ἡ σωματικὴ γυμνασία πρὸς ὀλίγον ἔστιν ὠφέλιμος, ἡ δὲ εἰσέβεια πρὸς πάντα*: and upon the whole, the value of bodily asceticism is not denied, but only relegated to its proper subordinate position as compared with the more important matter of the piety of the Church. An especially high value is placed in these Epistles on *godly activity*. It is, according to Tit. ii. 14, the very object of the work of redemption that God’s peculiar people should become *ζηλωτὴν καλῶν ἔργων*; it is repeatedly (iii. 8 and 14) insisted on that Christians should learn and apply themselves to the study of good works, in order that they may not be unfruitful; for such works are good and useful to men. Thus the significance and the necessity of good works are limited to the social and ethical sphere where they are incontestable, and the serviceableness of such works in a religious point of view is left out of consideration—indeed, it is

expressly denied in Tit. iii. 5, οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων τῶν ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, ὧν ἐποιήσαμεν ἡμεῖς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ ἔλεον ἔσωσεν ἡμᾶς (ὁ θεός). We have here, then, essentially the same compromise between the Pauline dogmatical view and the ethical and social estimate of good works, i.e. between the denial of their serviceableness for salvation and the affirmation of their moral necessity, which we have already found in the Epistle to the Ephesians (cf. ii. 8—10). The first Epistle to Timothy, however, goes far beyond this, in repeatedly ascribing to active work a religious significance, as a condition and cause of the salvation of men, which does not agree with the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith alone. According to 1. iii. 13, good deacons who have served well in the Church gain for themselves a good degree (βαθμὸν) and much confidence in the faith, which can hardly mean anything else than a higher degree of blessedness, a step in heaven (to interpret this as a higher official position would presuppose a more complicated hierarchy than is conceivable at that period; besides, this would require μέλλουσα instead of καλὴν to express a "better" office, for the diaconate was itself a *good* position; and lastly, the addition of the words, καὶ πολλὰ παρήρησιν ἐν πίστει, is decidedly in favour of the interpretation that has been given). It is said, further, in vi. 18 f. of the rich, that by well-doing, and being rich in good works, they lay up for themselves a good foundation for the future (as a treasure), in order to lay hold on eternal life; and this is the foundation of the salvation which they thus build up for themselves by their serviceable works. And when in ii. 15 it is said of the woman, σωθήσεται διὰ τεκνογονίας, the saying may be rightly understood indeed from a practical point of view ("the woman fulfils her destination, not by coming forward in public—ver. 12—but in the family"); but the expression is nevertheless perplexing, for σώζεσθαι is the recognized dogmatic expression for Christian salvation or eternal blessedness. Finally, the statement in iv. 8, that godliness is profitable for all things, since it has the promise both of the present and of the future life, savours some-

what of utilitarianism and religious endemonism, which is as far removed from the original Pauline doctrine of salvation and faith as it is akin to that of the serviceableness of good works.

If we cannot but see in all this a very decided attenuation of the original doctrine of Paul by the prevailing tendency of the time towards practical piety and the exaltation of the Church, we can, on the other hand, no longer wonder that the relation of this doctrine to the law and to Judaism had entirely lost its former violent antagonism. It is most suggestive, in regard to this point, that in 2 Tim. i. 3, 5, the piety of Paul and Timothy is put on the same lines, nay, declared to be identical, with that of their respective ancestors; consequently there is so little opposition in principle between the Christian and the Jewish religion, that one may be considered a simple continuation of the other. In complete accordance with this view, it is said of the Holy Scriptures of the Old Testament (iii. 15 f.), that they are able to make us wise unto salvation, by faith in Christ Jesus (who accordingly must in some way be contained in them), for all Scripture which is given by God's inspiration is profitable for learning, for reproof, for improvement, and instruction in righteousness, i. e. they are able to teach the truths of salvation, and to work repentance, faith, and sanctification in men. Surely this goes far beyond what Paul ascribes to the law, as the jailer and schoolmaster to bring us to Christ, which keeps us in bondage under the consciousness of sin, but cannot give us life. Finally, the Church's view of the law is thus contrasted with that of the Gnostics in 1. i. 8 f.: "We know that the law is good, if a man use it according to its nature (*νομίμως*), that is, if he understand that no law is given to the righteous, but to the unrighteous and disobedient," &c. These words contain neither dogmatic adherence to the law, as opposed to a hyper-Pauline Marcionite antinomianism, which there is no reason to suppose the *νομοδιδάσκαλοι* held, nor dogmatic antinomianism in opposition to Judaistic views of the law, for this antinomianism would certainly not have been so obscurely expressed—only (understood) then when

(*ἐάν*), &c. They contain, then, no dogmatic declaration whatever about the validity or invalidity of the Mosaic law, but confine themselves simply to the ground of a general moral point of view, from which they affirm that the only proper application of the law is as a means of training for the disorderly, and that it has no significance for those who are already moral without it. This is a proposition of incontestable moral truth, but which has nothing to do with the Pauline doctrine of the law, having no reference to it either positive or negative. The old controversy, then, about the lasting validity of the Mosaic law in Christianity has evidently lost its significance for the Paulinism of these Epistles; this is no longer the question in the controversy with the Gnostic teachers of the law, who in no wise defended the law in its simple Jewish validity, but rather made it the ground on which to build the very different structure of their speculative allegorical inventions. The follower of Paul who was no longer concerned with the dogmatic controversy regarding the validity of the Mosaic ceremonial law, was therefore able to estimate all the more impartially the general and abiding moral worth of the positive moral law, whether found in the Old Testament or elsewhere. At this standpoint (which we had already found in the first Epistle of Clement) the follower of Paul who took the part of the Church naturally found himself perfectly at one with the moderate Jewish Christian who took the same side.

THE EPISTLES OF IGNATIUS.

It is of some interest, for the purpose we have in hand, to compare the pseudo-Pauline Pastoral Epistles with the pseudo-Ignatian Epistles, which exhibit the same Paulinism in the Church combating the same heretical opponents, only with this difference, that the two parties are seen in the latter in a higher degree of development, and more distinctly characterized, than in the former Epistles. In the presence of the danger threatened

by heresy, the idea of the Catholic Church and of its hierarchical organization in the Episcopate, is much more distinctly developed, and more energetically maintained, than in the Pastoral Epistles; that which in these only took the form of pastoral addresses and exhortations, became in the Epistles of Ignatius dogmatic declarations of doctrine and hierarchical commands. But the dogmatic controversy with the false teachers has also assumed a new aspect. In the first Epistle to Timothy, a slight trace only of controversy with the Docetist Christology is to be observed, but this now comes under various forms into the foreground, as one of the main objects in view. False teachers appear to have energetically maintained their Judaistic doctrines, upon the basis of their advanced Gnosticism, and to have carried on, not without success, a propagandism in this direction. This gives to the Paulinism of the Church a new impulse to a more violent controversy with Judaism, which is the more significant in proportion as it more strikingly rises from the background of hierarchical and Catholic opinions. This union of Church views with anti-Judaism is the exact counterpart of the union of Docetist Gnosticism with Judaism in its heretical opponents; for that the two sets of opinions were united in the same opponents is indubitably shown by the Epistle to the Magnesians. In chap. viii. of this Epistle, the Gnostic Christology is opposed in uninterrupted connection with Judaism; and in chap. ix., in the course of the refutation of those who deny that Christ really died, and after the continuation of the controversy with the Judaists in chap. x., it is stated in chap. xi. that he says this in order to warn his readers not to fall into the snare of the false teachers, but to hold fast their faith in the birth, and the suffering, and the resurrection, *ἐπαλ-
θῆναι ἀληθῶς, καὶ βεβαιῶς ἐκ τῆς ἰστορίας Χριστοῦ*. As the preceding warning against Judaism (with which these chapters are occupied) are here used to have for their object the confirmation of the readers of the Epistle in their faith in the reality of the

human life of Christ, it is impossible but that the false doctrine thus opposed had united Docetism with Judaism, and these must in fact have been so intimately connected with each other, that the warnings against one of them had the force of a confutation of the other. We have, besides, the less ground for doubting that the heresy controverted by the pseudo-Ignatius consisted in a Judaizing Gnosticism, because we have seen the very same doctrine (although in an earlier stage of development) controverted in the Pastoral Epistles.

It cannot certainly be denied that we have less accurate knowledge about this Judaizing Gnosticism than about the anti-Jewish systems of Valentine and Marcion; but this has so much the less force as an argument against the correctness of our supposition, because the pseudo-Clementine Epistles contain evidence, that as Judaizing Gnosticism was the original form of the doctrines of this sect, so it also continued to maintain itself by the side of the developed anti-Jewish systems. For this reason, the Judaistic character of the Gnosticism here controverted can afford no satisfactory grounds for referring the date of the composition of the pseudo-Ignatian Epistles to an earlier period than the middle of the second century, to the second half of which all the other indications decidedly point.¹

Paulinism now rises to attack the Judaism of the heretics

¹ The spuriousness of the Epistles which have come down to us under the name of Ignatius may be assumed as proved. The attempt of *Bunsen* also to show that the brief Syriac recension is the work of the real Ignatius, may be regarded as a failure; for a more accurate examination of the sources of information has proved this brief recension to be not the basis of the larger work, but rather an abstract of it. This has been shown by *Baur* and *Ullhorn* from different points of view, and more recently by *Merx* in his "*Meletemata ignatiana*" (Halle, 1871); compare also *Hilgenfeld*, "*Apostol. Vater*," pp. 187—279. As we have before us, however, in the literature connected with the celebrated name of Ignatius, a mass of writings that for a long time kept changing its limits and its content, so, even on the hypothesis of its spuriousness, we shall have to take account of various strata of extensions and interpolations, which indicate different streams of dogma; just as we had to distinguish similar strata in the Pastoral Epistles,—the common spuriousness of which was presupposed. This will prove to be the abiding truth of the researches of Lipsius, "*über die Echtheit der Syrischen Recension der Ignatianischen Briefe*," in the "*Zeitschr. f. histor. Theol.*" for 1856. Cf. also the same author's "*Festprogramm, über den Ursprung und ältesten Gebrauch des Christennamens*," p. 7.

with renewed decision. But it is no longer the warfare of one party against another for its own justification and recognition, but it is the warfare of the universal Church, which is fully conscious of its independence and its superiority to Judaism, against a heretical sect, whose obstinate adherence to a standpoint which the universal Church had left behind, is boldly designated as unchristian. In Magn viii. it is said, *Εἰ μέχρι νῦν κατὰ Ἰουδαίων ᾤοντο, ὁμολογοῦμεν χάριν μὴ εἰληφέναι*: and chap. x., *οἷα τοῦτο μαθῆται αὐτοῦ γινόμενοι, μάθωμεν κατὰ Χριστιανισμῶν ζῆν* ὅς γὰρ ἄλλῃ ὀνόματι καλεῖται πλέον τοῦτον, οἷα ἔστιν τοῦ Θεοῦ. Ὑπέρθεσθε οὖν τὴν καλὴν ἐξουίαν, τὴν παλαιωθῆσαν καὶ ἐνοξίσαν, καὶ μεταβίβασθε εἰς νέαν ζῆσιν, ὃ ἔστιν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός. Ἀποπόν ἔστιν, Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν λαλεῖν (sc. λαλεῖν) καὶ Ἰουδαίειν. Ὁ γὰρ Χριστιανισμὸς οὐκ εἰς Ἰουδαϊσμὸν ἐπίστανται, ἀλλὰ Ἰουδαϊσμὸς εἰς Χριστιανισμὸν, ὡς πᾶσα γλῶσσα πιστευσάσα εἰς Θεὸν συνήχθη ("as every language, i. e. nation, which believed, was gathered to God;") with which compare chap. viii., "It is one God who has revealed himself through Jesus Christ," and chap. vii., *πάντες οὖν ὡς εἰς εἷα συντρέχετε τὸν Θεόν*). In Philad viii., to those who say, *ὅτι ἐὰν μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις εὖρω, ἐν τῇ εὐαγγελίᾳ οὐ πιστεύω*, it is retorted, *Ἐρω δὲ ἀρχαῖά ἐστιν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς, τὰ ἄδικτα ἀρχαῖα ὁ σταυρὸς αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὁ θάνατος καὶ ἡ ἀνάστασις αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ πίστις ἣ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐν οἷς θίλω ἐν τῇ προσευχῇ ἡμῶν δικαιωθῆναι*. Καλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἱερεῖς, κρείσσον δι' ὃ ἀρχιερεῖς, ὁ πιστευόμενος τὰ ἅγια τῶν ἁγίων, ὃς μόνος πεπιστευται τὰ ῥηπτὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ αὐτὸς ὡς ὄντα τοῦ πατρὸς, δι' ἧς ἐκέρχονται Ἀβραὰμ καὶ Ἰσαὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ, καὶ οἱ προφῆται, καὶ οἱ ἀπίστολοι, καὶ ἡ ἐκκλησία. Οἱ γὰρ ἀγαπητοὶ προφῆται κατήγγειλαν εἰς αὐτόν τὸ δὲ εὐαγγέλιον ἀπάρτισμά ἐστιν ἀφθαρσίας. These passages clearly express the self-confidence of the Christian consciousness, which so distinctly opposes itself to the Jewish religion, so far as this professes to stand by itself as Mosaic law, but at the same time knows that it is one with it, and is the completion of it, so far as it consists of prophecy and type (of *ἱερεῖς καλοὶ*). Nay more; Christianity appears not only as the end towards which Judaism tended, but in truth as the original,

substantial core of Judaism,—Christ is the door through which patriarchs and prophets enter; the prophets have already lived *κατὰ Χριστὸν Ἰησοῦν, ἐμπνεόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ*; as pupils of Christ in the spirit, they have waited for him as their teacher, wherefore also after his coming he raised them from the dead (Magn. viii. 9). Whereas the Judaizer estimates the truth according to its age, and regards the *ἀρχαία* of the tradition as the decisive authority in matters of faith, that which to the Christian is the truly ancient, the truly inviolable authority, is Christ himself, his cross, and his death, &c. In a truly Pauline spirit, the Jewish Christian's empirical standpoint of authority, which still considers itself bound by the more ancient authority of the old covenant, is contrasted with the freedom and self-confidence of the Christian consciousness, which is sure of finding justification in Christ (Philad. viii.), and therefore does not require anything more by the side of him, nay, perceives that the keeping of the old leaven, namely, Judaizing, is incompatible with the Christian profession, and is folly (*ἄστορον*) and godlessness (*οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ θεοῦ*, Magn. x.). Certain as it is that the author, in this view of the incompatibility of Judaizing with Christianity, expresses the consciousness of the Church of his time, yet it can at that time have been only held as a theory in Gentile Christian circles, and cannot have become a prevailing practical maxim in opposition to the Judaizers. For there is a warning in Philad. vi. not to listen to those who wished to carry on a propaganda in behalf of Judaism,¹ for it is better to hear Christianity from one who is circumcised, than Judaism from one who is uncircumcised. It follows from this, that Jewish Christians were still tolerated in the community, and it was only their propagandism among Gentile Christians that called forth the opposition of the Church, by which means the zealous Judaizers were forced more and more into the position of a sect. It is

¹ The nature of this propaganda is indicated by *Ἰουδαϊσμοῦ ἐμπνεῖσιν*; it was not, as in the case of the earlier Judaizers, simply the Mosaic law which they desired to force upon their converts, but they endeavoured, by allegorical interpretations and Gnostic spiritualization, to make it attractive and plausible.

probable that the *μερισμοί*, about which so many complaints are made in the Epistle to the Philadelphians, refer to this. And this was precisely the state of affairs in the time of *Justin Martyr*, as is indicated by the well-known passage in *Dial. c.* Tr. xlvii.

We have here seen Paulinism remaining true to itself in a very decided manner, against Jewish legality, and in the consciousness of its Christian autonomy; it is therefore all the more remarkable how this same Paulinism stripped itself of its original peculiarity in all other respects, and assumed that universal Church colouring which we have already often met with. And this constitutes a decisive confirmation of our whole view of the development of Paulinism, namely, that it did not depend on concessions to external opponents, but upon *involuntary inward modification*. One indication of the universal Church colouring of Ignatian Paulinism, is the frequent juxtaposition of *πίστις καὶ ἀγάπη*, which we also found in the Pastoral Epistles; e g., Eph. ix., ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν ἀναγωγεὶς, ἡ δὲ ἀγάπη ὁδὸς ἡ ἀναφέρουσα εἰς θεόν (faith is the engine which raises Christians like building-stones to the temple of God, love is the road that leads upward): it might be straining the metaphor to see in it a co-operation between the drawing upward by faith and the going upward spontaneously in love; but at all events such an idea is to be found in the following passage in Eph. x.: ἐὰν τελείως εἰς Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἔχητε τὴν πίστιν καὶ τὴν ἀγάπην, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ ζωῆς καὶ τέλος· ἀρχὴ μὲν πίστις, τέλος δὲ ἀγάπη· τὰ δὲ δύο, ἐν ἐνόητῃ γενόμενα, θεοῦ ἐστὶν, τὰ δὲ ἅλλα πάντα εἰς καλοἀγαθίαν ἀκολουθὰ ἐστὶν. One is involuntarily reminded here of the *συνεργία* of James, ἡ πίστις συνήργει τοῖς ἔργοις, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἡ πίστις ἐτελειώθη, James ii. 22. In the same way they appear in Smyrn. vi. as two halves of equal importance, which together make up the whole,—τὸ ὅλον ἐστὶ πίστις καὶ ἀγάπη, ὧν οὐδὲν προκρίνεται. Again, the Church colouring of Ignatian Paulinism shows itself especially in the fact, that in these Epistles, Christianity, in spite of all its elevation above the Jewish law, has nevertheless begun, within

its own borders, to shape a system of *Christian law* of its own. We find mention of *δόγματα* of the Lord and of the Apostles, in which the Magnesians are to be confirmed, in order that they may prosper in all things, in body and spirit, in faith and love, in the Son and the Father and the Spirit, in the beginning and the end, together with their most highly-esteemed bishop, and the presbytery and the deacons (Magn. xiii.). The Trallians (cap. vii.) are to be inseparable from Jesus Christ, the bishop, and the ordinances (*διατάγματα*) of the Apostles.¹ The Ephesians are applauded for their consistent preservation of unity with the Apostles (Eph. xi.). In Magnesia, a heretical party is said to have no conscience, διὰ τὸ μὴ βεβαίως κατ' ἐντολὴν συναθροίσθαι, and the community itself is called upon to be subject to the bishop, ὡς τῇ χάριτι τοῦ Θεοῦ, and to the presbytery, ὡς τῇ νόμῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ (Magn. iv. 2). The idealism of Paul, which had recognized only a νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς, is here "modified in a realistic sense,"² that is to say, it is changed into the law of the Church.

Among other dogmatical contents of these Epistles, the *Christology* deserves especial notice. The consciousness of the Catholic Church unmistakably expresses itself here in the endeavour to maintain the two aspects of the person of Christ as alike authoritatively established in all their fulness. Thus in Eph. vii., Εἰς ἱατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικός τε καὶ πνευματικός, γενητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος Θεός, ἐν θανάτῳ ζῶν ἀληθινῇ, καὶ ἐκ Μαρίας καὶ ἐκ Θεοῦ, πρῶτον παθητὸς καὶ τότε ἀπαθὴς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν. Very similar, only beginning with the ideal predicates, is the passage in Polyc. iii., τὸν ἐπὲρ καιρὸν προσδόκα, τὸν ἄχρονον, τὸν ἀόρατον, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς ὁρατόν τὸν ἀψηλάφητον, τὸν ἀπαθῆ, τὸν δι' ἡμᾶς παθητόν, τὸν κατὰ πάντα τρόπον δι' ἡμᾶς

¹ It is well worthy of remark, how the Apostles appear in these Epistles as a completely isolated body, as a *College* (*σύνδισμος*, Trall. iii.; *συνέδριον*, Magn. vi.; and even *πρεσβυτέριον ἐκκλησίας*, Phil. v.); the opposition therefore between Paul and the original Apostles has as entirely disappeared in the Epistles of the strongly Pauline and somewhat anti-Jewish pseudo-Ignatius, as in those of Clement.

² Hilgenfeld, *Apost. Väter*, p. 251.

ἱπομείναται. Moreover, there is a difference to be observed between those Epistles (Romans and Ephesians) in which the controversy with the Docetists has not yet begun, and those which deal with this heresy (those addressed to Tralles, Smyrna, and Magnesia). In the former, Christ is with perfect simplicity called God; compare the superscription of the Epistle to the Ephesians, Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν: *ibid.* i., ἐν αἵματι Θεοῦ: xviii., ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστός: xix., Θεοῦ ἀνθρωπίνως φαινόμενου: and vii., ἐν σαρκὶ γενόμενος Θεός: Rom. superscription, Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν: iii., ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐν πατρὶ ὦν, μαλλον φαίνεται (i. e. is more effectually revealed since his exaltation unto the Father): vi., τοῦ πάθους τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν. These expressions cannot, any more than all the similar ones in Tit. ii. 13 (see Part II. p. 207), be understood to refer to the suffering of the Father; for Christ is in this Epistle repeatedly distinguished as the Son from the Father (compare especially the passages quoted from Rom. iii.). There are some signs of an attempt to guard, in a later editing of these letters, against the danger of these passages being understood in a Docetist sense; and this is quite the predominant tendency of the anti-Docetist Epistles. In Trall. ix. 10, and Smyrn. i. 2, it is most emphatically asserted that Christ really (ἀληθῶς) was born, ate and drank, suffered, died and rose again, against those who affirm τὸ δοκεῖν πεπονθέναι αὐτόν. He is said to have been in the flesh, even after his resurrection, and to have allowed himself to be handled, to show that he was no incorporeal spirit. Only that Christ who has actually suffered as a "perfect man" can also actually give his disciples strength to suffer; and in the same way as he arose, will the Father also raise in him us who believe, without which we have not the true life. Therefore he who does not acknowledge the Lord as a *σαρκοφόρον*, slanders him, nay, utterly denies him (Smyrn. v.; cf. 1 John iv. 2, 3, πᾶν πνεῦμα ὃ μὴ ὁμολογᾷ τὸν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα, ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐκ ἔστι). To this is added, in the Epistle to the Magnesians, chap. viii., the *idea of the Logos*, as a new moment, which

has been of notable service to the Church since the middle of the second century in settling its Christology in opposition to the two-fold error of Docetism and Ebionitism. As it is here said of Christ that he is (θεοῦ) λόγος διδως, οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθὼν, ὅς κατὰ πάντα ἐληρέσθησεν τῷ πέμψαντι αὐτόν, we have in these words a complete view of the developed form of the Christology which sought to establish, in the idea of the Logos, both the divinity of Christ, and at the same time the difference between him and God the Father, and his subordination to God; but this stage of the growth of the Church's doctrine is undeniably somewhat different from the earlier simple apotheosis of Christ. The insertion of the words οὐκ ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθὼν moreover points to a Gnostic theory, as will be admitted by every impartial critic; for the interpretation of them in the sense that the Logos did not come forth after an antecedent silence of God, but, on the contrary, is his eternal instrument of revelation, is not admissible according to the laws of the language, for ἀπὸ σιγῆς προελθὼν signifies coming forth from some origin, and not coming forward after some event; besides, the idea itself, according to the views held by the Church, would be false, for it was certainly held that the revelation of God by means of the Logos had a beginning, namely, the creation of the world in time. This passage must therefore refer to the Gnostic theory, which made the Logos proceed from Σιγή, one of the æons.¹

It remains to speak of the *constitution of the Church*, which is so important a question in connection with the Epistles before us. The distinction between bishops and presbyters, which was not yet distinctly set forth in the Pastoral Epistles, although it was aimed at in the first Epistle to Timothy, is now presupposed in these Epistles as an accomplished fact. The bishop is no longer *primus inter pares*, but stands to the presbyters in the

¹ The well-known Valentinian system suggests itself most obviously in connection with the above. But this cannot be the system referred to, because the Judaistic character of the Gnosticism of this Epistle is the feature most strongly opposed. Theories of the same kind, however, seem to have been started elsewhere, e.g. in the pseudo-Simonian system.

same relation as God or Christ, whose place he occupies, does to the Apostles, whose order is perpetuated in the presbyters; cf. Magn. vi., *προκαθήμενον τοῦ ἐπισκόπου εἰς τόπον Θεοῦ, καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἰς τόπον συνεδρίου τῶν ἀποστόλων*: Trall. iii., *πάντες ἐντρύφισθωσαν . . . τὸν ἐπίσκοπον ὡς Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν, τοὺς δὲ πρεσβυτέρους ὡς συνέδριον Θεοῦ, καὶ ὡς σύνδεσμον ἀποστόλων*: Smyrn. viii., *πάντες τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ ἀκολουθεῖτε ὡς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς τῇ πατρὶ, καὶ τῷ πρεσβυτερίῳ ὡς τοῖς ἀποστόλοις*. As in the first Epistle of Clement the priesthood of the Old Testament was used as an analogy for the offices of the Christian community, so the relation of Christ to the Apostles is now employed as an analogy for the relation of the bishop to the presbyters; as the latter stood by the side of the bishop as an advising body, and were therefore called *συνέδριον ἐπισκόπου*, so the Apostles formed the first *πρεσβυτέριον* of the Church; comp. Philad. viii. with v. This certainly is still far removed from the view which the Church took at a later period, according to which the bishops were the successors of the Apostles—a view which promoted the tendency to gather the individual communities into the organic system of one united Church, by considering the individual bishops as co-ordinate with each other, but subordinate to a hierarchical unity. These Epistles, however, do not treat of this subject; it was impossible that they should at that time consider the relation of the individual bishops to each other, and to the collective Church, which was throwing itself into a monarchical form, but the relation of the bishop to the individual community and to its subordinate officers had to be settled.¹ It was not until the primacy

¹ In connection with this, the following passage in Smyrn. viii. is worthy of notice: *ὅπου ἐν εἰσι ὃ ἑπισκοπος, ἐκεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἐστί, ὡς παρ' ἑκόν ἐν ᾧ Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς, ἐκεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία*: the individual community, therefore, has the bishop as its centre of unity and organization, the collective Church has its ideal unity in Christ. It is indeed intelligible that the same tendency to external unity, which took form among the presbyters the bishop as the representative of the union of the community, necessarily strove to go further and escape from the plurality of the bishops, in the direction of a monarchical bent in the Bishop of Rome, in order that it might see the collective Church represented in a real centre, in the same way as the individual community was represented in the individual bishop. But this further consequence is still remote from the standpoint of these Epistles, catholic as are the ideas contained

of the bishop over the presbytery was firmly established, as was actually done in these Epistles, that the foundation was laid on which the further organization of the Church could be reared, by comprehending the individual communities in the universal Church. Regarded from this point of view, these Epistles occupy an intermediate position between the first Epistle of Clement and the age of Irenæus and Tertullian, i. e. between the beginning and the end of the second century.

The dignity of the service of the Church, and the duty of the community to be obedient to its officers in all things, are now most energetically enforced in every way by our Epistles. In Philad. Inscr. it is said of bishops, presbyters, and deacons, that they are appointed (*ἀποδεδογμένοι*) by the will of Jesus Christ, οὕς κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον θέλημα ἐστήριξεν ἐν βεβαιωσίῃ, τῷ ἁγίῳ αὐτοῦ πνεύματι: their election to this office therefore rested upon direct (οὐ δὲ ἀνθρώπων, *ibid.* i.) appointment by an act of Christ's will, and upon endowment with the holy spirit, which confirmed them in the right faith; in which the germ of the doctrine of the *continua successio spiritus sancti* may already be perceived. In accordance with this, the bishop is the shepherd, under whose protection alone the sheep find safety from the wolves, the false teachers (*ibid.* ii). And hence it follows, lastly, that "all who belong to God and Christ also hold the faith with the bishop, and also all those who penitently return to unity with the Church, in order to live in conformity with Jesus Christ (observe that to live a Christian life is made equivalent to living in communion with the Church), will belong to God. But he who follows a schismatic (*σχίστη*), does not inherit the kingdom of God; if any one walks in strange doctrine, he has no part in (Christ's) suffering" (*ibid.* iii). In Trall. iii, after an exhortation to obedience to the deacons and the bishop as to Jesus Christ himself, and to the presbyters as to the apostolic body, it

in them with regard to the monarchical organization of the individual community, yet the unity of the collective Church is still regarded, as in the apostolic age, as an ideal one, namely, Christ.

is said, *χωρὶς τούτων ἐκκλησία οὐ λαλεῖται*. And *ibid.* vii., only he who is not separated from our God Jesus Christ (or the God of Jesus Christ), and from the bishop, and from the ordinances of the Apostles, will remain unaffected by the poison of heresy; only he who is within the altar (i.e. the communion of worship with the Church) is pure; and this is immediately explained further by saying that every one has an impure conscience who does anything without the bishop and the presbytery and the deacon. Thus the position of the conscience towards God is, in true Catholic fashion, made to depend on behaviour to the authorities of the Church. And indeed the influence of these authorities was by no means limited to the immediate domain of the Church, but purely human affairs, such as marriage, are to be submitted to the γνώμη of the bishop; comp. Polyc. v., *πρέπει τοῖς γαμοῦν καὶ ταῖς γαμονιέταις μετὰ γνώμης τοῦ ἐπισκόπου τὴν ζωὴν ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα ὁ γάμος ᾗ κατὰ Θεόν, καὶ μὴ κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν*: thus the marriage is according to the will of God, if it have the consent of the bishop,—so far has the ideal of the hierarchical guardianship of Christian life already advanced! According to Magn. vi., the bishop is to preside in the place of God, the presbyters in the place of the συνέδριον of the Apostles, and the deacons as those who are entrusted with the διακονία of Jesus Christ. "Now," chap. vii. proceeds, "as the Lord does nothing, either by himself or with the Apostles, without the Father, with whom he is one, so also do ye nothing without the bishop and the presbyters. Jesus Christ is *one*; so now everything coalesces, as it were, into *one* temple of God, *one* altar, *one* Christ!" As the representative of the union of the community, the bishop has the exclusive direction of the public worship; in Smyrn. viii. it is said, "No one shall perform anything connected with the Church without the bishop." *Ἐκείνη βυστία εὐχαριστία ἡγιασθω, ἢ ἰπὸ τὸν ἐπίσκοπον οὐσα, ἢ ᾧ ἂν αὐτὸς ἐπιτρέψῃ. Ὅπου ἂν φαιῇ ὁ ἐπίσκοπος, ἐκεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἔστω, ὥσπερ, ὅπου ἂν ᾗ Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς, ἐκεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία. Οὐκ ἔξόν ἐστι χωρὶς τοῦ ἐπισκόπου οὔτε βαπτίζειν οὔτε ἀγάπην ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' ὁ ἂν ἐκείνους, τοκεῖν, τοῦτο καὶ τῷ*

θεῷ ἐνέρεστον, ἵνα ὡς ἡμεῖς ἡ καὶ βίβαιοι πᾶν ὁ πράσσεται. And in chap. ix., Ὁ τιμῶν ἐπίσκοπον ἰτὺ Θεοῦ τιτμήται, ὁ λάθρα ἐπισκόπον τι πράσσωσι τῷ διαβόλῳ λατρεύει.

These passages are enough to show how completely the *Catholic hierarchical principle* is developed in the pseudo-Ignatian Epistles. Unity with the bishop is unity with God and Christ; separation from the bishop is departure from God and Christ, leads to the loss of the kingdom of God, is denying the suffering of Christ—nay, is in short the service of the devil! The Church, with its hierarchical organization, steps in between God and man, determines man's relation to God, passes judgment regarding blessedness and the contrary, and rules over the entire moral life.

And now let us bear in mind that this is the language of the same pseudo-Ignatius, in the same Epistles in which he declares Judaizing to be an old leaven incompatible with Christianity, to be folly and godlessness, and holds up Jesus Christ, and his cross and his death, and faith in these, to the believer in the old covenant, who sought for authority as the only true and inviolable authority by means of which he could expect to obtain justification (Philad. viii). For external purposes, as weapons for the defence of Christian autonomy against Judaism, the purest maxims of Paul are maintained; but internally, for the members of the community, Paul's νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ has become a new law, namely, the hierarchical law of the Church. So far is this, however, from being a concession to Jewish Christianity, or even the consequence of a regulating influence exercised by that party, that, on the contrary, it is in the last decisive struggle with Jewish Christianity, which had now become a sect, that the hierarchical organization of the Church completely developed and established itself within the Pauline communities,—that Church organization, of which, half a century before, only the as yet innocent beginnings and preliminaries were to be seen in the importance attached to the ordering of the Christian community (cf 1 Clement). We may

see here a final and entirely decisive ^{*}confirmation of our whole view of the course of the development of Paulinism into Catholicism; namely, that it proceeded by the organic method of purely inward modification, and not by the mechanical method of external transactions and acts of compromise.

CONCLUSION.

THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES.

HAVING followed in these doctrinal writings the development of Paulinism, its transition and transformation into the faith of the universal (Catholic) Church, let us in conclusion once more turn our attention to the way in which this later Paulinism, reveals its character in the view it took of the original Paulinism, and its position with regard to the primitive Christian community. The "*Acts of the Apostles*" bears testimony to the consciousness of the later Paulinism regarding its own historical past. That this is no purely historical and original account of the primitive apostolic times, and of the doings of the Apostles, is proved—apart from all other evidence—by the purely external circumstance, that it is far too incomplete and fragmentary for such a purpose. It leaves almost wholly out of sight all the other Apostles, and only sets before us the doings of Peter and Paul, the former being the central figure of the first part of the work, and the latter forming the entire subject-matter of the second. But besides this, the history of these two chief Apostles is not represented in the way in which it must necessarily have been, if it were a real historical book. The history of Peter is allowed to drop from the moment when Paul appears upon the stage, although it had up to this point been overloaded with details, part of which can only be regarded as variations and repetitions of the same story. From the account of Paul, on the

other hand, a quantity of very important matter is omitted,—the founding of many communities, dangers and sufferings of every kind, and especially the violent contests of parties within the Church. A cursory glance at these external circumstances is enough to show us, that the Acts of the Apostles is not an original and historical account of the beginning of the Christian Church, of the fortunes of the Apostles and of the earliest communities, but that it has a far more limited aim. It is intended to give a parallel account of the two chief Apostles, Peter and Paul, as the representatives respectively of Jewish and Gentile Christianity, in order to show, by the equal position and cordial agreement of the two party leaders on essential points, that the equal authority and intimate union or compatibility of Jewish and Gentile Christianity within the Church, rests on apostolical foundation and example; consequently, that their incompatibility, as it was not catholic, so neither was it apostolical. As its historical statements mainly serve the purpose of holding up the mirror of the past, as an instructive pattern to the tendency of its own time to union within the Church, the Acts of the Apostles must *so far* certainly be regarded less as a historical work than as a writing with a practical Church tendency. But although it is certain that the selection and arrangement of the materials have been determined by this tendency, this is far from deciding the question whether the materials for the history have themselves been modified to suit this tendency. The fact that the Acts of the Apostles gives an account of the relation of parties in the primitive Church which varies considerably from that which is contained in Paul's Epistles, certainly appears to favour this supposition, and to support the hypothesis that the author of the Acts of the Apostles has intentionally made his Paul like Peter, and his Peter like Paul, in order to efface artificially the opposition that actually existed between the two parties. According to this view, the Acts of the Apostles would be a proposal of peace made by the Pauline party, which was willing to purchase the desired union by very important con-

cessions to Judaism—nay, almost by the denial of the fundamental propositions of Paul.

There are nevertheless some considerations of the greatest importance which are adverse to this view. Two of these rest on general grounds. In the first place, a standpoint of this kind is wholly without example in the history of Paulinism; for although we have had occasion to observe a very important modification of the original doctrines of Paul, yet this has nowhere consisted in giving up the position of the party in favour of a compromise of any kind, but in every phase of that process there has appeared an ever undiminished consciousness of the full right to autonomy possessed by Gentile Christianity, independently of the law; and the toning down of this specific dogmatism of Paul, in the sense of a neutral view held by the Church, never took the form of conscious concession to a foreign standpoint, but was always an inward and unintentional modification of consciousness, which inevitably occurred in Gentile Christian communities which were without the presuppositions of the dogmatic teaching of Paul, and which we might also naturally expect, under the altered circumstances of the time, in the presence of the new dangers and the new requirements of the community. The whole analogy, therefore, of the rest of the history of Paulinism is certainly not for, but against, the view, that the Acts of the Apostles is a work with a tendency such as has been described, which would purchase the recognition and friendship of the Jewish Christians by making concessions to them, and would sacrifice the historical Paul for the sake of this object. It is certainly much more probable that the author, possessed with the consciousness of his own time, in which Paulinism had in fact already become very different from what it was, apprehended in good faith the circumstances of the apostolic times also, and understood and honestly made use of his sources of information regarding it, with the presupposition that the relation of Jewish and heathen Christianity could have been no other in the time of primitive Christianity than it was

in his own,—namely, that of the mutual approximation, agreement, and union of the more sober elements of both sides, in opposition to the extreme views of either party.

And, among other things, this view is favoured also by the general character of the historical writing of our author as directly set forth by himself as his principle in the preface to Luke's Gospel, in which at any rate he has undeniably carried it out. He there affirms that he "had accurately traced all things" (Luke i. 3), by which words he can only indicate the exact and thorough cognizance of all the sources of information accessible to him, whether written or traditional, as well as the careful comparison, testing, and conscientious use of them, for the purpose of accurately ascertaining and setting forth the actual facts that occurred.¹ He certainly does not use his sources of information in a servile manner, but proceeds according to a plan and method of his own, as he intimates in the same place by the words, *καθεξῆς γράψαι* . . . *ἵνα ἐγγενῶς τῇ ἀσφάλειαν*,—considering it necessary to ascertain the exact facts by means of a certain critical sifting and handling of the traditional materials which appeared to him generally trustworthy, especially in order to exhibit the manifold details in their true connection and in chronological order (*καθεξῆς γράψαι*). This two-fold principle of his historical work—the accurate cognizance and consideration of his authorities on the one hand, and, on the other, the independent handling, critical sifting, and free arrangement of his materials, may be actually traced without difficulty in Luke's Gospel. The blending and diverse colouring exhibited both by the language and the dogma of this Gospel, has often suggested the question, How can the alternation of Hebrew and pure Greek, of Ebionitish and Pauline narrations and speeches, be explained, excepting by the use of different sources of information? It is true that the Pauline standpoint of the author unquestionably betrays itself in the preference and accumulation of such narrations as serve to support Paul's doctrine of divine

¹ *G. imm.*, "Über das Prologium des Lukas evangel," *Jahrb. f. d. Th.* xvi. p. 70.

favour and universalism; but this makes it the more significant, indicating the more forcibly the honest endeavour of the historian to give an impartial consideration to his various sources of information (πᾶσιν παρηκολούθηκοι, i. 3), that he has not disdained, on the other hand, to admit passages of the most decided Ebionitish character. Let it suffice here briefly to refer to the form in which he presents the Sermon on the Mount (vi. 20 f.); to the strong Jewish-Christian colouring of the history of Christ's childhood, chaps. i. and ii. (cf. the emphasis laid on the legal righteousness of his parents and those of John, i. 6 and 15; the kingdom of David assigned to Jesus, i. 32 f.; the reference of redemption to the nation of Israel, i. 51 f., 68—74, ii. 10, 34, and similarly xxiv. 21); to the promise made to the twelve Apostles that the kingdom should be assigned to them, and that they should sit on thrones and judge the twelve tribes of Israel (xxii. 28—30); to the Ebionitish point of the narrative in xviii. 18—27, and of the parables in xvi. 1—9 and xix. 31; to the saying in xvi. 17, about the impossibility that the law should pass away. But we may also learn from these very passages of chap. xvi., how the Pauline author contrived to reconcile to his views Ebionitish materials of this kind, which his conscience did not allow him as a historian to leave out. He subjoins to the first parable an explanation which, without prejudice to its value, points its moral, not to the meritoriousness of almsgiving, but to fidelity in small matters; he places the verse which speaks of the imperishability of the law, between two others, according to which the law is only valid until the time of John, when the gospel preaching of the kingdom begins (ver. 16), and the Old Testament law of divorce is abrogated in the kingdom of God, and replaced by another and stricter law (ver. 18). He supplements the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (which probably ended originally at ver. 26) by a conclusion, according to which the damnation of the rich is a retribution not so much for their luxurious living, as for their want of faith in the law and the prophets, and in one who has risen from the dead (i.e. in

the preaching of the Old and New Testament). In like manner, in close connection with the passage in which redemption is referred to Israel, he refers it to all nations, to the Gentiles (ii. 31 f.); to the sending forth of the Twelve he subjoins that of the Seventy (chaps. ix. and x.), and indeed he connects with the latter the speech containing the more detailed instructions, and adds a more lively account of their success (x. 17—29), which evidently relates to the success of the mission to the Gentiles; but he reserves for the Twelve the privilege of sitting in judgment (xxii. 30). No doubt he found the account of the sending forth of the disciples ready to his hand in this two-fold form, and therefore embodied both in his narrative, but he distributes his materials in such a manner as seemed best to accord with his Jewish-Christian views. In the same way, the tradition of the special promise made to Peter, as the chief Apostle, may have existed in two forms—that of Matthew (xvi. 17 f.), and that of Luke (xxii. 32) and John (xxi. 15 f.). The first of these two forms was either entirely unknown to Luke, or if known it probably appeared to him to be a mere variation (doublet) of the other, and so he gave the preference to the latter form, because by means of its reference to the denial of Peter and the necessity of his conversion, it appeared to give to his elevation its just proportions, and to put him on an equality with the other chief Apostle, Paul, who had likewise gone through the stages of sin and conversion.

Now if the author of Luke's Gospel and of the Acts of the Apostles has in the first of these writings unquestionably proceeded according to his principle of making a thorough and impartial use of his different sources of information, but of allowing himself, in the literary working up of the materials before him, the free choice and arrangement and rhetorical explanation of each situation in accordance with his own views in matters of doctrine, we may venture to anticipate that the same course has been pursued in the Acts of the Apostles. Thus we shall, on the one hand, descry in the facts narrated no inven-

tion with a particular bias, but matter taken from oral or written tradition. On the other hand, we must not forget that the choice of matter, its arrangement and *mise en scène* in each particular instance, and especially the speeches which throw light on the situations, are to be placed to the account of the free literary representation by which the author's dogmatic views are enforced, here as well as in his Gospel.

If, with these presuppositions, we proceed at once to the most decisive point, *the account of the convention of the Apostles* in Acts xv., we shall find that they are fully corroborated; for the statements here made, when compared with the authentic statement of the Apostle Paul in Gal. ii., certainly turn out not to be historically correct; but the difference is of such a kind, that we should by no means be justified in presuming that there had been any intentional misrepresentation. It is to be explained partly, so far as the facts are concerned, by wholly unintentional inaccuracies and transposition of details in the tradition which the author had before him; and partly, as regards the speeches, which we must naturally expect to have been freely composed according to the universal custom of ancient writers of history, by the honest presupposition of the author, that the peaceful tendency of the parties within the Church of his own time must have had its antecedent in the time of its apostolic heads.

As regards the facts, the first thing to be observed is, that both the occasion and the result of the conference at Jerusalem are in essential points quite correctly stated in the Acts of the Apostles. As to the occasion, certain persons who were zealous with regard to the law had come from Jerusalem to Antioch, in order to put an end to the "freedom" in Christ which prevailed at that place, and to subject the emancipated community to the yoke of the law. These persons in this mixed community had raised the question of the validity of the law, which had not yet come up for decision as a question of principle; they had thrown those whose opinions were undecided and those who were unstable in character into great perplexity, and endangered the

work to which Paul had devoted his whole life, the establishment of Gentile Christianity freed from the bondage of the law. If this crisis was to be overcome, if this question was to be decided, and the minds that had been unsettled were to be restored to peace, this could only come to pass at the central point of Christianity, by an understanding with the revered original Apostles, the "pillars" of Christendom. So far we have complete agreement between the Acts of the Apostles and Gal. ii. That according to the latter Paul went to Jerusalem in "obedience to a revelation," but according to the former at the request of the community of Antioch, are not contradictory views which mutually exclude each other; for the inward impulse was of course united with external motives, among which the desire of the community would have stood first. But it is too much to say that, according to the Acts of the Apostles, the community of Antioch applied to Jerusalem, as to a superior authority in the Church, for a judicial decision; while according to Gal. ii., Paul negotiated with the original Apostles as an equal with equals; for, on the one hand, Paul must actually have attributed to the decision of the original Apostles a certain influence in the way of arbitration, otherwise he would not have sought an understanding with them; and, on the other hand, the account in the Acts of the Apostles itself conveys an impression, not so much of a process before an ecclesiastical judicature, as of a free negotiation between equals; only this negotiation is certainly represented as of a more formal kind, and therefore approaching more nearly to a council of the Church, than it is according to Gal. ii. But how natural and probable it is that so important a conference should in tradition have assumed the more pompous outlines of a formal and solemn council of the primitive community!—A further point, which has been exaggerated, entirely without grounds, into a difference of great importance, reduces itself to the same category, viz., that according to the Acts of the Apostles the negotiations took place in public

before the assembled community, but according to Gal. ii. consisted only of private conferences with the Apostles who were "pillars." In the first place, this statement is not quite correct, for in Gal. ii. 2, Paul makes a distinction between two public bodies with whom he negotiated: first, *αἰ τοῖς* in general, i. e. the community of Jerusalem; secondly, *κατ' ἰδίαν δὲ τοῖς δοκοῦσι*, the Apostles who were pillars. Gal. ii. 3—5 must refer to the negotiations with the assembled community, because the controversy with the false brethren who demanded the circumcision of Titus can only have been a public one; and thereupon follows in conclusion the private conference with the Apostles who were pillars, in vers. 6—9, at which, moreover, the presence of some of the revered elders is not distinctly excluded by the words used. Now it agrees perfectly well with this that, according to Acts xv. 6 also, the Apostles and elders meet for the first time at the second stage of the conferences, after a debate had previously occurred with the Pharisaical zealots, informally, as is evident, in the presence of the larger public (ver. 5). It is true, however, that in the Acts of the Apostles the result of these negotiations in the narrower circle is represented as a formal conclusion of the community, while it was in fact only a private agreement between Paul and the three Apostles who are called pillars, with which it remains uncertain how far the rest of the community concurred, as their consent was never asked. That this more simple position of the matter was somewhat deranged in the course of tradition, and assumed the more imposing form in which it is presented to us in the Acts of the Apostles, is not at all surprising. Finally, with regard to the result itself, it is in the main quite in accordance with what is related by Paul, and that in two ways—positively, for Paul attains his chief object, the freedom of the Gentile Christians from the law; negatively, for as to other matters everything is left as it was before, the lasting validity of the law remains outside of the negotiation, and is presupposed by the Christians of

Jerusalem as self-evident.¹ This presupposition is in any case indicated in ver. 21, whether we take these words as the ground of the decision that the demands made upon Gentile Christians must not go beyond the measure of the injunctions to proselytes, or of the decision that at least so much must necessarily be required. The injunction that the Gentile Christians should keep themselves from the polluting idol sacrifices, from blood, from things strangled and from fornication, cannot certainly, as is represented in the Acts of the Apostles, have been imposed at that time on the Gentile Christians by an official decree; for this is too decidedly opposed to the express declaration of Paul, that those who possessed authority had laid nothing before him (*ἐπὶ οὐδὲν παραστήσαντο*, ver. 6), and that he held himself under no further obligation than that he should think of the poor (ver. 10). Besides, it is quite inconceivable that Paul should never mention that decision, not even when he himself forbids the Corinthians to partake of sacrifices offered to idols, as being an unchristian connection with the altar of heathen sacrifice, and consequently with devils (1 Cor. x. 14—22). But this erroneous statement of the Acts of the Apostles is certainly not the result of invention prompted by a tendency to particular views, but is simply to be accounted for by the fact that it was the custom of the primitive Church to refer everything, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus creditum est*, whether in faith or morals, to distinct apostolic enactment and ordinance. There can be no doubt² that such abstinences had become a matter of universal custom in Gentile Christian communities long before the time of the author, not only because Paul himself took occasion to enforce similar views (cf. 1 Cor. x. about partaking of idol sacrifices, and 1 Cor. v. about prohibited marriages), but also

¹ This is a case in which, least of all, a statement originating in a tendency to particular view ought to have been attributed to the Acts of the Apostles, for its account entirely accords with the historical situation, as deduced from Gal. ii (compare above, Part II. p. 5), while it could hardly be explained from the author's own views, or those of his time.

² Cf. *Lipsius*, in *Schonke's Bibellex.* sub verb. Apostelkonvent.

because the proselytes of the gate had always been bound to practise it, and these would naturally have formed in most instances the basis of the Gentile Christian part of mixed communities; it is self-evident that the proselytes who had become Christians would have considered themselves bound by those commandments, after their conversion no less than before it, if it were only that they might not break off their intercourse with the Jewish Christians; and then the further inference is also perfectly natural, that the Gentiles who were subsequently converted should have adopted the same customs which they found already existing among the oldest Gentile Christians, namely, those who had been proselytes of the gate. This ancient practice of the Gentile Christian communities, namely, binding themselves by the obligations laid on proselytes, may very probably have been referred by tradition at a later period to apostolical enactment, so that we shall only have to regard its more distinct connection with the convention of the Apostles, as added by the author in the exercise of his literary art; but it is so thoroughly in accordance with his general literary manner to connect facts vaguely handed down by tradition with definite occasions (selected by himself), that there is not the smallest ground for referring it to any particular tendency. Whilst, on the one hand, the explanation we have suggested accounts for everything in a perfectly natural manner, it is difficult to conceive, on the other hand, what object our author could have had in gratuitously inventing this injunction. That it was, as has been conjectured, a conciliatory proposal made by the Pauline party to the Jewish Christians, is impossible, because the followers of Paul could not have offered as a condition of peace a practice which already independently existed; and because, moreover, there were no longer any moderate Jewish Christians to be conciliated who would have been satisfied with this condition.

We have seen, then, that the facts of the convention have in the main been represented with historical truth in the Acts of

the Apostles, and that what is unhistorical in the account must be set down partly to the tradition which the author had before him, partly to the literary garb in which he chose to present it, without however being influenced by a tendency to any particular views. As to the *speeches*, it is true that the case is different. Here we should naturally expect to find no historically true account of what was said, for we must remember that it was the universal custom of ancient writers of history to illustrate actual occurrences by speeches composed by themselves. And how natural it is that in such compositions the historian should either put his own views into the mouth of the speakers, or at least make them speak as they might have spoken in his time, but not as they actually spoke in their own! Thus our author makes Peter express his views about the law in a liberal and Pauline spirit, as he (the author) thought on the subject, and as enlightened Jewish Christians of his time might also very well have thought, but as Peter in his own time could neither have thought nor spoken. That Peter referred to a case of Gentile conversion that had occurred in his own mission work, is indeed quite possible; the occurrence of such individual instances must in any case be assumed, for the account in Acts x. cannot possibly have been a gratuitous invention; but it is, according to the Acts of the Apostles also, an individual case that is described, and an exception to the rule, which did not abrogate the rule itself, according to which the original Apostles confined the sphere of their labours to Israel. This limitation, however, which according to Gal. ii. 9 was at that time laid down as a principle, reposed on a fundamental view of the relation of Christianity to Judaism, and of the permanent validity of the law (cf. above, Part II. p. 5), which is certainly not that of Paul, but rather contradicts the Pauline idea expressed in Acts xv. 9—11. If Peter were in reality so thoroughly convinced, as he there declares himself to be, that the law was only an intolerable yoke, and that in opposition to it the only way of salvation was faith in the favour of Christ, which was applicable equally

to Jews and Gentiles, how could he cling to the difference, which God himself had removed, between Jews and Gentiles, by confining his labours to the former? If he saw in the law an intolerable yoke, how could he maintain its lasting validity for Jewish Christians? How could he, after his momentary departure from this law under the influence of the freer customs that prevailed at Antioch, allow himself to be frightened back into submission to this yoke by the followers of James? How could he stand in need of Paul's explanation of the incompatibility of the law and faith, if he had himself already expressed precisely the same convictions at Jerusalem? We certainly see then that Peter is here made to resemble Paul; this man of undecided, moderate views, who could on occasion accommodate himself to a freer practice, but on the ground of his convictions took his stand with James against Paul, and therefore on the decisive occasion professed the principles of the party of the law, is transferred to the camp of Paulinism. Our author makes James speak more cautiously; he only reminds his hearers of the sayings of the prophets about the conversion of the Gentiles, which in no way went beyond the sphere of Jewish-Christian ideas, according to which converted Gentiles could join the Israelitish community of the Messiah as proselytes, by which neither the specifically Jewish character of the Christian community, nor, above all, the permanent validity of the law within it, were affected. In this difference between the speeches of Peter and James, as well as in the fact that it is the latter who brings forward the commandments enjoined on proselytes, a faint recollection is discernible of the stronger views of James as compared with those of Peter. That Paul and his friends are made in ver. 12 to defend their cause mainly by an appeal to their actual success among the heathen, is also very conformable to the facts, and agrees with Gal. ii. 7—9.

In Gal. ii., to the account of the conference of the Apostles in Jerusalem, is added the sequel of the scene between Paul and Peter in Antioch, in which the difference of principles which

had till then been concealed is for the first time brought into view, and which therefore throws a clearer light on the actual situation of parties in primitive Christian times than the negotiations at Jerusalem (cf. above, Part II. p. 11). The Acts of the Apostles gives us no account of this scene, but relates instead of it only the quarrel between Paul and Barnabas, which arose out of an insignificant occasion (the question whether Mark should be taken with them again on their mission journey), but led to a violent ebullition of feeling (xv. 36—41). It is very natural to see in this account a faint trace of the earnest conflict of which Paul gives an account. We cannot tell how far our author may have had more particular information on this subject; it is quite possible that tradition had already obliterated the recollection of that scene in Gentile Christian circles, softened the violence of the conflict, and lost the memory of its bearing. It will appear the more probable that this was the case when we consider that the chief Apostles, Peter and Paul, are already brought together in agreement in the first Epistle of Clement (chap. v.), and the dissensions between the parties of Paul, Peter, and Apollos in Corinth are represented as less sinful than the later dissensions with the presbyters, because they had all been illustrious Apostles, to whom those parties had attached themselves (chap. xlvii.). This evidently presupposes that, even at that early period, there was no longer any true conception of the real significance of the antagonistic views of the original apostolic parties, at least in Gentile Christian circles, in which case there could have been no full and clear recollection of the most pregnant expression of that antagonism, namely, the personal conflict of the party leaders at Antioch; at all events, its bearing could have been no longer understood. It was far otherwise, indeed, in the more decidedly Jewish-Christian circles, in which Paul could not be forgiven for that scene after the lapse of a century, as the Epistles of Clement show. With reference to this, we certainly cannot refuse to admit the possibility that our author was aware of this conflict, but passed it over in silence, in order

to spare the feelings of the Jewish Christians on this delicate point.

An attempt has further been made to treat the repeated instances in which, according to the Acts of the Apostles, Paul accommodates himself to the laws and customs of the Jews, as inventions which betray a certain tendency. But it ought first to be proved that these instances cannot be historically true. If the refusal to yield to the unreasonable demand that Titus should be circumcised (Gal. ii. 3) is relied on, in order to show that the account of the circumcision of Timothy in the Acts of the Apostles (xvi. 3) is unhistorical, two points of difference between these cases are overlooked—Titus was a pure Gentile Christian; Timothy, as the son of a Jewish mother, was half Jewish by birth; and, which is still more significant, in the case of Titus the object was to give a decisive example of the principle that Gentile Christians were free from the law: in this critical situation, to yield was equivalent to denying the principle; but in the case of Timothy, not only was there an absence of any reason of that kind for firmly carrying out the antinomian principle, but to do so would rather have been contrary to the object in view, because the offence that the Jews would have taken at an uncircumcised half-Jewish assistant to the Apostle would have been a constant hindrance in his missionary labours. No reasonable person ought to deny that in general such external grounds of expediency, in matters which are *in themselves indifferent*—and circumcision was so regarded by Paul, according to 1 Cor. vii. 19; Gal. vi. 15—may determine our action; and the Apostle himself, in particular, has given such decisive evidence (1 Cor. ix. 19 f.) that such considerations of pastoral wisdom exerted a determining influence on him, and disposed him, though antinomian in principle, to a practical accommodation to the adherents of the law, that there is no room left for doubt on the subject. How far, however, such accommodation would and ought to go, is a question which cannot possibly be answered *a priori*, because in such questions of moral taste each decision

must be purely subjective. If it be said that Paul could not have gone to the feasts at Jerusalem, because he himself had reprimanded the Galatians (iv. 10) with falling back into bondage in keeping such (holy) days, we must also remember that he himself, in Rom. xiv. 6, allows days to be kept, provided it be done "unto the Lord," i. e. in harmony with the Christian conscience. And it is as easy, on the one hand, to think of practical reasons which would make it expedient that the Apostle should be present in Jerusalem at the times of the great gatherings there, as it would be surprising, on the other hand, if these journeys to attend the feast were invented in the Acts of the Apostles for a special purpose, and yet neither emphasized nor made use of, but only so cursorily and casually mentioned as they are in xviii. 22. The journey in xi. 30 may have a wrong date assigned to it, but this is very far from justifying the accusation that it was invented with a special object. When, again, in the Acts of the Apostles, Paul is made to visit first of all the Jewish synagogue in his missionary journeys, and only to betake himself afterwards to the Gentiles, this is no less agreeable to the nature of the circumstances than it is in harmony with the express declaration of the Apostle, that the gospel was ordained 'Ιουδαίῳ τε πρῶτον καὶ Ἕλλησι, and that salvation had come to the Gentiles from the fall of the Jews. The account of the proceedings before and after the Apostle was taken prisoner at Jerusalem has given the greatest offence of all, because, if historically true, it would throw a shadow on the character of Paul; but we must again reflect, first of all, on the subjectivity of judgments of this kind which depend on moral taste. Does it not daily happen, that in the same course of action one man sees impurity and weakness, whilst another considers it permissible—nay, a proof of wisdom sanctioned by duty, or of amiable consideration? An objective judgment possessed of scientific weight cannot be based on merely individual views of this kind; this consideration might at least induce scientific critics to display somewhat more of caution and εὐσχημία. We must then consider that the precise group-

ing of events, and the causes with which they are connected by means of the speeches of the persons who took part in them, may be the literary work of the author, but that the facts themselves which he relates may nevertheless very well be historically true. Why Paul should not make use of a ceremony which was in his eyes a matter of indifference, without either meaning or value, in order to quiet the heated minds of a fanatical multitude which were not to be reached by any appeal to reason, it is not very easy to see. Besides, there are many reasons to conclude that it was of very great importance to him at that time to keep on good terms with the community at Jerusalem (cf. his zeal about the contribution for the poor, his anxiety for the friendly reception of it at Jerusalem, Rom. xv 30 f., the conciliatory tone of the Epistle to the Romans towards the Jewish Christians throughout, and particularly the friendly way in which the primitive community is mentioned, *ibid.* ver. 27). Whether this act of condescension on the part of the Apostle, the actual occurrence of which appears to be quite credible, had so direct a reference to the accusation in ver. 21, that he taught apostacy from the law, and was intended for a practical refutation of it, as is represented in the Acts of the Apostles, must ever remain doubtful; yet, even in this case, Paul may well be defended against the too severe accusation of falsehood; for, antinomian as he was in principle, yet he was not in practice a fanatical assailant of the law, as his opponents falsely asserted him to be; but, on the contrary, he both showed and felt indulgence to weak consciences that were held in bondage to legality (Rom. xiv.; cf. above, Part II. p. 44). Lastly, as to the speech which the Apostle made in his defence, we certainly cannot, on the grounds that have been above discussed, expect that it should be historically accurate; some things which the author here makes Paul say could not well have been so said by him; and besides, these speeches have been unmistakably composed according to a consistent plan. But we must not seek even in them a conciliatory tendency, which would have made Paul a

Judaizer in order to gain over the Judaizers. But when Paul expresses himself as if his present and his former faith, before he became a Christian, were not essentially different, we must remember that the second Epistle to Timothy, a thoroughly Pauline Epistle, to which no conciliatory tendency can be ascribed, contains precisely the same language regarding the faith both of Paul and Timothy (i. 3—5; cf. above, Part II. p. 215); and this indeed accords with the view of the universal Church respecting the essential identity of the Old and New Testament faith (cf. also Heb. xi.). In conclusion, it is to be observed that it is precisely in those portions that have been called in question, namely the scenes which occurred in Jerusalem, that the Acts of the Apostles makes a decided impression of its historical truthfulness by its epic liveliness and vividness of narration; and how can the hypothesis of its "tendency" be reconciled with the open way in which the hatred of the Jewish Christians to Paul is spoken of, and in which their most bitter reproaches are so bluntly expressed (xxi. 21)? And its silence regarding any help and support which the hardly-pressed Apostle of the Gentiles may have found on the part of the Apostles to the Jews, completely as it is in accord with the truly Pauline account in 2 Tim. iv. 16 (written from Caesarea shortly after the occurrence), is no less inconsistent with this supposed tendency. In fact, we can only wonder here, as in many parts of Luke's Gospel, at the *ingenuousness* with which the author, far from pursuing a purpose according to a plan which he has cleverly devised and carried out, has, on the contrary, taken up, from the sources of information before him, matter that by no means accorded with his presuppositions, by which in other passages he still abides

The mode in which the doctrine of Paul presented itself from the point of view of the later Paulinism of the Church, is to be collected from the doctrinal speeches of Paul in the Acts of the Apostles. It is incontestable that these speeches no longer contain the genuine doctrine of Paul, but only a very poor remnant

of it. But in this respect they only share the peculiar character of the rest of the later Pauline literature, especially of the Epistles of Barnabas, Clement, 1 Peter, and the Pastoral Epistles, and therefore fall under the same category—they are neither original historical accounts, nor inventions in support of a tendency, but true expressions of a later phase of the development of Paulinism in the Church. Three specially important missionary speeches of Paul are contained in the Acts of the Apostles; first, the speech at Antioch, xiii. 16—41, as an example of his speaking before Jews; secondly, that at Athens, xvii. 22—31, as an example of his speaking before Gentiles; and thirdly, that at Miletus, xx. 17—35, as an example of his speaking before Christians.

The first of these speeches, like that of Stephen, begins with a historical reminiscence of the Divine choice and guidance of the people of Israel until the reign of David, from which the transition is at once made to Jesus the Messianic son of David, in order to declare him beforehand to be the central object of all the Old Testament history and promise, and to make the evangelical preaching of him the fulfilment of this promise which was given to Israel (xiii. 16—26). Then follows the substance of the preaching of salvation (*λόγος τῆς σωτηρίας*), consisting of a brief statement of the two chief facts, the death and resurrection of Christ (vers. 27—37), and their religious consequences—the offer of forgiveness of sins and justification through faith (ver. 38 f.), concluding with a warning against unbelief (ver. 40 f.). That the death and resurrection of Christ and justification by faith should be held up, as they are here, as the substance of evangelical preaching, is quite Pauline if taken by itself; but it is too evident that the more precise sense in which Paul regarded the saving death of Christ and justification, as well as the connection between them, is not to be found here. The death of Christ is the fulfilment of the Old Testament prophecies, brought about by human ignorance, and therefore assumes

so restless and active a nature, than the plaintive, melancholy tone of that farewell address. Besides, the speech itself does not accord very well with the actual situation of affairs. It consists mainly of the Apostle's self-defence with respect to his having preached the truth and having been unselfish in his official labours, for which there could hardly have been occasion in addressing a community which had for years had the opportunity of becoming acquainted with him. The hortatory part passes over the present circumstances of the Ephesian community in absolute silence, and occupies itself instead with the future dangers which threaten the Church in general from ravening wolves, who should arise from amongst themselves; the presbyters being appointed by the holy spirit as overseers and shepherds of the community (of God?), which he has won by his own blood, are to guard their flock from the false doctrine of these wolves, which could only tend to mislead and divide them into sects (vers. 28—31). These false teachers, who were to rise from among the community after the Apostle's death and form a schismatic party, can be no other than those against whom the Pastoral Letters make Paul repeatedly utter the most strenuous warnings, by precisely similar *vaticinia post eventum*—the Gnostic heretics; whereas the real Apostle Paul says not a single syllable about such future false teachers in his genuine Epistles, but has always enough to do with his Judaizing opponents of the present. This passage then proves more clearly than any other that this speech was composed from the standpoint of the post-apostolic period, and in fact near the beginning of the second century (like the second Epistle to Timothy). We are reminded again of the Pastoral Letters by the way in which the presbyters are enjoined to guard the community from false teachers. The intimation that they were appointed as overseers by the holy spirit (ver. 28), betokens, on the one hand, an already increasing exaltation of the priestly office (compare with this 1 Cor xvi. 15 f., and above, Part I. p. 234); but, on the other hand, the fact that no difference is made between presby-

ters and *ἐπίσκοποι*, indicates an early stage of the development of the organization in the Church, and therefore exactly the same standpoint as that of the two older Pastoral Epistles. Moreover, certain expressions in the speech before us remind us of the Epistle to Titus—ver. 30, *λαλοῦντες διωστραμμένα*,—cf. Tit. i. 14, *ἀποστρεφόμενων τὴν ἀλήθειαν*, and iii. 11, *ἐξέστραπται ὁ τοιοῦτος*: ver. 28, *ἐκκλησίαν ἣν περιποιήσατο διὰ τοῦ ἰδίου αἵματος*,—cf. Tit. ii. 14, *ὃς ἔδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἵνα . . . καθάρσῃ ἑαυτῷ λαὸν περιούσιον*: ver. 21, *μετάνοια εἰς τὸν θεόν* (of conversion to Christianity),—cf. Tit. iii. 8, *οἱ πεπιστευκότες τῷ θεῷ* ("who have become Christians"); and the emphasis laid on the Apostle's unselfishness in his missionary labours reminds us of the injunction in Tit. i. 7, that the bishop should be *μὴ αἰσχροκερδής*, and again of what is said of the false teachers in ver. 11, *διδάσκοντες δὲ μὴ δεῖ, αἰσχροῦ κέρδους χάριν*.

The Acts of the Apostles concludes the account of the labours of Paul with a speech before the synagogue at Rome, which ends with a solemn declaration that the judgment of hardness of heart already foretold by the prophets was being fulfilled upon the Jews, but that the salvation of God was sent to the Gentiles, and that they would also listen to it (xxviii. 28). These two things, the bestowal of Christianity on the Gentiles and the rejection of Israel, form the substance of the Paulinism of the Acts of the Apostles. But neither is this *universalism* the same that was originally taught by Paul, nor is this *anti-Judaism* in any degree Pauline. The former is not grounded, like the universalism of Paul, on the central dogma of the abrogation of the law by the death of Christ (we only find in one instance, and that in the mouth of Peter, xv. 10, a kindred thought regarding the intolerable nature of the law, which may be regarded merely as a popular generalization of that Pauline doctrine); instead of this, the cause assigned for it is the unbelief of the Jews and the special divine revelations which prescribed the sphere of Paul's labours. Now it is certainly not intended, in assigning these external matters of fact as causes, to assert that the conversion

of the Gentiles was a merely contingent event which might possibly not have taken place at all; on the contrary, it is shown to have been predetermined from the beginning by the parting command of Jesus to teach all nations; and the author of the Acts of the Apostles, with his predestinarian views (cf. xiii. 48), must also have regarded the actual course of the conversion of the world to Christianity as willed by God from the very beginning. But he mistook the specifically Pauline ground of universalism, because the specifically Pauline dogmatic teaching was itself unknown to him, especially on its polemic and antinomian side. But this was not by any means the consequence of an accommodation of Paulinism to Judaistic notions regarding the law, nor was it an intentional concession to Jewish-Christian pretensions, but it depended rather upon the fact that the dogmatic conception, as well as the practical interest of the question of the law, had disappeared from the later Paulinism, in proportion as Gentile Christianity felt itself more and more secure in its independent rights. In the place of the dogmatic antinomianism of Paul, however, we now find in the Acts of the Apostles a national anti-Judaism which was entirely alien to Paul himself. While Paul saw in the hardening of the hearts of his nation Israel only a temporary degradation of them to a position below that of the Gentiles, but not a definitive rejection of them (Rom. xi.), this hope of the future conversion of Israel possessed but little immediate interest for those who were born Gentile Christians, because there was no national sympathy to support it, and whatever interest it might still retain would gradually have diminished with the actual course of events until it received its death-blow by the destruction of Jerusalem. For this reason we find, almost throughout the literature of the later Paulinism (cf. the Epistle of Barnabas, 1 Peter, the pseudo-Ignatian Epistles, and above all John's Gospel), the same judgment as in the Acts of the Apostles as to the rejection of the Jews. The consciousness of the unconditional autonomy of Christianity, this most essential fruit of the struggles of the

Apostle Paul, to whose mind it presented itself as a consequence of the dogmatic antithesis of the law and the gospel, clothed itself for the later Gentile Christianity in the popular but superficial form of national anti-Judaism, which however did not prevent a considerable portion of dogmatic Judaism from creeping into Catholic Christianity, under the guise of the "new law."¹

¹ Compare with the above, and with the whole of the concluding portion of this work—of the critic, *Oesterle*, Uebersetzung von De Wette's Erklärung der Apostelgeschichte (especially the Introduction); also *Heur*, Paulus; *Schwegler*, Nach-Apostol. Zeitalter; *Zeller*, Apostelgeschichte—of the apologists, *Meyer*, Comm.; *Lechler*, Ap. u. Nachapost. Zeitalter; *Thiersch*, Apostol. Zeitalter, *Lechbusch*, Ueber Kompos. u. Entstehung der Apostelgesch.—of those who take a middle course, *Ritschl*, *Reuss*, *Holtzmann* (in Schenkel's Bibellex.).

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